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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of a study of English and US corporate finance law and, in 
particular, the law in relation to hybrid financial instruments. I consider hybrids any 
financial instrument that presents a mix of equity and debt characteristics. Therefore 
this thesis excludes from examination all the derivative instruments, while it focuses 
on two main types of hybrid security, in relation to their relevance to the situation 
studied: preference shares and convertible bonds.  
 
Despite a clear distinction in law between equity and debt, the development of 
sophisticated hybrid financial instruments has forced regulators to look beyond the 
legal form of an instrument to its practical substance. As observable in practice, the 
increase in financial innovation reflects the necessity of the parties to allocate control 
and cash-flow rights in a way that diverges from the classic allocation resulting from 
equity and debt. Most of the empirical and theoretical research in this area has 
focused on the tax advantages of issuing hybrids as a way of reducing the cost of 
capital or on their capacity to be subordinated to all the creditors and to be unable to 
trigger the liquidation of the firm in case of default on its payouts. However, very 
little contribution has been made to the analysis of these securities with regard to 
their implications for corporate governance.  
 
This thesis aims to discuss the rationale for issuing hybrids, and to evaluate the law 
relative to these instruments against the background of both agency costs and 
property rights theories. The functional approach unveils an important rationale for 
issuing hybrids. The UK and US have legal systems characterised by transactional 
flexibility. They rely heavily on ex post standards strategies to protect preference 
shareholders and on the judiciary to evaluate the fairness of a transaction. This 
flexibility places the UK and US legal systems among the most business-friendly 
countries. The vacuum left by mandatory company law in favour of a major 
flexibility in the market has pushed the parties to fill it contracting for their rights. In 
so doing they have facilitated the business relations and better protected themselves 
with careful drafting. 
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This thesis consists of a study of English and US corporate finance law and, in 
particular, the law in relation to hybrid financial instruments. Generally, all research 
or work on corporate finance law begins by underlining a basic distinction regarding 
how capital is raised. This concerns the two different channels of investment in a 
company: “equity” and “debt”. Equity represents the totality of the claims 
characterised by governance entitlements, while debt is regarded as the part of the 
capital structure that benefits from financial entitlements. Given that equity is the last 
of bankruptcy priorities, it is often defined as risky capital compared to debt, which 
is distinguished by its contractually specified financial claims. In particular, I refer to 
ordinary shares as the equity stock held by the members of the company because this 
is the classic class of shares clearly distinguished from debentures both in law and 
fact. The rights of an ordinary share are considered to be essentially residual, and a 
shareholder only expects to benefit from the surplus, both for any given period and 
as accumulated over a period, i.e. retained earning. For this reason, ordinary 
shareholders are also called the “residual claimants” in the corporation and usually 
hold all or most of the voting power, the right to contribute to the organisation of the 
company’s business and the right to control its affairs, appointing and removing its 
directors, through attendance at meetings or voting. Conversely, the full rights of a 
debt-holder contrast well with the expectations of a shareholder. I refer to “bond” as 
a debt security held by a creditor of a company. This contract is the legal relationship 
between a company and its bondholder, based on a pecuniary cause, where the 
investor loans a certain amount of money to the company and the latter engages itself 
in repaying this amount by a certain date or on a fixed date with corresponding 
periodical interest. The bondholder is in law not a member of the company with 
rights in it, but a creditor with rights against it. This can result, if the company 
defaults, in the bondholder petitioning the Court on behalf of its rights and asking for 
the repayment of its credit.1 
                                                
1 See Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th 
ed. 2008) 1148-1150; Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 649; 
Ferran E., Principles of corporate finance law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 49-54 and 313; 
Pennington R., Pennington’s Company Law (London, Butterworth, 2001) 234-235. 
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Despite a clear distinction in law between equity and debt, this has become 
increasingly blurred over the years, and sorting reality into clear-cut categories has 
become extremely difficult. Some of the financial instruments issued by companies, 
so-called “hybrid” instruments, fall into a grey area between debt and equity, forcing 
regulators to look beyond the legal form of an instrument to its practical substance. 
In the context of this thesis, I adopt a broad definition of the financial category 
“hybrid financial instruments”. In particular, I consider hybrid (or of hybrid nature) 
any financial instrument that presents a mix of equity and debt characteristics.  
Therefore, this thesis excludes from examination all the derivative instruments 
that are debt whose value is derived from the performance of assets, interest rates, 
currency exchange rates or other external indexes, but not from the issuer’s own 
shares. Instead, there are two main types of hybrid security that will recur in my 
analysis, in relation to their relevance to the situation studied: preference shares and 
convertible bonds. Although a third type of hybrid is included in this definition, the 
thesis does not devote as much attention to it as the others due limitations of space. 
This is the debenture-holding covenant or veto rights. While it is common practice to 
consider preference shares and convertible bonds as hybrid, it is less intuitive to 
include bonds with covenants or veto rights in this group, especially considering that 
in the British experience these covenants or appraisal rights are not commonly used, 
and the few that are have become standard clauses in commercial contracts. 
However, these securities, which are financial obligations – being generally deeply 
subordinated debt – retain a power of control, typical of controlling shareholders, 
that limits the directors’ discretion in the management of the company through the 
use of positive and negative covenants. 
The thesis compares the UK law dealing with hybrid instruments with the 
corresponding law of the US in particular the laws of New York and Delaware, 
which are the most relevant jurisdictions in relation to company law. The 
comparative analysis with the US experience on this matter is extremely important to 
fully understand the origins and the growth of these securities over the years since 
they have a similar history of development. Comparing the US and UK approaches 
shows how different legal standards are often used in these two legal systems to 
reach the same results. Furthermore, although the legal jurisdiction of relevance is 
the UK and the issues are discussed in a UK context, many of the general principles 
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discussed in the thesis apply to all common law jurisdictions. Therefore in relation to 
hybrid instruments, the US market is too important to be disregarded.  
The aim of the thesis is twofold. First, it intends to unveil the costs and benefits 
of issuing hybrids and the function of hybrid instruments such as preference shares 
or convertible bonds in the modern company. For this reason, the thesis combines 
the analysis of corporate theories with a legal assessment of these instruments. Most 
of the research conducted on hybrid instruments has taken its first steps from the 
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) theorem, focusing on the profile of optimal leverage, 
namely the optimal ratio of debt to equity capital. Economic theory shows very little 
justification for a strict equity/debt distinction and it became quite clear to me that 
the law – by applying this distinction – creates a strong incentive for regulatory 
capital arbitrage. Finance theory explains this phenomenon mainly by pointing 
towards the differing tax and regulatory treatment of debt and equity as well as 
information asymmetries between the creditors, shareholders and managers. The 
differences in tax, accounting and regulatory treatment give rise to distortions and 
this can be costly for the society. Rather than focussing on the “real advantages” a 
certain capital structure offers, companies mainly try to optimise their capital 
structure with a view to these two areas. Much of the increase in the use of hybrids 
throughout the past two decades can be explained by tax and regulatory factors. 
Therefore, most of the empirical and theoretical research in this area has focused on 
the tax advantages of issuing hybrids as a way of reducing the cost of capital from a 
company’s point of view, or on their capacity to be subordinated to all the creditors 
and to be unable to trigger the liquidation of the firm in case of default on its 
payouts. However, very little contribution has been made to the analysis of these 
securities with regard to their implications for corporate governance. A large part of 
this thesis is dedicated to this original approach. 
In particular, I propose a functional approach for understanding hybrid 
financial instruments. Currently, our approach is based on the traditional 
understanding of debt and equity as fundamentally different, opposing methods for 
financing a corporation’s business. Starting from there, tax and accounting regulation 
try to define every hybrid financial instrument as merely a mix of the two opposing 
ends of the “capital spectrum” – pure debt or pure equity. I argue that this simplified 
view of hybrid financial instruments fails to properly grasp the complexity of 
modern corporate finance. In my view, more emphasis should be put on the agency 
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relations and the property law claims embedded in such “unconventional” financial 
instruments.  
Economic theories on the nature of the firm have generally explored two areas 
that are essential to reduce managerial opportunism and the related conflicts of 
interest. These are the ex ante incentives alignment and the contractual design to 
avoid ex post hold-up problems. Agency costs and property rights theories are 
targeted at preparing the right incentives for concentrating the relevant bargaining 
action at the ex ante contracting stage. While property rights theory emphasises the 
importance of ownership when it comes to allocating control powers and residual 
claims, the literature on agency deals with the principal-agent relationships and 
discusses how to align managers’ and shareholders’ incentives in order to maximise 
the company’s wealth. Transaction cost economics maintains that bargaining is 
pervasive during a business life. In addition, companies deal with uncertainty and 
risk in their businesses. Thus, governance mechanisms for ex post regulation or 
measurement are needed to avoid expensive disputes and hold-up problems during 
the life of the firm. These problems are a direct consequence of contracts being 
incomplete by nature. However, a more flexible contract going beyond pure equity 
or debt can effectively work as a very efficient compensation contract, aligning the 
ex ante incentives of managers and investors and thus, reducing the agency costs. 
Moreover, the special features of hybrid contracts allow a perfect economic 
integration between the investors in the firm. This thesis aims to discuss the rationale 
for issuing hybrids, and to evaluate the law relative to these instruments against the 
background of both agency costs and property rights theories.  
A functional approach also means putting more emphasis on the corporate 
governance implications of hybrid financial instruments. While some scholars 
question the case for mandatory company law, as a matter of fact there are no 
jurisdictions leaving all questions of corporate law and governance to the 
incorporators’ freedom. Assuming that there is a case for mandatory corporate law, 
we also need to ask whether holders of financial instruments who are not 
shareholders in the traditional sense, but whose contribution fulfil much of the same 
function as traditional equity financing, should also be offered the same level of 
(mandatory) protection we deem necessary for the typical member of a company. 
Therefore the second aim of this research is to evaluate the legal standards and 
strategies available for the protection of different categories of hybrid-holders 
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repaying this amount from a corporate governance perspective. Hybrid financial 
instruments as preference shares and convertible bonds are primarily an instrument 
of corporate finance and, as such, ought to offer shareholders the certainty of 
entitlements and protection of their rights while at the same time satisfying business 
needs as a security with specific functions and usefulness in modern corporate 
capital structures. As emerges from the historical analysis of these financial 
contracts, the status of preference shares has often given rise to a number of grounds 
for dissatisfaction. Historically, companies in need of finance have often raised funds 
in the form of preference shares, promising investors a higher return and priority for 
capital repayment at liquidation to compensate for their lack of voting rights. 
However, once these companies became profitable again, they often excluded 
preference shareholders from sharing in the profits beyond a certain fixed percentage 
stipulated in the terms of the contract. Preference shareholders support a risk similar 
to ordinary shareholders when they contribute funds in a time of financial difficulty 
for a company because they are, like ordinary shareholders, subordinate to all the 
creditors in liquidation. However, they do not enjoy the same rewards if the 
company is successful. It seems therefore that preference shares have become more 
similar in nature to debentures than to shares, without having the same advantages. 
The assessment of the value of these shares, compared to ordinary bonds, while the 
company is a going concern, is difficult because it must take into account the 
contingency of whether or not the ordinary shareholders will act to appropriate the 
company’s profits for themselves before a winding-up. With regard to the nature of 
the preference share, it is arguable that many of its inconsistencies could be 
eliminated if it were fully equated, with respect to capital entitlements, with 
debenture or other fixed-income securities. However, the essential nature of the 
preference share has never been clarified by the courts or in law, apart from their 
rights, which are stated to be contractual in nature. This poses the main problem for 
hybrid instruments. 
This thesis aims to identify and assess the interrelationship between legal and 
contracting solutions to governance and finance problems through the use of hybrid 
instruments such as preference shares and convertibles in several critical situations. 
It is often debatable how far their protection is a matter of contract and how far it is a 
mandatory matter of company law. Although nowadays the UK courts seem to have 
reached some definitive canons of construction, some recent US cases take a 
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different direction, opening up again the discussion of directors’ fiduciary duties 
towards shareholders as a whole, including preferred shareholders. The analysis 
shows that a lot of scope is left to the parties involved to bargain for their financial 
rights and rights of voice. Mandatory rules for public companies, which are few, are 
generally optional for private companies. This provides the investors with a strong 
incentive to contract for their rights.   
In Chapter 1, I initially define the hybrid instruments under examination, 
giving the reader an understanding of the peculiarities of these securities and of their 
evolution over the years. Chapter 2 discusses the economic and legal rationale for 
distinguishing between various claimants in the firm. The law is dedicated to a 
classification approach. In particular, this chapter examines some regulatory issues in 
relation to hybrids following classic legal analysis, which includes the legal 
classification of these securities according to different legal disciplines. The study 
highlights the limits and the inconsistencies of this approach and provides the basis 
for a new taxonomy: a functional approach. This approach is applied in the 
remaining chapters of the thesis. Chapter 3 concludes Part I by setting out the 
theoretical framework with a reassessment of the main theories of corporate finance 
and governance. In Part II, the hybrid instruments as referred above are observed in 
several critical situations depending on their relevancy to the situation. Therefore the 
governance regulation of hybrid instruments is analysed in significant corporate 
decisions such as firm’s constitution, variation of class rights, assets disposal and 
distribution of dividends (Chapter 5), in corporate financing decisions under 
uncertainty when the risks of opportunism of the parties is very high (Chapter 6) and 
in corporate control transactions (Chapter 7). Statutory law, legal standards and 
strategies for protection are discussed, compared and evaluated. Chapter 8 concludes 
with some considerations. 
The legal distinction between equity and debt can be meaningless and the 
results of that categorisation misleading. As observable in practice, the increase in 
financial innovation reflects the necessity of the parties to allocate control and cash-
flow rights in a way that diverges from the classic allocation resulting from equity 
and debt. Companies and capital structures evolve continuously in conditions of 
uncertainty and the incentives of the parties may diverge during the years. Thus, the 
parties may disagree on something they agreed on before. In such situations, the law 
is intended to protect the weak party from any possible abuse, while at the same time 
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facilitating the business in the best interest of the firm. The functional approach 
unveils an important rationale for issuing hybrids. Both the US and UK have legal 
systems characterised by transactional flexibility that places these two countries 
among the most business-friendly legal systems. Both the US and UK legal systems 
rely on ex post standards strategies to protect preference shareholders and on the 
judiciary to evaluate the fairness of a transaction. The choice of the regulator not to 
burden the market with excessive mandatory company law has left a lot of scope and 
given a strong incentive to the parties to contract for their rights. This has favoured 
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PART I – REGULATORY ISSUES OF HYBRID 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: THE CLASSIFICATION 
APPROACH 
Chapter 1. A Historical Perspective  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe these hybrid financial instruments and to 
examine their origins in order to inform later analysis of the character of those 
securities. In particular, the examination focuses on the evolution of these 
instruments showing how certain forms of contract, as preference shares, have 
moved away from standard equity peculiarities and certain others, as subordinated 
irredeemable debentures, convertible bonds and bonds with covenants, have moved 
away from standard debt characteristics. Moreover, it assesses the financial issues 
that such hybrid contracts raise and how the law and the courts have coped with their 
use since their first appearance in the history of corporate law. 
  
 
1.1. The birth and evolution of preference shares in the British legal system   
Atypical security issues, which were different from ordinary shares, can be found in 
the records of British companies as long ago as the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries2. In 1702, the stock of the East India Company was divided into two 
                                                
2 Since they appeared as an alternative to equity and evolved over the years such that preference 
shareholders’ rights became “somewhat more approximated to the role … of debenture-holders” as 
Lord Evershed MR stated in 1949, Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply Co. [1950] Ch. 161 at 175. See 
also Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 22-
28 and 357-368; Pennington R., Partnerships and Company Law (London, Butterworth, 1962) 97-
103; Farrar J.H., Farrar’s Company Law (London: Butterworths, 1988) 226-235 at Ch. 18; Michie 
R.C., The London Stock Exchange: a history (OUP 1999) 31 ff.; Burgess R., Corporate Finance Law 
(London, 1992) 319-323; Stiebel A., Company law and precedents (London, 1929) 62-71; Scott W. 
R., The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-stock Companies to 1720, I, 
(Cambridge, 1912) 364-365; Stiles C.R., Alphabet of Investment, Fin. Rev. of Rev., May 1918, 24-26. 
In this treatise, the author refers to the bonds issued in , see also Dewing A. S., The Financial Policy 
of Corporations (New York: Ronald Press Co. 3rd ed., 1921) 113–136; Idem, A Study of Corporation 
Securities: Their Nature and Uses in Finance (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1934) 134, n. (b); Idem, 
Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1914) Ch. 2 at 19; Berle 
A., Case and Materials on Corporation Finance (St. Paul, 1930) 438, 441, 459; Burtchett F.F., 
Corporation Finance (New York, 1934) 79 ff.; Cook W.,  A Treatise on the Law of the Corporations 
having a Capital Stock (New York, 1923) I, 884-935; Masson R.L., New Shares for Old (Boston, 
1958) 22-46; Evans G.H., Early Industrial Preferred Stocks in the United States, 40 J. Pol. Econ., 
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classes, one of which, since it was entitled to a dividend of eight per cent to be paid 
by the government, can be considered analogous to preference shares.3 Among an 
increasing number of British companies in the later eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth centuries, there was also a rise in the number of companies issuing 
securities which are best described as preference shares.4 Although these companies 
were the first to use these privileged securities in Great Britain, it was with the 
railroad corporations that this new instrument of finance developed and became 
popular.5  
The financial distress of the early transportation companies was one of the 
main reasons for the growth of the preference shares. The projects carried on by 
these companies were almost habitually started without an adequate understanding of 
the engineering difficulties to be overcome and in many cases, the initial capital was 
exhausted before the work was completed. Proprietors often faced with the prospects 
of a bankruptcy with the consequent loss of their enterprise, or the choice to entice 
new funds into their business in the hope that the project could eventually be made to 
pay a reasonable return. At that time, many barriers created difficulties for a 
company intending to raise money. First of all, the small size of markets and 
limitations on the circulation of a currency (along with related risks) meant that the 
resources required for each project had to be obtained mainly in the region in which 
                                                                                                                                     
1932, 227-243; Schultz W.J. and M.R. Caine, Financial Development of the United States (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, 1937) 52-56 and 96-103; Baskin J.B. and P.J. Miranti, Jr., A History of 
Corporate Finance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 152; Lawson J.D., ‘Preferred 
Stock’, The American Law Register, New Series, XX, 1881, 633-649; Buxbaum R.M., ‘Preferred 
Stock—Law and Draftsmanship’, 42 Cal. L. Rev., 1954, 243; Stevens W.H., ‘Stockholders’ Voting 
Rights and the Centralisation of Voting Control’, 40(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1926, 
357, 367 ff. 
3 Scott W. R., The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-stock Companies to 
1720, I, (Cambridge, 1912) 186. 
4 For example, this is the case of Aberdeenshire Canal in 1801, the Commercial Docks Company in 
1811 and again in 1817, the Edinburgh Joint Stock Water Company in 1819, the Gloucester and 
Berkeley Canal Company in 1822, the Southwark Bridge Company in 1823 and 1824, the Edinburgh 
and Glasgow Union Canal and the Leominster Canal companies in 1826 and the Portsmouth and 
Arundel Canal and the Thames Tunnel companies in 1828. For more details of these cnal companies 
in 1826 and the Portsmouth and Arundel Canal and the Thames Tunnel companies in 1828. For more 
details of these cases and an accurate bibliography of the publication written at that time see Evans 
G.H., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 74-81; Bishop 
H.C., The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1800-1825, The Journal of Political Economy, XLIII, 
1935, at 1-33; Bishop H.C., The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1830-1844, The Journal of 
Political Economy, XLIII, 1935, at 331-364.  
5 Kostal R.W., Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 28-
48; Evans G.H., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 82-
106 and Michie R.C., The London Stock Exchange: a history (OUP 1999) 31 ff. 
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the project was located. Secondly, the raised money could not be immediately 
productive because the time required for construction was at least several years. 
Furthermore, the parliament introduced a limitation on corporate borrowing powers 
to one-third of the paid-up share capital.6  
In such a situation, since mortgages, annuities and promissory notes were not 
always well accepted because offering higher interest rates could often mean to face 
a high risk of bankruptcy, the sale of shares was the only device left.7 However, in 
order to finalise a sale of shares in such a desperate condition, they had to make the 
shares more attractive to the existing propriety or the public. Two methods for doing 
this were developed: the first was to sell shares at a discount and the second was to 
attach a preferential dividend to the new shares. The former had a number of 
drawbacks mainly due to the fact that the capital raised did not equal the par value of 
the shares issued. Given that a company, in order to increase its debt, had to comply 
with the limitation imposed by law on the equity-debt ratio, there were two clear 
disadvantages in issuing shares issued at a discount. These were not only that they 
lowered the proceeds of the sale but also that they reduced the possibility of the 
company to raise new funds in the future. Moreover, registered companies were 
prohibited from issuing shares at a discount.8 If the new share and loan capital 
actually raised were not sufficient to enable the company to complete its works, 
Parliament had to be petitioned for the privilege of issuing more shares and the 
procurement of a supplementary act was costly. The preference share, which could 
be sold at par or at a smaller discount than an ordinary share, minimized this 
disadvantage. It is in such a confused context, in which the need for financing new 
businesses was strong and the regulation for corporate finance was in continuous 
change that, the new instrument - preference share - was born and during its life, it 
                                                
6 Dickson P.G., The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 
1688-1756, Modern Revivals in History, (Gregg Revivals; 1967 ed.) Ch. 14. 
7 Evans G.H., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 76-77 
and 85; Morgan V.E. and Thomas W. A., The Stock Exchange, Its History and Functions (Elek 
Books, London, 1962) 44; Michie R.C., The London Stock Exchange: a history (OUP 1999) 26-28. 
8 Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India v. Roper [1892] A.C. 125. 
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acquired an important economic status before its clear legal definition was 
developed.9  
Another important consideration that has to be taken into account, concerns the 
significant role of the statutory companies in the evolution of the preference shares. 
As it emerges from the empirical data of that time, most of the companies adopting 
these new kinds of securities were utility companies such as railway, gas, water and 
electricity undertakings. In the past, when these public utilities were left to private 
enterprise, statutory incorporations by private Acts were comparatively common 
since the undertakings would require power and monopolistic rights which needed a 
special legislative grant. Subsequently, as a result of the post war nationalisation 
measures, most of these statutory companies have been taken over by public boards 
and corporations set up by public Acts. An evidence of the changing conditions of 
those years is the history of the Oxford Canal. Under its act of incorporation, passed 
in 1769, the company was supposed to pay five per cent interest on all sums paid in 
upon its shares but given that this payment was proved to be “disadvantageous and 
inconvenient” to the company, its rate was reduced to four per cent by a second 
parliamentary act in 1775. Later, when the proprietors, to assure the payment of the 
dividends that were in arrears, decided to transform these accrued amounts into 
capital stock, Parliament sanctioned this agreement and removed the obligation to 
pay four per cent interest on the shares. Dividends were henceforth to be determined 
by the company, although certain limits were placed upon the rate until the borrowed 
money had been repaid. However, the inconvenience and humiliation, which beset 
companies which were financially unable to comply with the terms of their 
agreements requiring the payment of a fixed dividend on all shares, led to the 
introduction of more cautious provisions into parliamentary acts.10  
Forty years later, as the railway industry developed, some important 
newspapers of that time strongly supported the payment of about four per cent fixed 
dividend on the deposits and calls paid upon shares, arguing that this would create 
the right conditions for raising new money, inject new funds to finance future 
                                                
9 Evans G.H., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 96; 
Mitchie, 1999, note 75 above, at 31-36; Morgan and Thomas, 1962, note 75 above, 68-69; Baskin and 
Miranti, 1997, note 70 above, 122. 
10 Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 6 and 
438-439. 
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projects as well as lend stability to the stock market.11 The idea of a fixed return for 
the investor did not involve any preferential treatment for a particular class of shares, 
but the idea might have strengthened the inclination to offer a preference whenever 
the condition of a company made impossible the payment of dividends to all 
shareholders. Furthermore, some differentiation in shareholders that had gradually 
been introduced also made the use of preference shares a logical step for a company 
in dire financial straits. On June 4, 1829, the Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway was 
authorized by Parliament to issue shares with a “Right to Preference or Priority” over 
the existing shares to the extent of a five per cent non cumulative dividend but with a 
further participation in profits. Following this example, between 1829 and 1850 
more than one hundred railway preferred stock issues were either authorized by 
Parliament or made by companies.12  
Since their first appearance, preference shares were characterized by a hybrid 
nature. Being a privileged class of shares with the right to receive a fixed dividend, 
preference shares were sometimes made to rank with or ahead of the debt in the 
payment of their financial entitlements,13 the only exception being the payment of 
the annual interest and principal due on the government loans.14 Moreover, the 
preference shares were issued with a guarantee of either property or revenue from a 
particular source and allowed the conversion into ordinary shares when all calls were 
paid.15 In addition to the promise of a preferred dividend, sometimes reinforced by 
                                                
11 Kostal, 1994, note 73 above, 28-48; see also Herapath’s Railway Magazine, May 1839, at 209-215. 
12 Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 351-
353; Mitchie, 1999, note 75 above, 58-59; Baskin and Miranti, 1997, note 70 above, 152. For an 
historical empirical data on preference shares issued in those years, see Evans G.H., British 
Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 163 (Appendix). 
13 As in 1822 when the Gloucester and Berkeley Canal was authorised to issue preference shares 
which were entitled to pay dividends in preference to any existing ordinary shareholder but also in 
preference to any interest or payment in respect of any mortgage, bond, note, debenture, annuity or 
other security due to any creditor. 
14 In the Whitby and Pickering Railway Act of 1837, the statute fixed that the preferred dividend was 
payable after the interest on the existing debts, but in preference to the interest on debts incurred 
subsequent to the issue of the new shares. The Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal Act of 1826 not 
only ranked the preferred shareholders pari passu with the creditors, but it made the dividends 
cumulative; in other words, the part of the dividend outstanding was deferred and accrued to the 
future dividend payable. Finally, the London and South western Railway Act, dated 1839, contained a 
provision which allowed the payment of a dividend to a preferred shareholder “subject and without 
prejudice to all mortgages and bonds made and issued and to be made and issued”. 
15 See the cases of the Sunderland and Durham Railway in 1840 and of the Preston and Wyre Railway 
Harbour and Dock Company in 1843 in Herapath’s Railway Magazine, November 7, 1840 at 858 and 
Ibid., January 21, 1843, at 71. 
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provisions designed to assure the fulfilment of the company’s obligations, the 
preference shareholder often possessed many of the rights of the ordinary 
shareholder. These included unlimited participation in profits, the privilege of voting 
and the right to subscribe to new issues. Sometimes when profits were negligible or 
nonexistent, the dividend promised on preferential shares was to be paid out of 
capital. Although Parliament did not pursue a uniform course at first, when the 
speculation in shares increased and it was thought desirable to take adequate 
measures, Parliament decreed in the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act that no 
company should declare a dividend which would hinder its capital maintenance 
unless the mortgagees and bond holders gave their consent.16 This concept was 
strengthened few years later when the House of Commons took an even stronger 
attitude stating that it would not grant any railway the right to pay interest on calls 
out of capital. The Courts did not consider the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 
a document legitimating the preference shares and narrowly interpreted this statute 
so that preference share issues not specifically authorised by Parliament were illegal 
even as late as 1863, the date in which the fist general act dealing with preference 
shares was created.17 
Preference shares became very popular and the proceeds of their sale were used 
to retire loans. However, their peculiarities were about to change with their growing 
success. Preference shares were introduced in the market as a temporary device, their 
privileges being guaranteed for only a short period at the end of which the financial 
distress of the issuing company would presumably have disappeared. Parliamentary 
provisions usually protected the rights of the preference shareholder as long as he 
retained his preferential position, but gradually, the preference shares became a 
perfect replacement for debt while being shares. As a consequence, they started to 
lose the right to rank ahead of or on a par with debt and their preferential dividend 
became payable, only out of distributable profits and if approved by the general 
meeting. They only maintained the priority to be paid before the ordinary shares 
received anything and otherwise accumulated in a subsequent year. However, even 
this protection was disappearing since some issues were being made non cumulative. 
                                                
16 “... the interest of the money borrowed upon any such mortgage or bond shall be paid in preference 
to any dividends payable to the shareholders of the Company”, Companies Clauses Consolidation 
Act, 1845. 
17 The Companies Clauses Act, 1863, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 118, sections 13-15.  
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Furthermore, voting rights and participation in new issues of securities were 
increasingly reserved for the ordinary shareholder and the right to convert preference 
into ordinary shares was restricted.18 While until 1847, preference shares were 
assumed to have voting rights unless they had been issued specifically as non-voting 
shares, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the participation privilege was 
relatively less frequently given and the non-participation feature was often linked 
with the right of conversion and sometimes a prohibition on voting.19 Another group 
of express provisions, which were attached to preference shares, included those, 
which provided for the termination of the dividend priority through conversion and 
redemption. Whenever the dividend was not promised in perpetuity, preference 
shares automatically became ordinary shares upon the expiration of the preferential 
dividend period.20 
Between the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, 
the use of preference shares decreased and many outstanding preferred issues were 
redeemed by companies and replaced with other sources of financing.21 Despite the 
scepticism showed by some commentators of that time,22 interest in preference 
shares revived in the UK and US markets between the 1950s and 1980s.23 The 
phenomenon, which allowed the reintroduction of the preference shares in the 
market, was the rather substantial growth of the companies’ receivables during the 
1950s. This was financed mainly with short-term debt and by the end of the 1958, 
                                                
18 Evans G.H., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press) 92. 
19 As in the cases of the Monklands Railway in 1848 and London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
in 1847, see Herapath’s Railway Magazine, February 1847 and September 1848 at 282 and at 665 
respectively.  
20 Few doubts rose regarding the advisability of creating shares, which would permanently bear a high 
dividend rate. Fixed income bearing security could be dangerous in view of the possibility of periods 
of price inflation or unfair and unsuitable. See this point in Evans G.H., British Corporation Finance 
1775-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936) 135-148. 
21 Ashworth W., An Economic History of England, 1870-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 1961) 
271-272. 
22 Dewing A., The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: Ronald Press Co. 5th ed.., 1953) 
166; Santow L.J., ‘Ultimate Demise of Preferred Stock as a Source of Corporate Capital’, XVIII(3) 
Financial Analyst Journal, May-June 1962, 47-54. 
23 For some cases compare among others Fergusson D.A., ‘Recent Development in Preferred Stock 
Financing’, 7(3) The Journal of Finance, 1952, 461-462; Donaldson G., ‘In Defense of Preferred 
Stock’, 44 Harvard Business Review, 1962, 136; Fisher D.E. and G.A. Wilt Jr., Non-Convertible 
Preferred Stock as a Financing Instrument, 1950-1965, 23(4) The Journal of Finance, September 
1968, 624; Elsaid H.H., ‘The Function of Preferred Stock In the Corporate Financial Plan’, Financial 
Analyst Journal, 1969, 112-116. 
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the ratio debt to equity had reached a critical point and new form of equity finance 
was necessary.24  
The main obstacle they had to overcome was the introduction of a UK 
corporation tax in 1965. Since preferential dividends were paid out of taxed profits, 
it was argued that preferred stock financing did not compare favourably with debt 
financing which benefited from the tax deductibility of interest. However, it was also 
argued that the comparison between debt and preference shares tended to mislead 
and confuse the issue. If preference shares had to be compared, a more significant 
comparison would have been with common stock, such as ordinary shares.25  
Many advantages characterised preference shares over the common ordinary 
shares. Firstly, preference shares, being equity, could improve the capacity of the 
firm to take on additional debt financing and create a better ratio equity/debt. This 
fact could represent a possibility to pay a lower interest on new bond issues. 
Secondly, the liquidation preferences and the preferential dividend paid to preference 
shareholders were limited. Therefore, they were a cheaper source of funding, 
assuming that the cost of ordinary shares is measured by the expected return on the 
finance supplied. Thirdly, in a situation of financial distress within a company, it was 
possible to suspend the payment of the preferred dividends, whereas it was not 
possible to default on the payment of interest without causing the winding up of the 
company. Thus, in case of temporary insolvency, preference shares and their 
peculiarities became very crucial for the company as they could signify continuation 
or cessation of the business.  
Empirical research also showed that companies issued convertible and non-
convertible preferred shares simply to exploit the market conditions and meet the 
various demands of different types of investors.26 At that time many investors were 
particularly inflation-conscious but still desired the protection of a fixed income 
security. The prevailing sentiment was that if the earnings of a corporation rose 
along with inflation (which is by no means certain), common shares would rise in 
                                                
24 See Lindsay J.R. and Sametz A.W., Financial Management: An Analytical Approach (Homewood, 
Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963) 400. 
25 Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 353; 
Donaldson, 1962, note 91 above, at 125. 
26 Houston A.L. and C.O., ‘Houston, Financing with Preferred Stock’, 3 Financial Management, 
1990, 52 ff. 
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price and therefore the preference shares, especially the convertible ones, would 
have also risen in market value.27 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, preference shares have significantly financed the 
increasing merger and acquisition activities in the UK and US markets.28 Empirical 
studies reported a large use of convertible preference shares. Many were the reasons 
behind the use of these securities. Convertible preference shares offered common 
shareholders of the target company a double opportunity: equity in potential higher 
earnings as well as in assets. If the firm’s cash flow proved to be successful, they 
could convert and reap the benefit of higher earnings, whereas if the expected 
increase in earnings did not materialise, they could enjoy whatever protection the 
bonds might provide.29 
During the 1980s, significant changes occurred in the market for preference 
stock in terms of large number of new types of preference shares issued. Moreover, 
in sharp contrast to previous periods,30 the results showed that industrial firms rather 
than utilities issued the majority of preference shares.31 This phenomenon was 
facilitated by the downturn in capital expenditures by the utility industry and changes 
in the tax laws that made preference shares a tax-advantaged investment for 
corporate investors.32 The advantage was conferred by a tax exemption accorded to 
the recipient for eighty-five per cent of the amount of dividend paid.33  
                                                
27 Elsaid, 1969, note 91 above, 112-114.   
28 Phillips H.E. and J.C. Ritchie, ‘Investment Analysis and Portfolio Selection’, (South Western 
Publishing Co, 2nd ed. 1983) 32; Huckins N.W., ‘An Examination of Mandatorily Convertible 
Preferred Stock’, 34 The Financial Review, 1999, 89-108.  
29 Elsaid, 1969, note 91 above, 112-115. However, convertible preference shares were not used 
primarily to finance mergers, see Houston and Houston, 1990, note 94, at 53-54.  
30 See Phillips and Ritchie, 1983, note 96 above, 32-35 and 597-598; for US situation see Evans G.H., 
The Early History of Preferred Stock in the United States, The American Economic Review, 1929, 43-
58. 
31 See Laurent S., Securities that do the deal: The decision to issue preference shares by UK firms, 
working paper, Bristol Business School, 2001, 23; Houston A.L. and C.O., ‘Houston, Preferred Stock 
Financing: A Survey of Trends in the 1980s’, 7(4) Journal of Applied Business Research, 1991, 1-8. 
32 Fooladi I. and G. Roberts, ‘On Preferred Stock’, Journal of Financial Research, Winter 1986, 319-
324. They integrated preferred shares into Miller’s “Debt and Taxes” framework. 
33 In the US market, the rise of preference shares was due to some important regulatory changes in the 
financial service industry that produced significant implications for capital structure choice. For 
example, a change made to Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations in 1984 permitted thrifts to 
transfer up to thirty per cent of their assets to wholly owned financial subsidiaries for the purpose of 
obtaining a separation from the assets of the parent firm and collateralising the issuance of securities, 
typically preferred stock. See,  Cooper S.K. and Fraser D.R., The Boom in Bank Preferred. Stock 
Issues, The Bankers Magazine (November/December 1983), 73-77. 
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In the UK market, the introduction of the Companies Act (CA) in 1985 has left 
a lot of scope for shareholders to regulate the terms of preference shares, the only 
constraint imposed on the companies being the existence of at least one class of 
shares with unlimited voting rights and one class of shares entitled to receive the net 
assets of the corporation upon dissolution.34 An enormous variety of different rights, 
related to dividends, return of capital, voting, conversion into ordinary shares, 
redemption and other matters, might be attached to classes of shares described as 
preference shares35. Furthermore, different series of preference shares can be created, 
namely categories of preferred shares within the same class that differ according to 
the financial entitlements attached. Their only commonality is the privilege of a 
higher dividend to be paid in preference to all the other ordinary shareholders.36 
A class of preference shares may have mandatory and fully cumulative 
dividends included in its rights or may not, reflecting a payment stream of highly 
contingent and speculative quality. Moreover, after creditors have been paid in full 
upon liquidation, preference shareholders may have a priority pay-out over the 
common capped at the amount paid in per share at original issue. The preference 
shares may have the feature of being convertible and redeemable at a certain time 
and at the option of the issuer or of the investor. As such, depending on a company’s 
requirements, it is very easy to let such securities take on the characteristics of debt 
or equity, or virtually transform preference shareholders into creditors or residual 
claimants. In the event they are made redeemable at the option of the company, 
carrying a fixed cumulative dividend without any voting rights and with priority in 
repayment of capital in liquidation, they represent the extreme borderline in the 
equity-debt continuum of the corporate financial structure.37 
                                                
34 In UK, ss. 638 and 556 of the CA 2006 (before s. 128 of the CA 1985 and originally s. 33 of the 
1980 Act) allows the registration of particulars of special rights, normally included in the company’s 
memorandum or articles, see among the many handbooks Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles 
of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed. 2003) 624; Stedman G. and Jones J., 
Shareholders’ Agreement (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) 7 ff.  
35 Whether shares are ordinary or preference shares may be a question of construction: Alliance 
Perpetual Building Society v. Clifton [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1270; [1962] All E.R. 828. 
36 In UK under s. 128-129 Companies Act 1985; in USA, the Model Business Corporation Act at 
section 6, paragraph 2, refers to “one or more series within a class” of preferred shares.  In Canada, s. 
229 of the Business Corporation Act. 
37 See sec. 159 and so on of the Company Act 1985 and for a quick excursus Stocks T.E., Corporate 
Finance: Law and Practice (London, 1992) 17; McCormick R. and Creamer H., Hybrid Corporate 
Securities: International Legal Aspects, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), 16. 
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1.2. Particular features of the preference shares  
1.2.1. The preferential dividend  
One of the main features of preference shares is represented by the qualified right to 
receive a preferential dividend on the distribution of profits, before any dividend is 
paid on the company’s ordinary shares for a financial year or any shorter period 
prescribed by its memorandum or articles.38 As preference shares are part of the 
company’s share capital, any distribution of dividends has to be done only out of 
existing and sufficient profits according to s. 830 (1) and (2) of the CA (CA) 2006,39 
because otherwise the payment of the dividend would be an illegal return of capital 
to the preference shareholders.40 In addition to the General Meeting’s approval of the 
final accounts, in which a positive result or distributable funds must emerge, 
preferential dividends (like ordinary dividends) are payable only if declared.41 
Therefore the resulting resolution that decides the amount of dividends directors 
propose to distribute is the source of the company’s obligation to pay.42 Once that 
dividend is declared, it becomes a credit for the shareholders and no ordinary 
shareholder can be paid unless all the preference shareholders are satisfied according 
to their privileges.43 In truth, the directors’ discretion may be limited and the 
                                                
38 Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 7th ed. 2003) 620-623; Pennington R., Partnerships and Company Law (London, 
Butterworth, 1962) 97-99; Farrar J.H. and Hanningan B.M., Farrar’s Company Law (Butterwords, 
fourth ed., London, 1998) 230; Morse G., Palmer’s Company Law (London, vol. 1, 1959) 6039-6052; 
Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials (5th ed., New York, 2003) 353-385; Hill J., 
‘Preference Shares’ in Austin and Vann (eds), The Law of Public Company Finance (Law Book 
Company, Sydney 1986), ch.6 139-168.  
39 s. 263 (1) and (2) of the CA 1985. 
40 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409. 
41 Arrears even of cumulative dividend are prima facie not payable in a winding-up unless previously 
declared. See Crichton’s Oil Co, Re [1902] 2 Ch. 86 CA; Roberts & Cooper, Re [1929] 2 Ch. 383; 
Wood, Skinner & Co Ltd, Re [1944] Ch. 323. 
42 Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353; Re Accrington Corporation Steam Tramways 
Co 2 Ch 40 [1909] 2 Ch 40. It makes no difference if the articles provide that the preference dividend 
shall become payable without any declaration; this merely dispenses with a declaration by the 
shareholders in general meeting and it is still necessary for the dividend to be declared by the 
directors see Re Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway Co Ltd [1947] Ch 384, [1947] 1 All ER 729. 
See also Burland v Earle [1902] A.C. 83, PC; Godfrey Phillips Ltd v Investment Trust Ltd [1953] 1 
W.L.R. 41.  
43 Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co [1889] 42 Ch D 636. 
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preferential dividend may become a credit of the preference shareholder even after 
the first resolution that approves the annual financial statements, assuming profits are 
available. It is sufficient to expressly include in the memorandum of the company the 
profits in each year to be applicable first in payment of a preferential dividend on the 
preference shares44 or to be due on certain defined dates.45 
The dividend attached to a preference share may be cumulative or non-
cumulative. It may also be fixed or limited to a percentage of the nominal amount of 
the shares per year. It is a cumulative preferential dividend when is payable out of 
the profits in priority to the subordinate class or classes of shares so that if the profits 
of one year are not sufficient to pay the dividend for that period, the deficiency 
accumulates against subsequent profits46. Thus, no dividend can be paid in respect on 
ordinary shares or junior classes of preference shares until the preference dividends 
for all past financial years have been paid in full. The accumulation of unpaid 
preference dividends may continue over any number of years, because it is not a 
debt, which becomes statute-barred after the expiration of a limitation period. The 
accumulation will cease only once every preference shareholder has been paid for all 
the past complete financial years. If preference shares of the same class have been 
issued at different times and the dividend is unpaid in respect of some shares for 
more years than it is in respect of others, the total arrears have to be satisfied rateably 
when a dividend is paid in order to comply with the entitlements of each preferred 
category.47  
It is generally presumed by courts that, when one class of shares carries a fixed 
dividend in preference to another class, the dividend is cumulative, even though the 
                                                
44 Like in Evling v. Israel & Oppenheimer Ltd, [1918] 1 Ch. 101, where clause 6 of the memorandum 
of association provided that “the profits of the company” in each year should be applied in an order of 
priorities, in which the placing of sums to reserve was expressed to be subsequent to the payment of 
preference dividend. Here, the dividends paid out reduces the total profit distributable to the ordinary 
shareholders. 
45 See Bradford Investments (No. 1), Re [1991] B.C.L.C. 224. 
46 Re Wakley, Wakley v Vachell [1920] 2 Ch 505; Godfrey Phillips Ltd v Investment Trust 
Corporation Ltd [1953] Ch 449, [1953] 1 All ER 7. 
47 Webb v. Earle (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 556; First Garden City Ltd v Bonham-Carter [1928] Ch 53, 
where Tomlin J. held that payment should be proportionate to the total arrears of each class. See also 
before Weymouth Waterworks v. Coode & Hasell [1911] 2 Ch. 520, where Parker J. held that payment 
should be proportionate to the rate of dividend. 
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terms of issue do not in any way indicate that they ought to be,48 unless the 
construction of the regulations can be applied to deny it.49 Earlier, the doctrine has 
argued whether a preferential dividend had to be paid out of undistributed profits 
carried forward from prior financial years, or only out of profits realised in the 
current year. The problem is now definitively resolved by the law: profits available 
for distribution are defined under s. 831 of the CA 2006 (s. 263(3) of the CA 1985) 
as the company’s accumulated realised profits from the time of its incorporation less 
the company’s accumulated realised losses from the time of its incorporation.50 It 
then seems unnecessary for the terms of issue to contain any formulas explaining 
how it has to be defined the distributable profit for preference shares, because in the 
absence of a contrary provision,51 the dividends are payable out of profits and 
revenue reserves already in hand.52 Of course, this can only be done if profits or 
reserves still exist when the payment is proposed. Otherwise if this surplus has been 
eroded or eliminated by previous losses suffered by the company since they were 
earned or created, or if it has been capitalised and bonus shares has been issued and 
paid up by the capitalisation, a preference dividend cannot afterwards be paid out of 
them, given that no longer exist.53 
When a preferential dividend is stated to be non-cumulative, if dividends for 
that year are insufficient or inexistent, a preferential dividend does not cumulate 
upon omission of payment and the deficiency is extinguished instead of being carried 
                                                
48 See Webb v Earle [1875] LR 20 Eq. 556; Henry v. Great Northern Railway Co [1857] 1 de G & J 
606; Stevens v South Devon Railway Co [1851] 9 Hare 313; Sturge v Eastern Union Railway Co 
[1855] 7 de GM & G 158; Crawford v North Eastern Railway Co [1856] 3 K & J 723; Corry v 
Londonderry and Enniskillen Railway Co [1860] 29 Beav. 263; Foster v. Coles and N.B. Foster & 
Sons Ltd. [1906] W.N. 107. 
49 Staples v. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. [1896] 2 Ch. 303, CA. 
50 On this matter before the introduction of the s. 263 see Long Acre Press Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd 
[1930] 2 Ch 196, [1930] All ER Rep 237. 
51 Re Bridgewater Navigation Co [1891] 1 Ch 155 at 169 where the company’s articles direct the 
payment of the whole of the residual profits to the ordinary shareholders. In US, see the American 
case Gallagher v New York Dock Co 19 NYS (2d) 789 [1940]; affd 32 NYS (2d) 348 [1941] where it 
was expressed in the terms of issue that the preference dividend for each financial year was payable 
out of profits of that year alone.  
52 Crawford v North Eastern Railway Co [1856] 3 K & J 723. 
53 Re John Fulton & Co Ltd [1932] NI 35. See also the American case Lich v United States Rubber Co 
123 F 2d 145 [1941]. 
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forward against subsequent profits.54 Thus, the difference between cumulative and 
non-cumulative preference shares is very substantial. While the preferential dividend 
accumulates over the years in the former case, it expires in the latter if it cannot be 
paid out of the yearly distributable profits available for the company. It appears that 
the interests of the ordinary and preferred shareholders may not always be aligned, as 
in the case of the non-cumulative preference shareholders, and opportunistic 
behaviour of ordinary shareholders may concretize at the expenses of the preferred 
shareholders.55 In fact, in case of corporate retention of annual earnings, the market 
share value appreciates correspondingly and the ordinary shareholders theoretically 
may always realize their capital appreciation by selling some of their shares at 
enhanced market prices. Different is the case of the cumulative and non-cumulative 
preferred shareholders. The cumulative preferred shareholders are entitled to an 
annual fixed percentage of return on investment regardless of corporate earnings and 
at least exert some pressure toward distribution of dividends to common 
shareholders, since arrearages block any other payment of dividends, even if accruals 
are often threatened with elimination by corporate action and thus might not bloat 
market quotations.56  
However, the situation is even worse for the non-cumulative preference 
shareholders who do not receive accrual rights when annual earnings are retained.  
Sometimes, when it is expressly stated in the terms of issue that a preference 
shareholders’ class right to receive a non-cumulative preferential dividend is 
confined to the annual profits, it would appear to be possible for directors to utilise 
the reserves and retained earnings, if available, to pay dividends on the ordinary 
shares through a buyback of these shares, in an year in which the company reported a 
loss, while paying no dividends on the non cumulative preference shares. 
Furthermore, another source of conflict is represented by the directors’ discretion to 
propose a dividend at the annual general meeting. Theoretically, the board of 
directors is at liberty to recommend carrying as much profit as they see fit to 
                                                
54 Recently in Australia, see Trojan Equity Limited v CMI Limited [2009] QSC 114; in UK Coulson v 
Austin Motor Company Limited (1927) 43 TLR 493. 
55 See Stevens W.H., The Discretion of Directors in the Distribution of Non-Cumulative Preferred 
Dividends, 24 Geo. L. J., 1936, 371. For an analysis of some of these problems see the discussion 
paper of the UK Law Commission, Shareholders’ Remedies (Cm 3769, London, 1997). 
56 Meck J. F., ‘Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine’, 55 Harvard 
L. Rev., 1941, 81 ff.; Stiebel A., Company law and precedents (London, 1929) 147-148. 
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reserves. Therefore, they could carry the totality of the profits and extinguish the 
entire preferential dividend for that year if they are aware a payment of dividends 
could jeopardise the company’s going concern.57  
The key problems which have arisen with particular reference to dividends on 
preference shares have been those concerned with the precise amount of which is 
entitled normally, and upon winding up. Since a dividend cannot be distributed if not 
declared, it has been uncertain whether preference shareholders are entitled to their 
dividends after winding-up procedures have already commenced, if these dividends 
have not been declared and no express provision for their payment has been made in 
the company’s regulations. The courts have shown a substantial evolution on this 
matter. An early decision of the Court of Appeal laid down the basic principle that, 
prima facie, arrears of a cumulative preferential dividend were not payable on 
liquidation.58 The only exceptions to this were when the articles entitled the 
shareholders to their dividend once profits had been earned irrespective of a 
declaration, in which event they would be entitled to payment if the company had 
accumulated profits in its hands,59 or when the dividends had actually been declared, 
though not paid, before the liquidation. Subsequently, the courts in several instances 
have avoided the application of this principle and reached the opposite conclusion 
instead.60  
Generally, in order to satisfy its cumulative preference shareholders, a 
company will have to provide in its articles of association or the memorandum with 
the entitlement to receive a dividend in a winding up, even if not declared while the 
                                                
57 Theoretically, the holders of preference shares cannot prevent the company setting aside profits 
earned in any year to make good the losses sustained in previous years or to build up reserve if good 
faith is observed, even if their preferential dividend is cumulative. See Bond v. Barrow Haematite 
Steel Co. [1902] 1 Ch 353; Fisher v Black and White Publishing Co [1901] 1 Ch 174; Re Buenos 
Ayres Great Southern Railway Co Ltd [1947] Ch 384, [1974] 1 All ER 729. This seems to be the 
approach in US as well where non cumulative preferred dividends could be reasonably retained as 
long as the directors could show an appropriate corporate purpose for doing it, see Lich v. U.S. 
Rubber Co., 39 F. Supp. 675 (D. N.J. 1941) in contrast with the previous approach called the Wabash 
rule see Wabash Railway v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930). This rule was expanded later by the 
judgment in Guttmann v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 189 F. 2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 867 (1951). 
58 Re Crichton’s Oil Co. [1902] 2 Ch. 86, C.A.. This presumption was applied in Re Roberts and 
Cooper, Ltd. [1929] 2 Ch. 383 and Re Wood, Skinner & Co., Ltd. [1944] Ch. 323. 
59 Re Bridgewater Navigation Co. [1891] 2 Ch. 317 C.A.  
60 Re Walter Symons, Ltd. [1934] Ch. 308; Re F. de Jong & Co. [1946] Ch. 211, C.A.; Re E.W. 
Savory, Ltd. [1951] 2 All E. R. 1036; Re Wharfedale Brewery Co. [1952] Ch. 913. 
   
   31 
company was a going concern.61 If the preference shareholders are merely entitled to 
“unpaid preference dividends” or “arrears of dividends”, the dividends are calculated 
only up to the commencing of the winding up.62  
 
1.2.2. Priority to the repayment of capital in event of liquidation 
Preference shares usually have priority to the return of capital in event of liquidation 
of a company, if funds are still available after that all the creditors have been paid. 
However, while preference shares are prima facie assumed to have a cumulative 
dividend, it cannot be presumed that just because a class of shares carries a 
preference with respect to dividends, it likewise carries a right to preferential 
treatment for capital in a winding up.63 However, any capital priority is conditioned 
on express clauses stated in the articles, in the memorandum or in the terms of issue 
of the company. The preference shareholder’s priority to the repayment of capital 
generates a further discussion regarding the entitlement of a preference shareholder 
to participate in the surplus assets of the company after that all the creditors have 
been satisfied. The interest of this debate is due to the fact that capital assets, to 
which the preference shareholders may or may not have a claim, include 
accumulated profits of previous years which could have been distributed by way of 
dividend to the ordinary shareholders prior to the commencement of the winding-
up.64 However after winding-up has been commenced and company’s debts and 
liabilities have been satisfied, the same accumulated reserves become part of the 
company’s residual capital assets in which the preference shareholders are entitled to 
share equally with the ordinary shareholders. Therefore the question that was 
presented was whether or not the preference shareholders were entitled to participate 
                                                
61 Re New Chinese Antimony Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 115; Re Springbok Agricultural Estate Ltd [1920] 1 
Ch 563; Re Wharfedale Brewery Co [1952] Ch 913, [1952] 2 All ER 635.. 
62 Griffith v Paget [1877] 6 ChD 511; Re E W Savory Ltd [1951] 2 All ER 1036. 
63 Re London India Rubber Co. (1868) L.R. 5 Eq. 519; Re Accrington Corp. Steam Tramways [1909] 
2 Ch. 40. Nor will an exclusion of participation in dividends beyond a fixed preferential rate 
necessary imply an exclusion of participation in capital although it will apparently be some indication 
of it, see Scottish Insurance Corporation v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co [1949] AC 462, [1949] 1 All 
ER 1068; Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co., Ltd. [1961] Ch. 353.  
64 Re Bridgewater Navigation Co [1891] 2 Ch 317, where the Court of Appeal decided that the 
surplus had to be regarded as belonging to the ordinary shareholders and therefore distributable to 
them alone. 
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rateably with the other shareholders in the surplus assets of the company on winding-
up.65 
The courts’ reasoning on this matter has substantially changed over the years. 
Earlier, it was held at first instance that, in the absence of an express exclusion of 
participation in surplus assets, preference shareholders were entitled to participate - 
pari passu - with the other ordinary shareholders in addition to any preferential 
rights.66 In 1914, the House of Lords decided that where the preference shareholders 
were given a preferential dividend, that was all they were entitled to by way of 
dividend.67 For the purpose of defining preference shareholders’ rights on return of 
assets in liquidation, the courts were uncertain as to what was meant by surplus 
assets. It was held in the Court of Appeal that reserves of undistributed profits which 
could have been distributed by the way of dividend, before the commencement of a 
winding up to the ordinary shareholders, were not included in the surplus assets.68 In 
fact, the company cannot declare a dividend after it commences winding up,69 and 
the preference shareholders cannot acquire a title to the assets by anything done in 
the winding up proceeding, unless the dividend was not declared.70 Thus, a 
preference as regards both dividends and return of capital were presumed to be non-
participating in dividends but participating as regards a return of capital.71 After a 
period of considerable fluctuations of judicial opinion,72 in 1949, this distinction was 
removed by the House of Lords; preference shareholders with preferential or express 
rights to dividends or to a repayment of capital were presumed not to be participating 
                                                
65 See Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co., Ltd. v. Laurie [1961] Ch. 353. 
66 Re Espuela Land and Cattle Co. [1909] 2 Ch. 187. 
67 Will v United Lankat Plantations Co [1914] AC 11, H.L. 
68 Re William Metcalfe Ltd [1933] Ch. 142, C.A. 
69 Re Catalinas Warehouses and Mole Co Ltd [1947] 1 All ER 51; Re Artisans’ Land and Mortgage 
Corpn [1904] 1 Ch 796. Re W Foster & Son Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 314; Re Severn and Wye and Severn 
Bridge Railway Co [1896] 1 Ch 559. 
70 Re Odessa Waterworks Co [1901] 2 Ch 190n; Re Crichton’s Oil Co [1902] 2 Ch 86; Re Madame 
Tussaud & Sons Ltd [1927] 1 Ch 657; Bishop v Smyrna and Cassaba Railway Co [1895] 2 Ch 265; 
Re Bridgewater Navigation Co [1891] 2 Ch 317; Scottish Insurance Corporation v Wilsons and Clyde 
Coal Co [1949] AC 462, [1949] 1 All ER 1068. 
71 In Re William Metcalfe Ltd [1933] Ch. 142, C.A. 
72 Cf. Re Fraser & Chalmers Ltd. [1919] 2 Ch. 114; Anglo-French Music Co. v. Nicoll [1921] 1 Ch. 
386; Re John Dry Steam Tugs [1932]  1 Ch. 594 (in favour of preference shareholders) contra:  Re 
National Telephone Co. [1914] 1 Ch. 755; Collaroy Co. Ltd. V. Giffard [1928] Ch. 144. 
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as regards further dividends or capital repayments.73 It was said that a preferential 
right, if expressly specified in the memorandum, is presumed to be exhaustive74 and 
the burden of proving the contrary is upon the preference shareholders if they claim 
further or better entitlements.75 
Subsequently, it was reasonably said that to analyse nature and origin of 
surplus assets would have led to insuperable difficulties and seemed to be quite 
illogical,76 since under our dividend rules any part of the surplus could have been 
distributed to the shareholders by way of dividend. Therefore, the preference 
shareholders were granted with the right to participate to the surplus profits in 
liquidation but only when the articles provided that undistributed profits should be 
divisible among such shareholders.77 Nowadays, it is common to see preference 
shares carrying a priority to return of capital, whereas the liquidation preference is 
often fixed at a specified price per share and no rights to surplus assets in winding up 
are allowed.  
Similarly, some uncertainty, arising from the case of a company distributing a 
dividend to its shareholders through a reduction of capital, pushed the court to take 
                                                
73 Scottish Insurance Corporation v Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co [1949] AC 462, [1949] 1 All ER 
1068; later confirmed by the case Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply Co. [1950] Ch. 161. 
74 Will v United Lankat Plantations Co [1914] AC 11, H.L. In USA, see, Waggoner v. Laster, 581 
A.2d 1127 (Del. 1990). In Canada International Power Co. v. McMaster University & Montreal 
Trust, [1946] S.C.R. 178 followed the Will v United Lankat Plantations Co, making that the law; also 
recently Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 48 (Alta. C.A.). 
75 Scottish Insurance Corporation v. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. [1949] A.C. 462; Re Isle of Thanet 
Electricity Supply Co. [1950] Ch. 161. Previously in Re William Metcalfe & Sons, Ltd. [1933] Ch. 
142, as in some earlier cases, the view had prevailed that a preferential right in this category was not 
exhaustive but operated to confer an additional privilege over those otherwise enjoyed by the 
preference shareholders as a member of the company. For a discussion of these points, see Morse G., 
Palmer’s Company Law (London, vol. 1, 1959) 303; Pennington R., ‘Preference Shares Again’, 105 
S. J., 1961, 451 where the Author explains when the provision precluding participation in surplus 
assets is absent, the court construes the right of preference shareholders in respect of capital to be the 
same as if the provision were expressed, but this is because the court treats the priority given for 
repayment of preference capital as exhaustively defining the preference shareholders’ rights and not 
because the court implies a provision precluding participation in surplus assets in the terms of issue. 
See also Pickering M.A., ‘The problem of preference shares’, MLR, Sep. 1963, 503-505.  
76 It is also inconsistent with the well established principle that on a winding up all assets are 
distributed as a fund of capital see Staffordshire Coal & Iron Co. v. Brogan [1963] 1 W.L.R. 905, 
H.L. and with the line of cases culminating in Re Wharfedale Brewery Co. [1952] Ch. 913 see these 
cases in Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 
362-363. 
77 Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co., Ltd. [1961] Ch. 353. See also Re Bridgewater Navigation Co 
[1891] 2 Ch 317, where actually under the original articles there was only one class of shareholder. 
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an opinion.78 The court held that their position was the same it would apply in a 
winding up and that accordingly the first class of capital to be repaid was the class 
comprising the preference shares.79 Therefore, as long as the statutory requirements 
are complied with and the preference shareholders receive their rights on a winding 
up,80 the reduction has to be approved.81 This decision was later approved by the 
House of Lords, although in that situation, the articles expressly provided that the 
rights attached to the preference shares on a return of capital other than on winding 
up were the same as the rights which they enjoyed on a winding up.82  
When preference shares are drafted to receive a share of surplus profits in the 
company, all combinations accepted by the parties are possible. They can rank pari 
passu with the subordinate shares after those shares have received a specified 
dividend, receive an aliquot portion of the surplus profits, or their dividend can rise 
automatically in proportion to the dividend on the ordinary shares rises beyond the 
specified figure. For example, the market of preference shares has known a standard 
of preference shares commonly called preferred ordinary shares.83  These securities 
have the rights to participate in surplus profits but they are not entitled to priority for 
repayment of the capital in respect of their shares in the company’s winding up. 
Their participation dividend cannot be cumulative because it is related to and bound 
up with a dividend on common stock. Therefore, both classes of ordinary shares 
participating or not, share the fortune or the misfortune. Directors likewise have 
discretion to propose at the general meeting, or refuse to propose, even though 
earned, participation dividends on preferred or ordinary dividends on common stock. 
For this reason, preference ordinary shareholders have a position with respect to 
                                                
78 For an interesting and doctrinal opinion see Gower L.C.B., ‘Company’s reduction of capital: Note, 
14(3) MLR, 1951, 330-333. 
79 This arrangement seems nonsensical, because the preferred shares participating as regards income 
but non participating as regards capital, on a reduction of capital they are paid off on the latter basis, 
thus losing any share in the accumulated reserves, for Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company 
Law (3rd ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1969) 362 footnote 93a. 
80 Re Saltdean Estate Co Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 829.  
81 This approach has been confirmed in more recent judgments, see Re Ransomes plc [1999] 2 BCLC 
591; Re Ratners Group plc [1988] BCLC 685; Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 289. 
82 See House of Fraser plc v ACGE Investments Ltd [1987] AC 387, HL.  
83 See Birds J. and Boyle A.J., Boyle and Birds’ Company Law (6th eds, Jordan, 2007) 213. 
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participation dividends analogous to that of a holder of non-cumulative preferred 
stock.84  
Other variations can consist of issuing different series or categories of 
preference shares. Normally, if a class of preference shares is issued with an attached 
right to a fixed preferential dividend, it means a preferential dividend in priority to 
all other shares. However, where the preferential rights are defined only in the 
articles of association or by resolution, the company could, as a rule, create 
preference shares ranking pari passu with the original preference shares simply by 
inserting an article that states whether a new class of preference share shall modify 
the rights of already existing preference shareholders. In addition, preference shares 
may hold the right, in a winding up or on a reduction of capital, to a premium. The 
terms on which an issued share may provide for the payment of this premium is 
known as a “Spens Formula” and is commonly attached to preference shares. This 
formula is used in cases in which the value of the shares of a company is represented 
in a stock market. According to the Spens Formula, holders of the share capital 
concerned are expressly entitled to a premium, if during a defined period prior to the 
repayment, the shares have been standing in the market at a figure in excess of par. 
The premium is usually calculated with reference to the average stock exchange 
price for the relevant period before the payment subject to adjustments to take 
account of any accrued arrears of dividend, which is reflected in the market price of 
shares.85  
Unfortunately, because of the variety in the drafting of these documents 
throughout history, the courts have had to evolve different canons of construction of 
the documents, thus overruling earlier decisions and defeating the legitimate 
expectations of the investors who purchased preference shares relying the 
construction adopted earlier. At the moment, reasonable and uniform canons of 
construction as well as a modus operandi to determine their entitlements appear to 
have been adopted. Thus, the nature and the extent of a class rights is, first, 
                                                
84 See Berle A. and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and World, 1926) revised edn, 1968, 307-312 where he wrote that the doctrine of the non 
cumulative stock cases, that merely deferring dividends does not alter rights, should be applied also in 
the cases of participating preferred or ordinary dividends paid on common stock, otherwise the 
participation right of the preferred stock ceases to be a right in contract and becomes a mere gamble 
on the manner in which a board of directors will exercise its discretion. 
85 It could be argued whether the inclusion of the Spens Formula makes preference shares relevant 
shares for the statutory pre-emptive rights contained in Companies Act 2006, s. 560. 
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determined primarily as a question of the construction of the relevant regulations of 
the company.86 Secondly, where specific provision in the nature of preferential rights 
is made, such provision will normally be construed as definitive of the whole of the 
rights of the class in respect of that provision.87 Thirdly, in the absence of specific 
provisions the rights of all shareholders are deemed to be the same.88  
The fundamental legal concept of the inclusion of these securities to equity 
capital has never been qualified by the courts or by the statute. Better still, some past 
judgements have shown a reversal in trend on the nature of preference shares, 
recognising that the position of a preference shareholder has again become more 
approximated to that of a debenture holder than was the case some 80 years ago.89 
For instance at law, unless it is explicitly conferred by the company’s regulations, 
preference shareholders do not have any right to participate in surplus profits.90 The 
package of rights of the preference shares usually vary greatly depending on the 
result a company want to achieve issuing these securities.91 
 
1.2.3. Conversion and redemption of preference shares 
There are two common features that are generally included in the terms of a 
preference share: the conversion and the redemption clauses. I will discuss the 
conversion first. Preference shares may be made convertible at the option of the 
holder into common shares or at a fixed ratio specified in the memorandum of 
association. Where the conversion option is exercised, the company must notify the 
Registrar of Companies within one month of the alteration in the rights attached to 
the converted shares and their redefinition as ordinary shares.92  
                                                
86 See Scottish Insurance Corp v. Wilson & Clyde Coal Co. [1949] A.C. 462; 1949 S.C. (H.L.) 90; 
1949 S.L.T. 230 
87 This proposition was stated in Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply Co. [1950] Ch 161, CA. 
88 Birch v Copper [1889] 14 App Cas 525. 
89 See Lord Simonds in Scottish Insurance Corp v. Wilson & Clyde Coal Co. [1949] A.C. 462; 1949 
S.C. (H.L.) 90; 1949 S.L.T. 230; and Sir Raymond Evershed in Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply 
Co. [1950] Ch 161, CA. 
90 See the case Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., Ltd [1914] A.C. 11. 
91 Pickering M.A., ‘The problem of preference shares’, MLR, Sep. 1963, 499-519. 
92 Companies Act 2006, s. 636. 
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The apparently simple matter of converting preference shares into ordinary 
shares can become one of considerable complexity, at least where the nominal value 
and the number of the ordinary shares into which the preference shares are to be 
converted differ from those of the preference shares to be converted, so that there is a 
danger that the transaction will involve an unauthorised return of capital, on the one 
hand, or the issue of shares at a discount, on the other. If the nominal or paid up 
value of the preference shares is changed on their conversion into ordinary shares, 
whether on the exercise of preference shareholders’ conversion options or as a result 
of agreement at the time of conversion, the conversion may be effected in five 
alternative ways: by the company consolidating or subdividing the original shares 
into ordinary shares with a higher or lower nominal value each, the paid up capital in 
respect of the original shares being allocated proportionately to the new shares;93 by 
the preference shareholders surrendering their original shares in exchange for new 
ordinary shares with a total paid up value not exceeding that of the surrendered 
shares and the amount remaining to be paid up on the new shares, being not less than 
the amount unpaid (if any) on the original ones;94 by the company reducing its issued 
share capital by a special resolution approved by the court so as to repay the capital 
paid up on the preference shares, issuing new ordinary shares to the former 
preference shareholders in their place and appropriating the amount of the reduction 
of capital to pay up the nominal value of the new shares;95 by the company 
purchasing the preference shares for cash under its statutory power to effect off 
market purchases and the preference shareholders subscribing for new ordinary 
shares and paying for them with the purchase price;96 or by a scheme of arrangement 
approved by meetings of all interested classes of shareholders and by the court.97  
If the paid up capital in respect of the ordinary shares resulting from the 
exercise of conversion is to be greater than the capital paid up on their original 
shares, the difference may be provided by capitalising the company’s undistributed 
profits or revenue reserves, but this may be done only if the company’s articles 
                                                
93 Companies Act 2006, s. 617. 
94 Re County Palatine Loan and Discount Co, Teasdale’s Case [1873] 9 Ch App 54. 
95 Companies Act 2006, s. 641 (3)(4)(5), Re St James’ Court Estate Ltd [1944] Ch 6. 
96 Companies Act 2006, s. 690 and s. 694. 
97 Companies Act 2006, s. 895 (2). 
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expressly so provide. This option for the preference shares can be attractive when 
common shares are publicly traded, so that an active market exists for the conversion 
securities. 
The company can also make the preference shares redeemable at a future date. 
This type of shares appeared in England granted to companies under s. 46 of the CA 
1929, a provision introduced following the recommendations of the Greene 
Committee.98 The use of redeemable preference shares increased due to their 
advantages. First, they allow a company to raise short-term capital while enjoying 
the benefits of a relational contract. Second, they ensure that any loss of control 
resulting from an issue of shares to outsiders is only temporary. However, since their 
existence these peculiar shares have sparked many doctrinal debates on the nature of 
the obligation to redeem them at a fixed time and on the coordination of these 
securities with the set of guidelines of maintenance of capital and with the 
prohibition against a company to purchase its own shares.99 Despite of the distrust at 
that time on the utility of this tool, in 1948, the power to issue redeemable preference 
shares was given to companies by s. 58 of the CA, which reproduced with certain 
amendments the section of the previous Act.100 Later, s. 159 in the 1981 Act 
extended this possibility for both private and public companies to all the categories 
of shares.101 Thus, all the shares are now potentially redeemable either by initial 
agreement on issue or by subsequent agreement to purchase. This new authority has 
to be seen in the context of ss. 658-676 (ss. 162-169 before in CA 1985) which allow 
companies, subject to certain procedures, to purchase their own shares and 
sometimes to hold those shares as treasury shares. Generally, the preference shares 
are issued as redeemable shares either at a set date or event, or at the option either of 
the company or the shareholder. The date or dates for redemption of the shares will 
commonly equate with the investors usual requirements for the payment of a 
                                                
98 1926 Cmnd 2657, para. 28 where the Greene Committee commented redeemable preference shares 
“would prove useful in certain cases” and should be given, “provided that proper safeguards are 
adopted”. 
99 Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409. For a discussion see Gower L.C.B., Principles of 
Modern Company Law (4th ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1979), 413. 
100 1945 Cmnd 6659 where the Cohen Committee that concluded proper safeguards were particularly 
necessary to protect creditors from the potential harm arising from the erosion of the doctrine of 
capital maintenance. 
101 For a quick comparative excursus see Stocks T.E., Corporate Finance: Law and Practice (London, 
1992) 17 ff.  
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commercial loan.102 The redeemed shares must be fully paid and the terms in the 
articles must provide for payment on redemption. These requirements apply equally 
for companies purchasing their own shares.103 
The power of a company to issue redeemable shares, provided it is authorised 
to do so by its articles, is now contained in s. 684 of the CA 2006. No redeemable 
shares may be issued at a time when there are no issued share of the company which 
are not redeemable,104 obviously in order to avoid the result of a company being left 
with no share capital following the redemption of the shares. The modalities of 
redemption have been, since their introduction, a matter of some dispute among the 
doctrine because it was unclear whether the company’s articles could give a measure 
of discretion to the directors with regards to the detailed aspects of the redemption, 
such as the redemption price and the date of redemption or whether it requires those 
details to be set out specifically in the articles.105  
The debate seemed to subside when the British Parliament introduced s. 133 in 
CA 1989, delegating to the directors the power to fix the redemption date and 
allowing the redemption price to be determined in accordance with a formula 
specified in the company’s articles as an alternative to specifying a firm redemption 
price in the articles. However, the requirements of including a redemption date or a 
period in the articles created some difficulties and critics, because it precluded shares 
being issued on terms that they were redeemable at the option of the company and / 
or the holder as contemplated by the CA 1985 or as being redeemable as a result of 
specified events. Furthermore, these requirements had adverse capital adequacy 
implications for banks and for private companies whose shares were not actively 
traded because it could be difficult to devise a viable formula that did not require a 
measure of discretionary judgement from its auditors or other valuers as to the value 
                                                
102 Stedman G. and Jones J., Shareholders’ Agreement (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) 18. 
103 As modified by the Companies (Acquisition of Own shares) (Treasury Shares) Regulation 2003, SI 
2003/1116, reg. 2(1), (3) as from December 2003. 
104 s. 684 (4) of the CA 2006. 
105 This idea was also strengthened by some analogy in Australian law, where a provision similar to 
the English one has been interpreted as permitting the articles to provide for delegation to the 
directors: TNT Australia Pty v Normandy Resources NL [1990] 1 ACSR 1, SA SC; see this and other 
cases in Hill J., ‘Preference Shares’ in Austin and Vann (eds), The Law of Public Company Finance 
(Law Book Company, Sydney 1986), 143-153. In the U.S.A., in order to avoid expensive 
amendments to the articles of incorporation, a number of states authorised the creation of “blank 
shares” namely shares containing no financial terms at all but delegating the board of directors to 
designate them. See recently Siegman v. Palomar Medical Technologies, [1998] WL 118201 Del. Ch. 
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of the shares. The Company Act 2006 clarifies the position in favour of a flexible 
approach.106 Therefore, s. 685 permits the directors to “determine the terms, 
conditions and manner of redemption of shares if they are authorised to do so by the 
company’s articles or by a resolution of a company”.107 The current approach can 
then be summarised as the requirement to provide the terms and manner of 
redemption in the articles with a cautious approach for what concerns the level of 
details to include according to Article 39 of the Second Directive.108 However, such 
provision can also be inserted at a later date from the time when the shares are 
issued. It is not essential to specify a redemption date or period, and it seems 
possible to include in the articles the possibility to redeem the shares at any time at 
the option of the company and / or the holder or after the occurrence of specified 
events.109 
Detailed rules apply to the financing of redemption. Apart for private 
companies for which an exception applies,110 redeemable shares can be redeemed 
only out of distributable profits or out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares made 
for the purpose.111 It is also usual to expect the company to pay a premium on 
redemption and this premium sometimes varies with the date of redemption, 
decreasing in value with the passing of time. The financial terms of redeemable 
shares may include a provision for the payment of a redemption premium, that is, an 
amount greater than the par value of the shares. Redemption premiums must be paid 
out of distributable profits112, except that in respect of redeemable shares which were 
issued at a premium, where any premium payable on redemption may be paid out of 
the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares, but in this case a redemption premium may 
not exceed the lesser of the aggregate amount of share premiums received by the 
                                                
106 In 1993, the Company Law Review (CLR) proposed to remove the requirement and instead to 
require companies, after the event to include this information in the return which companies are 
required to make to the Registrar. See, Company Law Review: Terms and Manner of Redemption of 
Redeemable Shares. Sections 159A and 160 (3) of the Companies Act 1985, DTI Consultative 
Document. 
107 Company Act 2006, s 685(1).  
108 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976. 
109 Ferran E., Principles of corporate finance law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 157-58 and 227; 
Burgess R., Corporate Finance Law (London, 1992) 323. 
110 Companies Act 2006 s. 709 ch 5 
111 Ibid, s. 687 (2). See Quayle Munro Ltd, Petitioners, [1991] S.L.T. 723, I.H. 
112 Ibid, s. 687 (3). 
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company on the issue of the redeemable shares and the amount credited to the 
company’s share premium account at the date of the redemption (including share 
premiums paid as part of the proceeds of the fresh issue of shares).113  
Normally, on redemption the preference shares are cancelled and the issued 
share capital reduced by their nominal amount, or when redeemed out of the 
proceeds of a fresh issue the capital yardstick will be maintained as a result of the 
issue.114 In any case, they cannot be held as treasury shares.115 Sometimes, where no 
fresh issue of shares for the purposes of redemption is contemplated, the 
requirement that capital be repaid from profits may be inhibiting for an issuing 
company. It may be difficult for the company to find sufficient profits for both 
payment of dividends and redemption. Issuing preference shares at a premium can 
solve this problem. However, in order to avoid unlawful repayments of the 
company’s assets to the shareholders116 and to protect creditors, a provision in s. 
733 of the CA 2006 provides that when redeemable shares are redeemed out of 
assets representing a company’s distributable profits, the amount by which the 
company’s issued share capital is thereby diminished must be transferred from 
profits or revenue reserves to a special capital reserve called “the capital 
redemption reserve”.117 This reserve can be reduced only in the same way as paid 
up share capital.118 The amount credited in this special reserve replaces the 
aggregate nominal values of the redeemed shares and the transfer from profits or 
revenue reserves makes the amount transferred unavailable for distribution of 
dividends.119 However, it is possible for this amount credited to capital redemption 
reserve to be converted into share capital by the company using it to pay up the 
nominal value of the new fully paid shares to be issued as bonus share.120  
                                                
113 Ibid, s. 687 (4). 
114 Ibid, s. 687 (5). 
115 Ibid, s. 688 CA 2006. 
116 See, for instance, Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co. v Laurie [1961]  Ch. 353; Re New Zealand 
Flock & Textile Ltd [1976] 1 N.Z.L.R. 192; Blackburn v Industrial Equity [1977] 2 A.C.L.R. 421; 
[1977] 3 A.C.L.R. 89. 
117 CA 2006, s. 733 ss 1-4. 
118 CA 2006, s. 733 ss 5-6. 
119 CA 2006, s. 734. 
120 At general law the prohibition not to allot shares at a discount s. 580 and the exceptions at ss. 586, 
587, 593 of the CA 2006 see Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India v Roper [1892] A.C. 125. For an 
analysis of the main debate regarding the so called “nimble dividends” see for all, Hill J., ‘Preference 
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1.2.3.1. Failure to redeem 
It is s. 735 of the CA 2006 that deals with the consequences of failure to redeem 
preference shares by the due date. However, prior to the 1981 Act, which introduced 
that provision, the question of failing to redeem had been surprisingly uncertain. 
There were basically two main perspectives. On the one hand, the agreement to 
redeem between the parties was considered as not being compulsory because it is not 
a contractual obligation arising from a debtor-creditor relationship but is simply a 
shareholders’ expectation as others. Therefore, the shareholder could not sue the 
company for the redemption moneys as a debt owing. At an extreme point, what has 
sometimes even been put forward is that upon the passing of the date for redemption 
the shares cease to be redeemable and the shareholder has no right whatever to insist 
on redemption. On the other hand, it was said that shareholders had a contractual 
right to redemption and although redeemable preference shareholders could not 
enforce it by a mandatory injunction, the failure to redeem might surely justify 
winding up of the company or the granting of an injunction to prevent payment of 
dividends to ordinary shareholders until redemption of preference shares had taken 
place.121 That argument had to be viewed in light of the rules governing the method 
of redemption in the CA.122 Thus, if no funds specified under this section were 
available to redeem the shares there would be no default by the company in failing to 
redeem and no contractual rights which the shareholder could enforce. Moreover, 
although a winding up order in favour of the preference shareholders might in certain 
circumstances be appropriate, it could not be based on any breach of contract, but 
simply on the general principles under the “just and equitable” ground. In this 
direction a further possible source of relief for the shareholder, whether or not the 
nature of the redemption clause was contractual, would have been an action under s. 
994 on the basis that the failure to redeem was “unfairly prejudicial to the interests” 
                                                                                                                                     
Shares’ in Austin and Vann (eds), The Law of Public Company Finance (Law Book Company, 
Sydney 1986), 155. 
121 Morse G., Palmer’s Company Law (London, vol. 1, 2004) para. 6.027. 
122 Now s. 684 CA 2006 (before s. 159 CA 1985). 
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of the preference shareholders. The court would have had sufficiently broad powers 
to make an order requiring the company to redeem the shares.123 
The uncertainty regarding what the remedies of a shareholder are if the 
company fail to redeem or purchase his shares and what happens if the company 
goes into liquidation before the shares have been redeemed or purchased was 
clarified by s. 735. Accordingly, the company is not liable for damages in respect of 
any failure on its part to redeem or purchase.124 However, the shareholder shall 
retain any other right to sue the company but the court shall not grant an order for 
specific performance “if the company shows that it is unable to meet the costs of 
redeeming or purchasing the shares in question out of distributable profits”.125 In the 
case of liquidation of the company, when “at the commencement of the winding up 
any of the shares have not been redeemed or purchased, the terms of redemption or 
purchase may then be enforced against the company and when the shares are 
accordingly redeemed or purchased, they are cancelled”.126 The investor seller will 
change his position in the company from member to creditor. However, this does not 
apply if the terms of redemption or purchase provided for performance to take place 
at a date later than that of the commencement of the winding up or if during the 
period beginning with the date when redemption or purchase was to take place and 
ending with the commencement of the winding up, the company did not have 
distributable profits equal in value to the redemption or purchase price.127 Of course, 
the shareholder will gain little or nothing by enforcing the contract if the winding up 
is an insolvent liquidation because his claim in respect of the purchase price is 
postponed to the claims of all the creditors and all the other shareholders whose 
shares carry rights to capital or dividend which are preferred to the rights as to 
capital of the shares to be redeemed or purchased.128 
                                                
123 See Re Holders Investment Trust, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 583, 2 All E.R. 289.  
124 Companies Act 2006 s. 735(2). 
125 Ibid. s. 735(3). The provision does not protect the company against paying damages in all 
cases as a result of its failure to redeem, see British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc v. Barclays 
Bank Plc [1996] 1 W.L.R.J., CA.  
126 Companies Act 2006 s. 735(4). 
127 Ibid. s.735(5). 
128 Ibid. s.735(6). 
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The vulnerability of the redeemable preference shareholders, particularly 
regarding receipt of dividends and redemption of shares, has been reduced by the 
introduction of ancillary safeguards. A typical redeemable preference share issue 
includes a so-called “put option”. According to it, the parent company of the issuer 
enters into an agreement to purchase the shares from the investor in certain specified 
circumstances, the most important being default by the issuer in dividend payments 
or in repayment upon redemption. Many other occurrences may threaten the security 
of the preference shareholder and thus the list of triggering events in the purchase 
agreement may be long, covering matters such as reduction of capital by the issuer, 
allotment of equal or prior ranking shares, and changes to income tax law. As the 
name implies, the requirement to purchase the shares does not automatically arise; it 
will depend on an election by the investor to enforce it. This will usually be done by 
requiring that the investor make a purchase request within a certain period of 
becoming aware of the occurrence of the triggering event.129 The consideration for 
the parent company’s promise to purchase is the investor’s promise to take up shares 
in the issuing company, obviously, the put option agreement must therefore be 
entered into before or at the same time as the contract of allotment. Otherwise the 
consideration would be past consideration and the promise in the put option would 
not be binding.130 
A further clause is commonly included in the terms of a redeemable preference 
share issue whereby, if the company fails or is unable to redeem on the redemption 
date, a specified percentage of the holders of the preference shares may elect to have 
the company apply, from time to time, any money permissible towards redemption 
until full repayment has occurred. Only at this time will the shares be redeemed. 
Moreover, in order to avoid any doubt on whether the preference shareholders, 
acting in this way, preclude themselves from relying on failure to redeem to bring 
                                                
129 See Hill J., ‘Preference Shares’ in Austin and Vann (eds), The Law of Public Company Finance 
(Law Book Company, Sydney 1986), 144 where she says that the correct analysis of this 
arrangement should be seen in the decision United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v. 
Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd, [1968], 1, W.L.R. at 74, where it would appear to be that a 
unilateral contract exists whereby the parent makes an irrevocable offer to the investor 
which will become enforceable upon the fulfilment of the conditions precedent of triggering 
event and notification. On this analysis, the investor has no right to call on the parent to 
purchase the shares unless there is strict compliance with the notification requirement. 
130 Triantis A.J. and G.G. Triantis, ‘Conversion rights and the design of financial contracts’, 72 Wash. 
U. L. Q., 1994, 1240 ff.  
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into operation the put option,131 they may explicitly write this clause to be “without 
prejudice” to the company’s obligation to redeem on the redemption date. This wise 
precaution can be very useful for a preference shareholder, because assuming that 
the failure to redeem were construed as a continuing default, it would therefore seem 
that the shareholder could activate the put option at any later time. Finally, the 
position of the shareholder can be further fortified by the issue of a letter of credit by 
a bank that secures the performance by the parent of its obligations under the 
purchase agreement. The bank, in granting this facility, will usually require that 
security be given, often in the form of charges over the property of the parent 
company. There are many possible permutations of this basic structure. The terms of 
issue of the shares can contain various indemnities protecting the shareholders from, 
for example, detrimental changes to income tax law and other problems arisen by the 
hybrid characterisation of such a transaction.132 
 
 
1.3. Elements of convertible obligations  
The history of convertible bonds goes back to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. At that time transport routes with railway lines were financing their 
investment needs. In England, as a consequence of the South Sea Company and 
other fraudulent issues, a strict legislation was introduced that severely limited stock 
promotions. However, the need for fresh finance to build the canals and railroads in 
the nineteenth century eventually restored public acceptance of business corporations 
and trading in market securities became the primary activity. This resulted in the 
establishment of the London Stock Exchange in 1802 and the repeal of the 
legislation in 1825.133 So important did the London market become to the railroad 
promoters of the Middle Atlantic and Southern states that they, following the 
                                                
131 See Hill, 1986, note 194, at 164. It is not clear whether the preference shareholders merely waive a 
right to redemption on a particular date, which can be reinstated by the giving of reasonable 
notice or rather impose a new obligation on the issuer precluding themselves from relying on 
the failure to redeem to activate the put option. 
132 See Dawson K., Option agreements, 18(5) Comp. Law. 1997, 152; Ferran E., Company Law and 
Corporate finance (Oxford University Press, 1999) 391. 
133 Morgan V.E. and Thomas W. A., The Stock Exchange, Its History and Functions (Elek Books, 
London, 1962) 16. 
   
   46 
example of the states governments, began to issue their bonds in sterling 
denominations with the interest and principal payable in London.134  
While in densely populated England and New England, local resources were 
sufficient to enable the early railroads to use mostly equity financing, the railroads 
constructed in the western United States raising funds in the British financial market 
were largely debt-financed.135 US railroads tended to raise debt finance for two main 
reasons. In primis, because the importance of American railroad finance involved 
huge sums and only equity was not sufficient. Second, since these projects needed to 
seek funds from distant regions, in which the investors were poorly informed about 
the project’s duration and its related developments, debt securities, being the safest 
channel to invest in a corporation’s business, were considered the best mean to 
obtain finance.136 	  
However, at that time, the greater asymmetry of information between the 
investors and the companies made even debt finance problematical. Financial 
institutions had to be invented to make "trading on equity" feasible. Generally, as 
long as the payment of interests and principal are guaranteed, a corporate debt 
security can be priced accurately. However, the evaluation of debt finance was 
complicated by the uncertainty and high risk perceived by the investors. In order to 
reduce it, in 1836, an order of English Parliament introduced a capital ratio equity-
debt of one-third for companies and conditioned borrowing to the full payment of at 
least one-half of share capital.137 This policy of limiting leverage may have made 
corporate debt securities more marketable, but also restricted possible benefits. The 
most prevalent technique of reducing perceived risk was therefore through liens.138 
When the debt security was issued as a debenture, but not only, it was most likely 
made convertible into a share of the company. The equity option was considered an 
                                                
134 Chandler A., ‘Patterns of American Railroad Finance’, 28 Business History Review, 1954, 248-
263. 
135 Cleveland F.A. and Powell F.W., Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the United States 
(Ayer Publishing, 1909) 50-51; Dewing A.S., The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: 
Ronald Press Co. 2nd ed., 1919) 64 and Ripley W.Z., Railroads: Finance & Organizations (New York 
Longmans, Green and Co. 1915, reprinted 2000 by Beard Books) 105. 
136 Baskin J.B., ‘The Development of Corporate. Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 
1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric. Information’, 62 Business History Review, 1988, 199-237. 
137 Ripley, 2000, note 200, at 116. 
138 As of 1913, 90 per cent of the funded railroad debt in the US ($11.2 billion) was backed by some 
type of mortgage and only 10 per cent consisted of debentures, see Ripley, 2000, note above, at 139. 
   
   47 
acceptable compensation for the increased risk due to the absence of liens.139 Two of 
the three largest privately financed roads, the Reading and the Camden and Amboy, 
shortly after they began construction, floated twenty-year and thirty-year sterling 
bond issues secured by mortgages on the road's property and convertible to stock at 
the holder's option. The long-term convertible mortgage bond initiated here was to 
remain throughout the nineteenth century the standard type of American railroad 
bond.140  
A convertible obligation may be defined as a corporate obligation to pay 
money that includes a stipulation granting to the holder at his election the privilege 
of requiring the debtor corporation to deliver shares of stock in place of payment of 
the debt. The privilege granted to the holder of a convertible obligation is an option 
separate from the corporate obligation to pay the money and its invalidity will not 
affect it.141  For investors, this future claim gives convertible bonds the advantage of 
combining desirable features of straight bonds, such as fixed income payments and 
principal repayment, with the upside potential of common stock.142  
In consideration of the conversion privilege, which gives bondholder the right 
to convert the bond into the issuer’s (or guarantor’s) equity, an investor is prepared 
to accept a lower interest rate. Thus, a convertible bond is usually issued with a 
lower coupon than that payable on a comparable straight bond of the same issuer in 
the same currency. The coupon or interest rate payable on the bond is, however, 
fixed at a premium over the current dividend yield of the underlying shares so as to 
make the convertible an attractive investment when compared with purchasing the 
underlying equity. In exchange for the future equity claim, bondholders customarily 
also accept a subordinated status in the priority list of claims of the firm and not to 
                                                
139 See also Cleveland and Powell, 1909, note 200 above, at 156-64. 
140 Chandler, 1954, note 199 above, at 248-263. 
141 Dewing A. S., A Study of Corporation Securities: Their Nature and Uses in Finance (New York: 
Ronald Press Co., 1934) 621 where the Author speaking of convertible bonds states “[…] But these 
partake largely of the nature of stocks, since they are issued with the hope that the holder will 
become a partner and not a creditor, if the enterprise can in the future be made to appear 
sufficiently attractive. They stand for an indirect method of increasing the stock or of creating an 
artificial market for the bonds by attaching to them a speculative element which is foreign to the 
fundamental conception of funded debt”. Johnson C.J. and Mc Laughling J., Corporate Finance and 
the Securities Laws (New York, 1997) 697 ff.; Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law 
(4th ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1979), 413; Magnus S.W. and Estrin M., Companies Law and 
Practice (London, 1978) 101; Berle A., Studies in the Law of Corporate Finance (Chicago: Callaghan 
& Co. 1928) 130. 
142 Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 673. 
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impose restrictive covenants to the firm. To issuers, these concessions give 
convertibles advantages over straight debt, such as cost savings, increased future 
capacity to incur senior debt and greater flexibility to advance the interests of the 
common stockholders.143 
In order to measure the conversion privilege included in a convertible bond, it 
becomes essential to break it down into its elements: its debt value, its conversion 
value and its conversion premium. Its “debt value” is the value of an equivalent 
straight bond with the same coupon rate. This value is sensitive to the variables 
dominant in straight bond valuation, such as interest rate levels and the issuer’s 
equity cushion. The price at which the convertible bondholder may subscribe to 
shares in the issuer or guarantor is its “conversion price”. This price is usually higher 
than the prevailing market price for the shares at the date of the bond issue. If the 
conversion price is a constant, conversion value, which the amount is resulting by 
multiplying the conversion price by the number of shares the bondholder receives 
upon conversion (conversion ratio), varies with any change in price of the underlying 
common stock. The terms and conditions of the bonds will prescribe the mechanics 
of conversion and provide that the number of shares into which the bond converts 
will be equal to the denomination of the bond divided by the conversion price. For 
example, if a bond of £1,000 denomination is convertible into shares with a 
conversion price of £2 per share, 500 shares will be issued to the bondholder on 
conversion. Effectively, the debt represented by the bond will be released through 
the issue of such shares.144 
The bondholder’s investment in a fixed rate convertible bond is also protected 
against an upward movement in interest rates, which would usually depress bond 
value, due to the equity cushion in the form of the conversion privilege. Even if 
interest rates rise well above the rate payable on the convertible, the value of a 
convertible may not fall or fall as much as ordinary bonds, because investors would 
regard the convertible feature as adequate compensation for lower interest rates. In 
such events, arbitrage possibilities would prevent the bond from selling below the 
lower of debt or conversion value. The investor stands to lose only where interest 
                                                
143 Klein W.A., The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., 1975, 547-573. 
144 Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials (5th ed., New York, 2003) 420; Ferran E., 
Principles of corporate finance law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 520-522. 
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rates rise well above the convertible coupon and at the same time the stock price of 
the issuer does not rise above the conversion price. Of course, the optimal gain to an 
investor would occur if the issuer’s stock price rises well above the conversion price 
specified in the bond at a time prior to final redemption. The amount by which 
market value exceeds debt or conversion value is called “conversion premium”. In 
convertible bonds issuer the “conversion premium” is usually around 5 to 25 per cent 
above current share value.145  
The period during which a bondholder may exercise his conversion privilege 
usually commences at the end of the 40-day period after completion of distribution 
and continues until a date just prior to any date fixed for redemption of the bonds.146 
In practice, however, a bondholder would not wish to convert his bond into equity 
until the shares market price has exceeded the conversion price specified in the bond 
instrument, otherwise he would be subscribing shares at a price higher than their 
market price. On the other hand, a call option may be conferred on the issuer in 
convertible bonds, giving the company a right to redeem the bonds prior to the final 
maturity date. An issuer would usually wish to redeem the convertible bonds 
outstanding if interest rates moved significantly below the rate payable on the 
convertible. Such a right of redemption is also a mechanism whereby an issuer can 
force the bondholder to convert and exercise the conversion privilege, since the 
redemption of the bonds results in the extinction of the conversion privilege. Ideally, 
the issuer would wish bondholders to convert soon after the market price for the 
issuer’s ordinary shares or conversion stock is at a level above the conversion price 
specified in the bond instrument.  
 
 
1.4. Debt holding restrictive covenants and veto rights 
It is already known the dependence of the corporate sector on debt. Since debt 
characteristics assign the creditor defined contractual rights against the 
                                                
145 See Katzin J.S., ‘Financial and Legal Problems in the use of Convertible Securities’, Business 
Lawyer, January 1969, 359-361 says that in the US domestic market the premium was around 10% to 
20%; McCormick R. and Creamer H., Hybrid Corporate Securities: International Legal Aspects, 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), 4 place the premium between 5% and 25% in the international 
markets in London. 
146 See Wood P., ‘International Convertible Bond Issues’, 12 JIBL, 1986, 69. 
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company, providers of debt are in a position to play a significant role in 
corporate governance by monitoring managers and pressurising them to fulfil 
their obligations. Generally, the larger is the part financed by debt, the more 
control and pressure on the management the debt-holders will exert and this will be 
useful for the shareholders too.147 The extent to which bondholders can perform or 
would choose to perform the function of monitoring or controlling management will 
depend on the size of the loan, its intended duration, whether or not it is secured and 
above all which kind of covenants are included in the terms of issue of their 
securities. The practice of financial contract design has a long tradition in UK. Loan 
covenants were commonly used by early UK and US commercial banks, which were 
usually structured as joint-stock companies. At that time, banks operated in markets 
characterised by a high information asymmetry. In order to reduce the risk of default, 
lenders must create information about the borrowers. Early banks created 
information by probing the applicant's credit history and current financial condition, 
by evaluating the flow of funds through the borrower's checking account and by 
negotiating restrictive covenants specifying the users to which a particular loan 
would be put. Therefore, covenants allow financial institutions and financiers a say 
in the way that borrowing companies conduct their affairs and provide them with the 
leverage to renegotiate for yet more stringent control of borrowers in financial 
difficulties. The spirit of covenants is to prevent the managers from taking actions 
that benefit stockholders at the expense of bondholders. This aim is pursued by 
dealing with three main areas of concern for banks and investors: liquidity, the long-
term risk of a borrower getting into financial difficulty and management.148 
These obligations are usually more frequent and stringent when the lender is 
taking a large exposure. A lender, which is advancing a relatively small amount, may 
attach less importance to covenants.149 When the counterpart is composed of a pool 
of creditors, a large syndicate generally reduces the incentive for each investor to 
                                                
147 In general, see Triantis G.G. and R.J. Daniels, ‘The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate 
Governance’, 83 California Law Review, 1995, 1073; Cheffins B., Company Law: Theory, Structure 
and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 75-79; Ferran E., Company Law and Corporate 
finance (Oxford University Press, 1999) 480 ff.  
148 Wood P., International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 32. 
149 Day J. and P. Taylor, ‘Evidence on the Practice of UK Bankers in Contracting for Medium-Term 
Debt’, 9 JIBL, 1995, 394; Day J. and P. Taylor, ‘Bankers’ perspectives on the Role of Covenants in 
Debt Contracts’, 5 Journal of International Banking Law, 1996,  201 ff. 
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monitor decisions and increases haggling and coordination costs.150 The negotiating 
strength of the borrowing company and the nature of its business are also relevant 
considerations. A small company, which has limited access to other sources of 
finance, may have no commercial alternative but to accept short-term finance or 
funds which are subject to detailed restrictive covenants, while a large and well-
established company with a good credit rating and many available borrowing options 
may contract better and more flexible conditions in their loans.151  
However, even if a borrower would be willing to accept severe restrictions 
or, perhaps more accurately, lack the negotiating strength to resist them, a lender 
might hesitate to impose them. In fact, if a covenant is unduly onerous so that 
management is required to retain more of the company’s profits than it can prudently 
invest, this could result in investments being made in risky ventures with potentially 
adverse consequences for both lenders and shareholders.152 This issue has generated 
concern between both academics and practitioners, especially in relation to the 
drafting of terms attached to publicly issued debt securities.153 The potential 
difficulties arise most sharply in that context because, if the terms originally drafted 
prove to be too restrictive, the process of obtaining a relaxation may be particularly 
cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive as it may require the convening of a 
special meeting of the holders of the securities for that purpose.154 Furthermore, 
                                                
150 Rajan R.G.. and A. Winton., ‘Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to. Monitor’, 50 The Journal 
of Finance, 1995, 1113-1146. 
151 Normally, “bank power tends to be inversely related to borrower size, because the latter is closely 
correlated with credit rating and available borrowing options” see Herman E.S., Corporate Control, 
Corporate Power (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981) 122; see also Lomax D., ‘The Role 
of Banks’, in N. Dimsdale and M. Prevezer eds., Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, 1994, 
at 161, 173-177 outlining differences in a clearing bank’s relationships with small and larger 
businesses.  
152 Lister R., Debenture Covenants and Corporate value, 6 Co Law, 1985, 209 and 213; Sappideen R., 
‘Fiduciary Obligations to Corporate Creditors’, JBL, 1991, at 365 and 378. 
153 In the United States the work of the American Bar Foundation in sponsoring the development of 
standardised forms of debenture indentures (an indenture being the contract entered into between the 
issuing company and the holders of securities) has provided a focus for this debate: see Brudney V., 
and Bratton W.W., Brudney and Chirelstein’s Corporate Finance (4th ed. Foundation Press 1993)  
187-193. For an economic analysis of covenants see Smith C.W.  and J.B. Warner, ‘On Financial 
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, 7 Journal of Financial Economics, 1979, 117. 
154 Accordingly, covenants in bank loans are traditionally more restrictive than in bond issue, see 
Wood P., International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 137 
where he says that the relaxation process, either by way of the banks consenting to occasional 
transactions or by way of a formal variation to the contractual terms, may be relatively 
straightforward. However, it has to be remembered, in order not to oversimplify, that a 
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managers are especially likely to resist restriction of discretion to make investments. 
Accordingly, these covenants are likely to appear only in private placements and 
institutional investors’ venture capital and private equity transactions in which the 
lender has substantial contracting power as, for instance, in venture capital.155  
In the common practice of business covenants, a formal distinction can be 
made between affirmative and negative promises or between borrower’s promises to 
do and borrower’s promises to refrain from doing. Positive covenants concern the 
promise of the borrower to make periodic informational reports, to comply with law, 
maintain its franchises, insure and maintain its properties, and pay all properly 
assessed taxes. These covenants are useful because allow bondholders to monitor 
their investment. However, they do not change the debt nature of the security, 
because none of them materially constrains management’s discretion to operate the 
business, which is still prerogative of the controlling shareholders. In contrast, 
negative covenants oblige the borrower not to do certain operations, in order not to 
put its financial position at risk and in this way, they can significantly drive the 
business decisions-making by managers. In other words, whereas positive covenants 
are about information, negative covenants are about control. The longer is the list of 
prohibited outcomes, the stronger the control. At some point, the magnitude of 
control may become as great as to give the lender effective control of the firm.156  
Negative covenants can further be divided into occurrence-based versus 
maintenance-based covenants. Covenants for high yield loans will typically be 
occurrence-based that means the issuer can only undertake certain actions, such as 
raising additional debt or selling assets, if the action contemplated will not result in it 
breaching certain financial ratio tests at that time. These may include leverage ratio 
                                                                                                                                     
syndicated loan involving a number of lending banks could give rise to administrative difficulties 
similar to, if not as severe as, those which could be encountered in the context of debt securities. 
155 Bratton W.W., ‘Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and 
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above, 51 ff.; Smith C.W.  and J.B. Warner, ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants’, 7 Journal of Financial Economics, 1979, 124; McDaniel M., ‘Bondholders and 
Corporate Governance’, 41 Business Lawyer, 1986, 423; Day J. and P. Taylor, ‘Bankers’ perspectives 
on the Role of Covenants in Debt Contracts’, 5 Journal of International Banking Law, 1996,  201 ff. 
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tests as, for instance, the debt/total capitalisation ratio or the debt/EBITDA ratio and 
coverage tests as, for instance, the EBITDA/interest ratio. Conversely, bank credit 
and private placement note purchase agreements usually contain restrictive 
maintenance-based covenants that are tested quarterly or semi-annually. Non-
compliance with such tests would typically constitute an event of default even if the 
issuer had not borrowed another penny since the original debt issuance.157  
An extreme application of negative restrictive covenants comes from the use 
of veto rights as a protective provision often attached to preference shares in venture 
capital financing. These clauses give the investors a right to oppose unfair 
company’s actions carried on against their interests. However, the scope of these 
provisions differs from company to company. Veto rights are generally employed 
by venture capital investors in order to avoid claim dilution in situations in which 
the risk supported by them is disproportionate vis-à-vis their return. Accordingly, 
they allow the investors to oppose the completion of a firm's recapitalization 
through the issuance of new securities involving the entry of a new investor, if 
the subscription price is considered to be too low compared to the real share price 
or the presumed share price.158 These covenants are also frequently used in the 
context of an exit event, a sale of all or substantially all of the company’s assets, a 
merger or other important corporate transactions. For instance, in IPOs, if the 
financier considers unacceptably low the price per share proposed for the listing, he 
or she may benefit from a right to veto and block the transaction by refusing to 







                                                
157 These covenants can also be used as early warning signs of a financial deterioration of the 
business. 
158 See Mann R.A. et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing a Start-up 
Company, 56 ARK. L. REV., 2004, 861-2.  
159 The preferred stock purchased by financiers will generally have a provision requiring the 
automatic conversion of preferred stock upon either an IPO at a pre-specified price per share or the 
requisite vote of preferred stockholders. 
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Chapter 2. Distinguishing between Equity and Debt 
The starting point for any research in capital structure is the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem. It suggests that – under very strict and unrealistic assumptions – a 
company’s capital structure does not matter. However, without doubt, a lot of energy 
is invested in finding the optimal capital structure for a given company in the real 
world. Theory explains this mainly by pointing towards the differing tax and 
regulatory treatment of debt and equity, respectively, as well as information 
asymmetries between creditors, shareholders and managers. However, once the 
conditions that underpin the M&M study on the optimal capital structure are 
relaxed,160 the choice between financing assets with debt or equity becomes material, 
and mutatis mutandis, the classification of a financial instrument as either debt or 
equity. As far as classifications are concerned, accounting rules play an important 
role in the framework of corporate law. They are targeted to measure and classify the 
financial instruments issued by a company in order to reflect the desire for 
transparency between company and investors. Furthermore, regulatory bodies 
heavily rely on accounting numbers as control over regulations.  
Accountants and tax authorities are dedicated to a dichotomous classification 
that has been considered the most suitable way to identify and then interpret certain 
results as the annual income and taxable results. Although in principle, a twofold 
distinction between equity and debt can appear quite straight forward because of 
their contrasting characteristics, it is in reality blurred by the existence of hybrid 
financial instruments, which consist in securities with a mix of both equity and debt 
features. Therefore, hybrids complicate the task of the regulators because they 
provide the users with an optimal tool of regulatory arbitrage.  
 
2.1. Does capital structure matter? 
During the years, the equity-debt trade off has animated many doctrinal discussions 
in relation to dividend policies, the optimal financial structure on investment choices, 
conflicts of interests arising between different claimants of future streams of returns 
                                                
160 It means that markets are not perfect and efficient so taxes and bankruptcy costs exist as well as 
asymmetric information and borrowing costs.  
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and the management of the company, as well problems associated with the 
separation between ownership and control in a company.161  
One strong argument against writing a thesis on the Debt-Equity distinction is 
the Modigliani & Miller theorem (M&M theorem), which demonstrates how the 
division between the two is irrelevant to the value of the firm and the doctrine on 
corporate finance should not concern itself with figuring out the perfect debt-equity 
ratio to maximize the shareholders’ value. The theorem was published in 1958 and 
since then has been considered by many as the foundation of the modern corporate 
finance.162  
In the study, Modigliani and Miller assumed several strict conditions. First, in 
their fictitious economy they assumed the absence of any costs of insolvency 
(bankruptcy costs) as well as the absence of any taxation imposed either at the firm 
level or at the individual level. Second, markets are efficient and perfect. The 
efficient markets assumption means that there is no asymmetric information between 
the managers and all market participants. Therefore, the prices on traded stocks, 
bonds or property already reflect all known information, and instantly change to 
reflect new information. The perfect markets assumption means that transaction 
costs do not exist and there are no barriers to exit or enter in the markets. Thus, all 
investors share homogeneous expectations about the future prices of securities and 
individuals can borrow at the same interest rate as corporations. Third, in this 
fictitious world there is no division of the stream between cash dividends and 
retained earnings in any period, because the management is presumed to be acting in 
the best interests of the stockholders. The issued shares are divided into “equivalent 
                                                
161 See Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th 
ed. 2008) 815-820 and 1135-1148; Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 
2009) 163 ff.; Farrar J.H. and Hanningan B.M., Farrar’s Company Law (Butterwords, fourth ed., 
London, 1998) 158-160; Burgess R., Corporate Finance Law (London, 1992) 5-6; Stocks T.E., 
Corporate Finance: Law and Practice (London, 1992) 6; Hamilton R. W., Corporations, Including 
Partnership and Limited Liability Companies, Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn., 1998) 299; Klein 
W.A. and Coffee J.C. Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles (New 
York, ninth ed. 2004) 7-11; McCormick R. and Creamer H., Hybrid Corporate Securities: 
International Legal Aspects, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), 2; but this opinion is supported since 
long time Dewing A.S., The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: Ronald Press Co. 2nd ed., 
1919) 34 and 78. 
162 See Modigliani F. and M. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Theory of 
Investment’, 48 The American Economic Review, 1958, 261-275. The essay was modified in part later 
Modigliani F. and M. Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes and The Cost of Capital: a Correction’, The 
American Economic Review, 1963, 433-443, and reconsidered more recently by Miller M.H., ‘Debt 
and Taxes’, The Journal of Finance, 32(2) 1977, 261-275 and Miller M.H., ‘The Modigliani Miller 
Propositions After Thirty Years’, 4 Journal of Economic Perspective, 1988, 99. 
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return” classes that means that all the shares issued by any firm in the same class 
have the same return and the various shares within the same class differ, at most, by 
a “scale factor”. In this way it is possible to classify firms into groups within which 
the shares of different firms are “homogeneous” or perfect substitutes for one 
another. At the same time, all bonds are assumed to yield a constant income per unit 
of time, are traded in a perfect market and are perfect substitutes for each other up to 
a “scale factor”.163   
Given those assumptions, the first and most famous proposition establishes a 
company capital structure does not matter because it is completely independent from 
the investment choices.164 To support its thesis, the M&M theorem showed that as 
long as the relations between “market value” and “average cost of capital” did not 
hold between any pair of firms in a class, arbitrage could take place and restore the 
stated equalities simply because if an investor were to exploit an arbitrage 
opportunity and to acquire shares at a lower price, the value of the overpriced 
securities would fall and the under priced shares value would rise, eventually 
eliminating the discrepancy.  
From the first proposition derives the second proposition that concerns the 
“rate of return” on ordinary shares in companies capitalized by debt. The second 
proposition establishes that gearing the firm does not increase the shareholder’ return 
or reduce the cost of capital, because the cost of equity capital is a linear function of 
the debt-equity ratio.165 Obviously, M&M theorem does not deny that a different 
composition of the financial structure could affect the expected rate of return of a 
company, but it shows that increasing the rate of return of the ordinary shares 
increases the amount of debt and consequently the financial risk, generating in a 
long-term investment a zero-sum game.  
A conclusion for an optimal investment policy of the firm that summarises the 
M&M theorem is reported in their third proposition where they state that the 
                                                
163 However, Stiglitz demonstrated that this third assumption is not essential, see Stiglitz J.E., ‘A Re-
Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem’, 59 American Economic Review, 1969, 784-793. 
164 See Modigliani F. and M. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Theory of 
Investment’, 48 The American Economic Review, 1958, 268. 
165 See Modigliani F. and M. Miller, 1958, note above, 271 where the authors say “the expected yield 
of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate p(k) for a pure equity stream in the 
class, plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread 
between p(k) and r”. 
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optimum ratio equity/debt is completely unaffected by the type of security used to 
finance the investment.166 For the authors, firm value is determined by the size and 
riskiness of the cash-flows arising from the investments in risky projects. The 
underlying investment and operating decisions that determine corporate cash-flows 
are independent of financing decisions i.e. are unaffected, and therefore capital 
structure decisions will merely result in changing the distribution of these cash-flows 
between the different claimants. Capital structure decisions will, of course, alter 
shareholder’s anticipated risk and returns but this will not have any impact on total 
firm value because in a perfect and complete capital market, investors can profit 
without cost from any market mispricing via the application of “home-made 
leverage”, namely the arbitrage effect.  
Subsequently in a following study, Miller and Modigliani first and Miller then 
observed the same scenario relaxing the no taxation assumption. Due to the 
preferential treatment of debt relative to equity in tax law, the optimal capital 
structure can be complete debt finance. However, although a firm could generate 
higher after-tax income by increasing the debt-equity ratio and thus higher pay-out to 
stockholders and bondholders, the value of the firm need not increase. The 
explanation for it is that while debt lowers the firm’s cost of capital because passive 
interests are tax deductible, it rises the level of taxation to individual investors, 
because for an investor taxes are higher on interest payments than on equity returns. 
The disproportion in taxation resulting from a cheaper tax rate on dividends and 
capital gains than on interest at the investor level, eliminates or partly offset the tax 
advantage of debt finance to the firm.167 Company will persuade the market investors 
to hold debt instead of shares as long as the corporate tax saving is greater than their 
personal tax loss.168 
The fundamental contribution of the M&M Theory is that it structures the 
                                                
166 See Modigliani F. and M. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Theory of 
Investment’, 48 The American Economic Review, 1958, 288. 
167 Miller M.H., ‘Debt and Taxes’, The Journal of Finance, 32(2) 1977, 269 and 270, where the 
author says the value of the firm in equilibrium will be independent of its capital structure but “there 
would be no optimum debt-equity ratio for any individual firm”. 
168 Farrar D. and L. Selwyn, Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors. 20(4) 
National Tax Journal, 444-454; Myers S.C., ‘Taxes, Corporate Policy and Returns to investors: 
Comment’, 20(4) National Tax Journal, 1967, 455-462; Myers S.C., ‘Capital Structure’, 15(2) The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001, 87-88; Stapleton R.C., ‘Taxes, the Cost of Capital and the 
Theory of Investment’, 82 The Economic Journal, 1972, 1273-92; Stiglitz J.E., ‘Taxation, Corporate 
Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital’, 2(1) Journal of Public Economics, 1973, 1-34. 
   
   58 
debate on why irrelevance of the financial structure fails around the theorem’s 
assumptions, i.e. neutral taxes, no transaction costs, asset trade restrictions or 
bankruptcy costs; symmetric access to credit markets, symmetric information and 
firm financial policy. So doing, the theorem identifies exactly where to look for 
determinants of optimal capital structure and how those factors might affect capital 
structure.169 With regards to firm capital structure, the Theorem opened a host of 
literature on the fundamental nature of debt versus equity. The doctrine has been 
debating whether and in which ways the distinctions between debt and equity, as two 
distinct forms of capital, are really substantial in economic terms.170 Therefore the 
main questions driving this chapter are does a clear distinction between equity and 
debt, as two different opposing methods to contribute finance in a corporation’s 
business exist in law and how hybrid financial instruments fit in this dichotomy? 
And if yes, since economic theory finds no justification for it, why the law needs to 
classify investors’ claims and why companies issue hybrid instruments? 
 
 
2.2. Definition of equity and share capital    
The Company Act 2006 defines equity share capital as “its issued share capital 
excluding any part of that capital which, neither as respects dividends nor as 
respects capital, carries any right to participate beyond a specific amount in a 
distribution”.171 Preference shares are normally, although not always, entitled only 
to a fixed return by way of both dividends and capital. They do not therefore 
constitute equity share capital although they may do so if the return on dividend or 
capital is not fixed or deferrable. In accountancy, a broader notion is the generally 
accepted definition as reflected in the international accounting standards documents 
where equity is defined as the residual interest in the assets of an enterprise after 
deducting its liabilities.172 The European accounting rules makers have chosen not to 
make the definition of equity conceptually based, but simply based on an arithmetic 
                                                
169 Huang P.H. and M.S. Knoll, ‘Articles and Essays: Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance 
Theory’, 74 Southern California Law Review, November 2000, 179. 
170 Villamil, Anne P., ‘Modigliani–Miller theorem’, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, in 
Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (eds.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 2nd eds.). 
171 s. 548 (ex s. 744 of the CA 1985). 
172 IASB, F. 49(c). 
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calculation: that is, knowing assets and liabilities, equity can be inferred. The 
purpose of this choice is the desire to include the totality of classes of shares without 
entering in difficult legal definitions. In fact, some items included in the equity of the 
balance sheet are merely “accounting figures” given that they are not based on 
contracts as the other capital instruments. Instead, these are items sometimes based 
on statutory requirements, such as retained earnings and sometimes neither based on 
contracts nor statute such as currency translation adjustments or gains and losses that 
have been recognised directly “in equity”. Under current International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), these items are not recognised in the income statement 
(revaluation reserve, cash flow hedging reserve). They are simply figures that exist 
as a result of certain accounting conventions. Nevertheless, since shareholders may 
claim them, at least upon liquidation, they still do form capital interests that are 
attached to a capital instrument. Therefore, it can be argued that the capital side of 
the balance sheet comprises “claims” that only differ on their intensity. The claims to 
the company’s assets generally feature a combination of certain criteria such as term, 
type of return and existence of voting rights and their corresponding attributes: fixed 
term vs. perpetual life, fixed vs. variable return, existence of positive or negative 
covenants etc.173 Shares and bonds strongly differ in the intensity of their claims. 
However, in between these two distinct categories, there is a myriad of hybrid 
financial instruments that mix characteristics, which are generally associated with 
straight equity and straight debt, making their classification into a dichotomous 
structure of capital very difficult.174 Difficulties in distinguishing between equity and 
liabilities arise especially when the single characteristics of a security point into 
different directions. For example, a security may assign to its subscribers a right to 
participate in the company’s gains and losses, which is a characteristic generally 
associated with ordinary shares, but at the same time be repayable at a fixed date, as 
a plain vanilla bond. As Table 1 below shows, it is possible to replicate any typical 
characteristic of equity or debt with hybrid financial instruments while obtaining a 
different classification. Therefore, if ambiguity in the accounting constructs is to be 
accepted as an important conceptual and practical issue, it is necessary to understand 
                                                
173 Pro-active accounting activities in Europe (PAAinE), Discussion Paper “Distinguishing between 
liability and equity”, January 2008, available at http://www.iasplus.com/efrag/0801liabequitydp.pdf 
(accessed March 2012). 
174 Connors P.J. and G.H.J. Woll, Hybrid Instruments – Current Issues, 553 PLI/TAX, 2002, 175, 181. 
   
   60 
how these constructs are utilised by financial statement users and how they 
potentially influence real decisions made by companies and individuals and perhaps, 





2.3. Why distinguish between equity and debt: the role of accounting as 
control over regulations 
The importance of distinguishing equity from liabilities or equity instruments from 
debt instruments respectively has to be considered in relation to the fundamental role 
that accounting numbers have acquired within the framework of company law. 
Nowadays, accounting numbers are perceived to have sufficient credibility to act as 
a basis for economic contracting between corporate entities and related interest 
groups. Disclosure and transparency rules, which are mandatory for public 
companies, strongly rely on accounting numbers. Public companies generally need to 
publish their accounts according to certain defined international standards and have 
them certified by an authorized audit company. Financial accounting provides 
investors with the primary source of independently verified information about the 
Characteristic features 
Classification as: 
EQUITY HYBRID SECURITIES DEBT 
Participation in ongoing profit or 
losses 
X Participating preference shares  
Subordination to all the creditors in 
liquidation 
X Subordinated/perpetual debentures  
Fixed payment on the instrument  Cumulative preference shares X 
Variable claim in repayment / 
redemption 
X 
Profit participating loans / 
redeemable preference shares 
 
Possibility to agree on no redemption X Redeemable shares  
Fixed term / maturity  
Cumulative redeemable preference 
shares / convertibles 
X 
Control / voting rights X 
Veto rights preference shares / 
voting bonds 
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company’s economic situation and the performance of managers.175 For instance, 
widespread use is made of accounting-based performance measures in managerial 
compensation contracts176 and in collective wage negotiations or of accounting-
based covenants in public debt contracts.177  
The level of gearing that measures the proportion of debt financing in the 
financial structure in comparison to equity financing is a strong instant indicator of 
the potential financial risk associated with a company. The rationale for this measure 
is based on the fact that debt is issued under contractual terms requiring the 
repayment of principal and interest on specified dates, whereas equity capital carries 
no such contractual obligations. As a matter of fact, the risk of default on debt 
repayments will increase as the proportion of debt finance in the capital structure 
increases. Decisions, which are based on risk assessments such as bankers’ lending 
decisions and investors’ decisions to buy or sell securities in the secondary markets, 
will depend on such analysis. Furthermore, the fundamental approach to define 
income implicit in conventional accounting procedures is to measure the change in 
equity between two points in time, adjusting for any new subscriptions of equity 
capital or withdrawals of capital in the period. Although profit or loss is calculated 
from flow variables such as revenues and expenses, the accounting model on which 
financial statements are based, linked by the process of double entry bookkeeping, 
ensures that revenues or other recognised gains are also reflected as increases in 
assets or decreases in liabilities, whereas expenses will coincide with decreases in 
assets or increases in liabilities. In both cases, changes in the values of assets and 
liabilities arising from investments by or distributions to the owners of an enterprise 
would be excluded from the definition of income. If the above definition of income 
                                                
175 For a analysis of the role of accounting information in financial contracting see Gilson S. and J. 
Warner, Private versus public debt: evidence from firms that replace bank loans with junk bonds, 
Working paper, Harvard Business School, 1998, passim; Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial 
contracting meets the real world: an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of 
Economic Studies, 2003, 286-295. 
176 Bushman R.M. and A.J. Smith, ‘Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, December 2001, 237-333. 
177 Press E.G. and J.B. Weintrop, ‘Accounting-Based Constraints in Public and Private Debt 
Agreements: Their Association with Leverage and Impact on Accounting Choice’, 12 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 1990, 65-95; Sweeney A.P., ‘Debt-covenant violations and managers' 
accounting responses’, 17(3) Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 281-308; Peel D. A., Pope, 
P., 'Corporate accounting data, capital market information and wage increases of the firm', Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 1984, 177-188. 
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is accepted, then it is clear that the ability to distinguish between equity and 
liabilities is crucial to the income measurement process. In fact, the determination of 
the final result of the period together with the retained profits or other distributable 
reserves is usually the primary test for determining the maximum distribution to 
shareholders, whether the EU Second Directive178 applies or whether a solvency test 
is taken into account, as for instance, in the case of “whitewash procedure”. 179 
Moreover, as a matter of fact, extensive evidence shows that equity prices for public 
companies listed in the secondary market are associated with reported income.180  
Regulatory bodies heavily rely on accounting numbers as controls over 
regulations, for example, in the case of banks and insurances’ compliance with 
capital adequacy requirements, in the assessment of a company’s obligation to file its 
annual tax returns or when preparing the list of priorities in a company’s winding up. 
Other special authorities or market controllers rely on accounting numbers. The UK 
Stock Exchange, for example, imposes various constraints on listed companies, such 
as requiring the disclosure of contracts of significance (Class 3 transactions) in the 
directors’ report, defined as contracts which represent one per cent or more in value 
of a company’s net assets for a capital transaction. Again accounting numbers, in this 
case the total assets minus total liabilities or net worth (the equity of the firm), 
assume a pivotal role. The reclassification for banks and insurers solvency 
requirements as well as the financial analysis for credit rating is strictly based on the 
accounting statements. Furthermore, the income measurement process is essential in 
the calculation of corporate tax liabilities. Finally, the law of insolvency hinges 
crucially on accounting numbers to define the insolvency event and hence, the 
situations under which directors face penal sanctions or are imposed creditor-
regarding duties.181 It is clear that the measurement of the magnitude of liabilities in 
relation to the total assets is crucial in the first instance in defining insolvency. 
Formally, one of the criteria the court will take into account when determining 
whether a company is unable to pay its debts is whether the value of the company’s 
                                                
178 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 
179 Pope P.F. and Puxty A.G., ‘What is Equity - New Financial Instruments in the Interstices between 
the Law, Accounting and Economics’, 54 MLR 889 (1991) at 895. 
180 Lev B., ‘On the Usefulness of Earnings and Earnings Research: Lessons and Directions from Two 
Decades of Empirical Research’, Journal of Accounting Research: Supplement, 1989, 153-192. 
181 Davies P.L., ‘Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency’, 7 EBOR, 2006, 
336-337. 
   
   63 
assets is less than the value of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and 
prospective liabilities.182  
 
 
2.4. Classification of financial instruments in different regulatory areas 
Most concepts of accounting for hybrid financial instruments, for instance, in 
tax and accounting law, share a preliminary principle for keeping the binary structure 
on the balance sheet. The rationale for keeping a simple structure lies in the 
regulatory need to provide investors with clear and easily accessible balance sheets. 
Therefore, accounting and tax law attempts to fit hybrid financial instruments into 
the two traditional baskets – equity and debt. While this leads to a binary 
classification of the entire instrument as either debt or equity in tax law, an 
intermediate approach is taken in accounting. Here, using the traditional baskets, an 
instrument can be classified as a combination of these two ends of financing 
spectrum. It can easily be seen, however, that debt and equity still remain the 
reference points in accounting, and hence are treated as the building blocks (or 
ingredients) of any financial position. 
Capital adequacy regulation in banking (and likewise in insurance regulation) 
as well as assessment of financial instruments by CRAs, on the other hand, partly 
abandon the traditional binary model. Banking regulation acknowledges multiple 
categories or different “qualities” of capital, which are represented by the various 
tiers and sub-tiers of capital. Unlike in accounting regulation, not all of these baskets 
can simply be regarded as a mix of a plain vanilla debt position with common share-
like equity. Mainly because of the particular risks associated with the inherently 
fragile financial sector and the resulting regulatory goals, factors that do not fit in 
well with the traditional divide – such as remaining time until maturity, pay-out 
restrictions, redemption (ie pre-payment) restrictions, etc – are increasingly taken 
into account in bank capital regulation. This effectively goes some way towards 
acknowledging a multi-dimensional approach to the classification of hybrid financial 
instruments. Going even further, the approach of CRAs in assessing hybrids almost 
completely abandons the traditional divide. The aim of CRAs is to rate the quality of 
                                                
182 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 123. 
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a claim from the creditor’s (or beneficiary’s) perspective. This aim necessarily 
implies a more commercial – or functional – approach to this exercise. 
It is worth noting that all of these approaches are interconnected. For instance, 
the approach taken by CRAs has an important impact on banking regulation. While a 
banking-specific regulatory framework applies to the right-hand side of a bank’s 
balance sheet, the regulatory use of CRA-assessments183 in relation to a bank’s assets 
import their approach to hybrid classification into the banking regulation sphere. To 
a certain extent, such links also exist between accounting and tax law. 
None of the aforementioned approaches is able to consistently deliver the 
“correct” results, even within the narrow boundaries of the respective discipline or 
regulatory aim. Hence, they often create incentives for regulatory arbitrage. In fact, 
hybrids show a capacity to evolve and change their characteristics during their life in 
order to exploit the differences of different tax systems or simply the inconsistencies 
in the same regulation. For this reason, they are widely used as tools for intra-group 
financing, driven by both tax and accounting regulation. Research has shown that 
with a simple equity-debt split the reporting companies are almost encouraged to 
take advantage of this somewhat limited view by structuring their instruments’ terms 
and conditions in order to achieve a desired accounting classification.184  
Moreover, issuers can raise funds without fully having reflected their true 
financial positions in head-line financial metrics such as the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Hence, the heavy reliance by institutional investors and analysts on key financial 
figures in itself creates scope and incentives for arbitrage, which is independent of 
the regulatory system. Just as firms sometimes buy back shares in order to “adjust” 
(ie manipulate) financial figures such as earnings per share (EPS), which then 
incidentally result in increased incentive pay,185 managers can also use hybrid forms 
                                                
183 See Weber R., ‘The regulatory use of credit ratings in bank capital requirement regulations’, 10 
Journal of Banking Regulation, 2008, 1. 
184 Engel E., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew, Debt-equity hybrid securities, 37 Journal of Accounting 
Research, Autumn 1999, 262 ff. The evidence found demonstrated how important is for managers the 
classification of some financial instruments and that firms often are able to pay a “premium” to 
achieve certain classification status. 
185 For an empirical study of this effect in the context of accelerated share repurchases see e.g. 
Marquardt, C.A., Tan, C.E. and Young, S.M., ‘Accelerated Share Repurchases, Bonus Compensation, 
and CEO Horizons’ (2009). Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346624> (accessed 18 January 
2011). 
   
   65 
of financing to “optimise” their firm’s capital structure – or at least its perception in 
the market.186 
How can the problems created by inconsistent and imperfect classification of 
hybrids be addressed? It has been argued that a more faithful representation of a 
company’s financial position would require adding a third category – “mezzanine 
capital” – to the traditional dichotomy of equity and debt.187 However, a threefold 
capital structure would not only require a costly revision of the entire accounting and 
tax system. It is submitted that it would also be an inadequate response to the 
problems identified in this chapter. If the main finding is multi-dimensionality, it is 
unclear how introducing a new “in-between” category would do more than 
complicating things even more. In fact, the proposed “mezzanine” category seems 
very similar in result to the already practised accounting rules applicable to certain 
hybrid instruments, whereby the capital raised is bifurcated (ie accounted for 
partially as equity and partially as debt).188 
The analysis also shows that the different aims of classifying hybrid 
instruments in accounting, tax and corporate law render it impossible to find a single 
consistent approach for this exercise. This divergence cannot, in the opinion of this 
author, be bridged by introducing a third classification category. Nor will it be 
possible – or indeed desirable – to create a common methodology for assessing 
hybrid financial positions across different disciplines.189 
 
                                                
186 Empirical evidence on this is provided by  Hribar P., Jenkins N. and Johnson W., ‘Stock 
repurchases as an earnings management device’, 41 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006, 3. 
Hribar et al find that share buy-backs are significantly more likely to be implemented where they lead 
to the issuer meeting analysts’ EPS forecasts which otherwise they would have fallen short of. 
187 Hopkins P., ‘The effect of financial statement classification of hybrid financial instruments on 
financial analysts’ stock price judgments’, 34 Journal of Accounting Research, 1996, at 45-46 where 
the author shows how analysts examined more carefully the attributes of hybrid securities as the 
mandatorily redeemable preference shares when they were classified in the mezzanine instead of 
either debt or equity. This idea was already proposed long time ago, see Paton, W.A. Accounting 
Theory: With Special Reference to the Corporate Enterprise (New York, NY: Ronald Press, 1922) 
passim. 
188 See IAS 32. 
189 Creating a third category of capital or abolishing any categorization between equity and debt 
would necessitate addressing questions that reach beyond a stand-alone revision of the current 
standards. Compare the report of Ryan S.G., R.H. Herz, T.E. Iannaconi, L.A. Maines, K. Palepu, 
C.M. Schrand, D.J. Skinner, L. Vincent; “Evaluation of the FASB's Proposed Accounting for 
Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Liabilities, Equity, or Both: AAA Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee”, 15 Accounting Horizons, 2001, 387-400. 
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2.5. Hybrid financial instruments’ implications for corporate law 
For a long time, international regulatory bodies and courts have struggled with the 
classification of hybrid instruments. Over time, hybrid financial instruments and 
capital structures have grown to such complexity that their consistent classification 
across different regulatory spheres has become virtually impossible. The analysis in 
this Part highlights some of the most important regulatory issues raised by hybrid 
financial instruments and points to the influence the law has on the way companies 
raise their financing. We have considered several regulatory areas, all of which take 
different approaches to classifying hybrids. 
One area that has received significantly less attention in the literature than the 
classical regulatory issues is corporate law. While deeply interwoven with 
accounting and insolvency law, corporate law also uses the distinction between debt 
and equity as a reference point when assigning roles within the organisational 
governance structure. While economic models typically regard shareholders’ 
governance rights as a natural counterweight to their “residual claimant”-nature and 
their lack of fixed entitlements to the firm’s assets,190 company law typically takes a 
very formalistic approach towards assigning such control rights. As we have 
explored in other areas, hybrids can often closely resemble or even perfectly 
replicate an equity holder’s financial position without using traditional, pre-packaged 
bundles of rights (ie ordinary or preference shares). Moreover, legal capital rules 
used in Europe likewise use a formal approach towards classifying financial 
instruments, thereby also leaving room for regulatory arbitrage. 
Thus, hybrids can, to some extent, call into question basic propositions like 
“equity holders will only receive distributions out of profits (or in the course of a 
capital reduction)” or “debt-holders will not be allowed to vote in the shareholder’s 
meeting”. If, for instance, an issuer is able to create an equity-like financial position, 
which, from a corporate law perspective, does not make the holder of the instrument 
a shareholder, redemptions of such instruments are not formally restricted by the 
rules on share buy-backs. Moreover, fundamental shareholder rights like pre-emptive 
rights and more generally control rights in connection with share issues could 
potentially be diluted to the extent that shareholder-like positions disguised as debt 
                                                
190 See e.g. Williamson, O., The Mechanisms of Governance (OUP 1996) 185.  
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instruments can be issued by managers without approval of shareholders. Likewise, 
shares can also be structured in a way that closely resembles debt instruments, 
conferring control rights on parties with no (real) residual claim.  
Of course, the ability of a company to assign control rights to some, but not all 
equity holders, is recognised by UK company law,191 and only little restrictions 
apply to such structures. But even in the UK, certain shareholder rights mandatorily 
(also) apply to holders of non-voting preference shares.192 By using hybrid financial 
instruments, parts of the mandatory corporate law can effectively be side-stepped, 
leading to a more flexible framework within which a company can reach a bargain 
with its investors than envisaged by the legislator. 
A company can, for instance, issue a profit participating loan, which gives the 
creditor the right to share in the (pre-P&L) profits of the company, achieving a result 
economically similar to an issue of redeemable shares.193 The redemption 
(repayment) of such a loan, however, would not be subject to strict capital 
maintenance rules. Moreover, as mentioned above, control of “real” (legal) 
shareholders is at least diluted with respect to the decision to issue such instruments. 
From this reasoning it follows that in order to achieve meaningful results the 
assessment of hybrid financial instruments must have regard to economic realities. In 
other words, an inflexible classification approach will never be able to deal with all 
forms of hybrids and adequately address the issues they may raise.  
Accordingly, the debt-equity examination needs to take a further analytical step 
and adopt a superior taxonomy that refers directly to the various financial and 
governance features embodied in any given hybrid instrument. Therefore, the 
analysis in the next part will consider the function of hybrids and the legal strategies 
                                                
191 Many other countries, however, take a more restrictive approach on the issuance of non-voting 
shares. Restrictions as to the proportion of a company’s capital issued in the form of non-voting 
preference shares exist, inter alia, in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg and Spain; see Shearman & Sterling LLP, ‘Proportionality Between Ownership and 
Control in EU Listed Companies’, 2007, 13, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/study_report_en.pdf> 
(accessed 10 January 2011). Restrictions generally range from 25% to 50%; ibid. 
192 See e.g. s 633 CA 2006. 
193 Certain company regulations imply a consequent accounting classification that may render the 
related accounting rule inapplicable in that particular case. For example, in the loss absorption 
approach, redeemable shares at a certain expected event are considered liability, although in Europe 
the Second Directive of capital maintenance expressly allows the redemption of the shares only out of 
distributable dividends. 
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available for their investors to address the opportunism that can accompany 
fundamental changes in the life of a firm. The list is illustrative rather than 
exhaustive and is written with the understanding that some suggestions may be more 
practical than others and some more controversial than others. 	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Chapter 3. Setting the theoretical framework  
This chapter, which concludes Part I, aims to define the theoretical framework in 
which I operate and that will be useful for the following analysis in this thesis. It is 
centred around the economic analysis of corporate law and finance. The task of it is 
to found the basis of a new methodology for assessing hybrid financial instruments 
and the implications for the corporate governance. For this purpose, the chapter will 
re-examine some main corporate governance theories. In particular, transaction 
costs, agency costs and property rights literature is discussed at the aim of 
developing a functional approach. The stream of literature, which followed the 
M&M Theorem, has focused on the nature of capital, examining financial contracts 
such as debt and equity as two alternatives for the investors to respond to particular 
market frictions, in conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. Therefore, 
the company is not seen as a “black box” but as “simply one form of legal fiction 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterised 
by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the 
organisation”.194 The study on the nature of the firm, which started with Ronald 
Coase’s seminal work,195 has been essential in understanding the dynamics of power 
relations among corporate constituents.196 
Often in the past, hybrid instruments have been analysed in relation to one or 
some of their characteristics but never in context. Since the economic theories have 
evolved with the development of the corporation, the analysis of the corporate 
structure and in particular of the financial instruments must also be adjusted. The 
originality of the methodology lies under the fact that the legal strategies concerning 
hybrid forms of securities will be analysed against the background of these theories.  
                                                
194 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, 26 J. Law & Econ., 1983, 
327.  
195 Coase R., ‘The nature of the firm’, 4 Economica, 1937, 20 ff.; Idem, reprinted 1988, 33 and 43-47.    
196 See Triantis G.G.. ‘Financial contract design in the world of venture capital’, 68 The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 2001, 305-322; Armour J. and M.J. Whincop, ‘The Proprietary Foundations of 
Corporate Law’, 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2007, 440-457; Kraakman R. et al., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2009, 2nd ed.) passim; 
Worthington S., ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and entitlements (Part 1 and 2)’, 22(9) The 
Company Lawyer, 2001, 264 ff.; Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: 
Clarendon Law Series) 2002, passim; Blair M.M., ‘A Contractarian Defence of Corporate 
Philanthropy’, 28 Stetson L. Rev., (1998) 26; Macey J.R., ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: 
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’, 84 Cornell L. 
Rev., 1999, 1269-1273.  
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3.1. Transaction costs and company law  
Much of finance literature has analysed the firm’s choice of capital structure as 
separate from the firm’s real decisions, for example, what to produce and how to 
organise production. However, for a complete analysis, capital structure should be 
subsumed under a more general theory of the firm. Property rights literature and 
agency traditions share a view of institutional design as determined by a desire to 
economise on agency costs. While agency literature has been the main alternative 
approach in the capital structure literature, this literature does not explicitly consider 
the allocation of control rights, which is at the base of the property rights theory. 
Therefore, the two theories have to be considered complementarily.197  
The first incisive work on the study of the firm was Ronald Coase’s article on 
the nature of the firm, dated 1937, whose implications were long overlooked.198 This 
study broke with the traditional perfect competition model, adopted in the 
neoclassical economics theory where transaction costs were considered nil, to 
develop a new justification for the firm to exist. The managers of firms did 
intentionally what a market did spontaneously, i.e. to allocate resources to different 
uses. The economic reason for why the firm exists as a viable alternative to the price 
mechanism, of course, is because the price mechanism does not function flawlessly 
and costlessly. The process of internalisation of the business in the firm is explained 
as a means of economising on the transaction costs of using markets. However, 
internalisation is costly, because as firms increase in size, the managers become less 
efficient. Thus, in a world of positive transaction costs, governance structures matter 
for efficiency outcomes.199  
The scope of Coase’s paper was limited by its study of the classical firm, 
namely a company in which the shareholders and the managers were always 
coinciding. The difference between the classical firm and the modern corporation 
                                                
197 Bratton W., ‘Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring’, 1 Duke L. 
J., 1989, 1478-1501. 
198 Coase R., ‘The nature of the firm’, 4 Economica, 1937 reprinted in 1988, at 22. 
199 The Coase’s analysis of transaction costs shares strong parallels with his later study on property 
rights and externalities see Coase R., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 
1960, 42. 
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were studied by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their famous work.200 The 
authors indicated that shareholdings in many American public corporations were so 
diffuse that shareholders were unable to control those who managed the firm. They 
argued that this separation of ownership and control caused a divergence between the 
maximising behaviour expected of the classical firm and that these public 
corporations were controlled de facto by managers. The problems associated with the 




3.2. The company as a “nexus of contracts” and the theory of agency costs   
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling defined the firm in terms not dissimilar to Coase’s 
“system of relationships” as “a nexus of contracts”.202  The “nexus of contracts” 
definition disregards, as far as corporations are concerned, the distinction between a 
corporate contract, which is of an “originating” nature and that which is merely 
“operational”.203 The first type, which is of special interest to lawyers, may not arise 
for consideration in a micro economic analysis of production theory. This explains 
                                                
200 Berle A. and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York, Macmillan, 
1933) 244 and 312. For a recent survey on the ownership structure of the modern corporations see La 
Porta, R., Lopez De Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, ‘Investor protection and corporate valuation’, 
NBER Working Paper 7403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA., 1999, 511-
513.. See also, La Porta R. et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 Journal of Finance, 
1997, 1131-50 and La Porta R., F. Lopez De Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny,  ‘Law and Finance’, 
106(6) Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 1113-1155; Barca F. and Becht M., The Control of 
Corporate Europe (Oxford, 2001) 266-281.  
201 See Fama E., ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 88 Journal of Political Economy, 
1980, 290-292 where the author considers that a corporation does not have owners in any meaningful 
sense and the two functions of management and risk bearing have to be treated as naturally separate 
factors within the set of contracts called the firm. A possible solution is to make the management the 
ultimate beneficiary of the firm’s success (or a “residual claimant”) see this in Cheffins B., Company 
Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 35; for the management 
incentives see Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law 
Series) 2002, 198-214. 
202 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 305; Fama E. and M.C. Jensen, 
‘Separation between ownership and control’, 26  Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 301; Fama E. 
and M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 
327.   
203 Businesses are incorporated for specific purposes and those who invest in corporations have 
different expectations, rights and responsibilities depending on the legal nature of their investments.  
   
   72 
why a “nexus of contracts” definition will apply in economic analysis whether we 
are concerned with the classical capitalist firm or the modern firm.204  
The rich literature in this field emphasised that the corporation was simply a 
nexus for contracting between investors, factor suppliers and those responsible for 
managing the firm.205 Every single contractual relationship in the corporation 
generates an agency relationship.206 The “contract” determines the rights and 
obligations of the various stakeholders. However, economists, who first advanced 
this view, use “contract” in a much looser sense than lawyers to indicate all sort of 
voluntary arrangements and their various forms of governance, whether by 
legislation, by judge-made rules (e.g. fiduciary duties) or by private agreement (e.g. 
the articles).207 They eschew the concept of corporate ownership in assessing 
shareholders’ rights and directors’ obligations in the corporate system.208 Thus, they 
considered it anomalous to view the shareholders as corporate owners and untenable 
to claim that directors’ obligations should be driven mainly by the need to maximise 
                                                
204 Easterbrook F.H. and Fischel D.R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991) 12. 
205 The literature on the “nexus of contracts” theory and on the classical theory of property rights is 
considerable. See Williamson O.E., The Mechanisms of Governance (London, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Williamson O.E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (New York: Free 
Press, 1985); Alchian A. and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organization’, 62 American Economic Review, 1972, 779; Demsetz H., ‘Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights’, American Economic Review, May 1967, 354 ff.; Fama E. and M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency 
Problems and Residual Claims’, 26 Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 327; Butler H.N., ‘The 
Contractual Theory of the corporation’, 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev., 1989, 99; Wilson R., ‘On the 
Theory of Syndicates’, 36 Econometrica, 1968, 119-132; Berhold M., ‘A Theory of Linear Profit 
Sharing incentives’, 85 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1971, 460-482; Ross S.A., The Economic 
Theory of Agency: the Principals problems, LXII American Economic Review, 1973, 134-139; 
Heckermann D.G., ‘Motivating managers to make Investment decisions’, 2 Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1975, 273-292. 
206 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 308: “We define an agency 
relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.” 
207 Many of these different contractual provisions come in a standard form, providing either 
mandatory or default rules. Because the aim of the standard form is simply to reduce transaction costs 
in private arrangements, it follows that mandatory rules should be kept to a minimum, leaving the 
parties free to make their own bargains in accordance with prevailing market forces, see Easterbrook 
F.H. and Fischel D.R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1991) 21-22. 
208 See Fama E., ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 88 Journal of Political Economy, 
1980, 288. 
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profit for the shareholders.209 Simply, they perceived corporate constituents as factor 
providers, whose interests in the corporation are defined and regulated by contractual 
negotiations with the corporation.210  
Thanks to the theory of agency costs, the Coasian claim that defines the firm in 
terms of internalised contracts was united with the analysis of the separation of 
ownership and control, which was the reason behind the asymmetric distribution of 
information, and so becoming applicable to all kind of corporations. In particular, the 
theory of agency costs shed light on the nature of the transaction costs affecting 
particular contracts and how parties economised on these costs. Corporate 
governance trades off three things. The first is the advantages to specialisation in the 
performance of management functions and the bearing of residual risky by 
shareholders. The second is the complexity of management. The third is the 
transaction costs associated with implementing optimal governance to address 
contracting problems. The attributes of a firm, such as the diffuseness of its 
shareholder population, the separation of managerial functions from oversight 
functions and the structure of the board of directors, are treated by this literature as 
the equilibrium that the parties expect to optimise the outcome of this trade-off.211   
The agency costs analysis identifies specific contracting problems in 
corporations and in particular, how investors of equity and debt capital find it 
difficult to observe the exercise of managerial discretion. As a result, the directors 
may put into practice opportunistic behaviours such as transferring firm resources to 
their own, consuming “perquisites”, seeking higher than market salary or job 
security etc. For this reason, they need to be controlled and all the monitoring and 
bonding costs of auditing, formal control system, budget restriction and 
establishment of incentive compensation systems will be reflected in the company's 
                                                
209 Freeman R.E. and W.M. Evan, ‘Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder interpretation’, 19(4) The 
Journal of Behavioural Economics, 1990, 337-340. 
210 See Williamson O.E., Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L. J., 1984, 1197; Brudney V., ‘Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract’, 85 Colum. L. Rev., 1985, 1404. 
211 See Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law Series) 
2002, 201; Cheffins B., Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997) 249; Blair M.M., ‘A Contractarian Defence of Corporate Philanthropy’, 28 Stetson L. Rev., 
(1998) 26; Worthington S., ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and entitlements (Part 1 and 
2)’, 22(9) The Company Lawyer, 2001, 264 ff.; Macey J.R., ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: 
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’, 84 Cornell L. 
Rev., 1999, 1266. 
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shares value.212 However, the inefficiency is reduced the larger is the fraction of the 
firm’s equity owned by the manager.213 In public corporations where the managers 
are in control, the conflicts are between the managers and the shareholders as a 
whole and the agency costs are at their maximum, while in small private firms the 
conflicts, which are largely reduced, are between the majority and minority of the 
shareholders.214 
These agency costs of equity can be mitigated by the existence of debt. In fact, 
the larger the part of the corporate finance financed by debt, the more control and 
pressure on the management the debt holders will exert and this will be useful for the 
shareholders too. Since debt legally obliges the firm to pay out cash in order to 
satisfy the bond-holders’ contractual rights, the amount of “free” cash available to 
managers to spend on their benefits and perquisites is clearly reduced in the case of a 
leveraged company.215  Managers have a strong incentive to avoid a financial distress 
situation, because, if the company is declared insolvent, they may lose all their 
benefits of control and reputation. Moreover, debt allows the company to raise new 
funds without diluting the shareholders’ residual claim and to attenuate the adverse 
selection problem of outside equity by presenting a right to a fixed interest rather 
than a residual claim whose pay-off are less sensitive to the distribution of 
information.216  
However, debt finance does not come without its own agency costs. In order to 
maximise shareholders’ benefit, managers may invest in a way that transfers wealth 
                                                
212 See Barnea A., Haugen R. and Senbet L., Agency Problems and Financial Contracting (Prentice – 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985) passim; Brander J.A. and M. Poitevin, Managerial Compensation 
and the agency costs of debt finance, in Managerial and Decision Economics, 13 (1992), at 55-64; 
Ross S.A., The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach, 8 Bell 
Journal of Economics, 1977, 23-40, the author evolved an incentive-signalling model in which the 
capital structure can be considered as a mechanism that reduces the information asymmetries between 
manager and shareholders, demonstrating the robustness of financial and accounting signalling 
models. See also Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law 
Series) 2002, 198 ff. 
213 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 343. 
214 Barclay M.J. and C.W. Smith Jr., The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities, 50 Journal of 
Finance, (1955), 899; Klein W.A. and Coffee J.C. Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and 
Economic Principles (New York, sixth ed. 1996) 353.   
215 Jensen M., ‘Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-overs’, 72 American 
Economic Review, 1986, 323-329. 
216 Townsend R.M., ‘Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification’ 
21 Journal of Economic Theory, 1979, 265; Lacker J.M. and J.A. Weinberg, ‘Optimal Contracts 
under Costly State Falsification’, 97 The Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 1345-1363. 
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from the bondholders to the shareholders. For example, managers may exploit the 
limited liability of the company to invest in riskier projects with higher returns 
instead of choosing more valuable investments with lower variance. In so doing, 
equity holders gain the most if an investment yields large returns well above the face 
value of the debt. Otherwise, their risk is limited. This problem is also called “asset 
substitution” by economists. Similarly, when the firm’s cash flow from existing 
assets does not provide a sufficient return for the shareholders, managers have an 
incentive to discriminate and eventually turn down some profitable investment 
opportunities. In fact, management will choose to make an investment only if its net 
present value exceeds the face value of the debt, otherwise only creditors will benefit 
from this new project. This problem is called “underinvestment” or “debt 
overhang”.217 If the bondholders perceive the peril of being appropriated by an 
overinvestment in high-risk projects or by an underinvestment in low-value projects, 
they may well adjust downward the price they are willing to offer for the bonds or 
demand a higher interest rate for the credit and thus pass back the agency costs to the 
firm.218 
There are other opportunistic behaviours that may generate agency costs. 
Managers may be able to transfer wealth from debt-holders to shareholders with 
excessive dividend payments. Increased dividends create a decrease in the market 
value of the existing debt, when the payout is financed through a reduction in 
investments.219 Similarly, new borrowings of the same or higher priority to distribute 
a dividend expropriate debt value.220 In addition, managers may conceal problems or 
situations of financial distress to prevent creditors from acting to enforce immediate 
bankruptcy or reorganization, expanding the effective maturity of the debt and 
increasing its risk.221 In all these cases, important indirect costs occur even if 
                                                
217 Myers S.C. , ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, 5 Journal of Financial Economics, 1977, 
passim; Myers S.C., ‘Capital Structure’, 15(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001, 97. 
218 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 335-336. 
219 Black F., The dividend puzzle, 2 Journal of Portfolio Management, 1976, at 5-8; Kalay A., 
‘Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints’, 10 Journal of Financial Economics, 
1982, 211-233. 
220 Black, F. and M. Scholes, ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities’, Journal of Political 
Economy (May- June 1973), at 637-659. 
221 For examples of temptation at work see Asquith P. and D.W. Wizard, ‘Event Risk, Covenants and 
Bondholder Risk in Leveraged Buyouts’, 27 Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 195-214.  
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bankruptcy itself is ultimately avoided.222 According to the theory of agency costs 
thus, the equilibrium in the capital structure is given by the point of intersection 
between the curves of the marginal agency costs and of the demand for outside 
financing.223 In other words, an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading 
off the agency costs of debt against its benefits.224  
 
 
3.3. Contract incompleteness and ex post conflicts  
Ownership is important for economic efficiency in a real world where transaction 
costs are positive. This comes as a straight consequence of the relaxation of the main 
agency costs theory condition that transaction costs of contracting are nil because 
contracts are complete. Contractual arrangements are viewed as devices to mitigate 
ex post conflicts arising from managers’ opportunism. They revolve around three 
things: information privileges, control and property rights. Thus, the parties are 
capable of choosing optimal governance through contracting.225 However, contracts 
suffer from positive transaction costs. These costs have two specific effects: they 
may preclude trade or they may cause contracts to be incomplete. Contracts are 
incomplete either because terms are not specified or are not differentiated for certain 
                                                
222 Fama E. and M.C. Jensen, ‘Separation between ownership and control’, 26  Journal of Law and 
Economics, 1983, 301; Fama E. and M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, 26 
Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 327. For a modern approach to the agency costs and the related 
legal strategies to reduce them see also Armour J., H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Agency 
Problems and Legal Strategies’, in Kraakman R. et al. (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2009, 2nd ed.) 35 ff.; Davies P.L., Introduction to 
company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law Series) 2002, 111-280. 
223 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 357. This equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal, in other words, given a certain level of outside financing there is no way to reduce the agency 
costs without making someone worse off. 
224 Given a positive cash flow, high leverage can, at its equilibrium point, compensate the agency 
costs of debt and equity with its benefits. For this reason, industries in which the opportunities for 
asset substitution are more limited will have higher debt levels (these include tobacco corporations, 
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A. Raviv, ‘Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt’, 20 Journal of Financial Economics, 
1990, 55-86; Harris M. and A. Raviv, ‘The Theory of Capital Structure’, 46 The Journal of Finance, 
1991, 302 and 320. See also Stultz R., Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. 
Fin. Econ., 1990, 3-27. 
225 The term used by Williamson O.E., Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 
(New York: The Free Press, 1975) 70 to denote ex post opportunism. 
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possible states of the world.226 The contract incompleteness is due not only to the 
cost of bargaining, but also because language is imprecise and opens itself to 
interpretation, foresight is limited and asymmetries in information between parties 
may discourage more specific bargaining.227 While the law can address some of 
these incompleteness problems by providing standard terms that parties might be 
expected to agree to (for example, incorporation statutes of a low-cost company), 
some rules are impossible to emulate contractually since they apply to persons who 
are not parties to the corporate contracts (for example, the prohibition on the 
creditors of shareholders enforcing their debts against the assets of the company).228  
Since corporations run their business in the presence of uncertainty, contracts 
may also be incomplete in the lack of contractible elements due to difficulties in 
contemplating in advance all possible future contingencies and measuring 
performance under each contingency. In addition, the states of the world on which 
the parties would like to condition their contractual payoff often cannot be verified 
by a court. An insufficiently state-contingent contract creates an incentive to 
renegotiate or to breach.229 For example, “a promise to pay a fixed interest will mean 
the promisor must bear the risk that the production process fails, for whatever reason, 
to produce the expected surplus”.230 After all, the firm’s actions are not perfectly 
controlled. Furthermore, it is common in practice for a firm to comply fully with all 
of the restrictions contained in its debt agreements while still being able to undertake 
many changes in corporate policy that affect the debt-holder’s wealth.231 Similarly, 
“a contingent promise will mean the promisee must be able to observe and verify to a 
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230 Armour J. and M.J. Whincop, ‘The Proprietary Foundation of Corporate Law’, 27 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 2007, 447. 
231 Garvey G. and P. Swan, ‘The Economics of Corporate Governance: Beyond the Marshallian 
Firm’, 1 Journal of Corporate Finance, 1994, 141 where the authors say “so long as such explicit 
promises are fulfilled, the bondholders bear any losses and enjoy any gains that may flow from 
changes in corporate policy”. 
   
   78 
court that failure to make the promised payments does not fall within the contractual 
exclusions”.232  
Therefore, the significance of property rights depends on other properties of the 
contracts and on the transaction subject to contracting, such as the verifiability of 
important variables and opportunities for renegotiation. By definition, ceteris 
paribus, a more complete contract confers less residual property rights. The parties 
will adopt an organisational structure that allows information about managers to flow 
to other constituencies of the firm in order to control managerial opportunism. The 
parties will allocate property rights in a way that allow managers to act in the 
interests of investors and to permit persons with comparative advantages in 
monitoring to capture benefits from acting to remedy problems they observe.233  
 
 
3.4. The modern theory of property rights  
The theory of the firm literature has been enriched by the development of the theory 
of property rights. This study offers a more complex picture of the firm than the 
nexus of contracts paradigm.234 In contrast with the neoclassical assumption that 
common shareholders have control over corporate decisions because they “own” the 
corporation,235 the theory of property rights reconceptualises the corporation as 
merely a nexus of contracts, asserting the company is not an entity to be owned but a 
legal fiction separate from the individuals involved in it, with its own interests. This 
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legal personality of a company is the tool to realise a bundle of relationships or a 
network of explicit as well as implicit bargains. This revived the question why one 
should vest voting control in only one set of contracting parties. If shareholders 
retain rights of control because they represent a residual interest in a corporation’s 
value, it has to be said they are not the only risk-bearing group. Other groups also 
bear risk and this risk cannot be dealt with adequately by ex ante contracting. The 
property rights theory evolved to a pluralistic approach considering the investors in a 
firm not as shareholders or bondholders, but as stakeholders and all residual 
claimants although to different extents. The approach concedes the efficiency of 
linking governance and control rights to risk bearing.236 
The theory of property rights studies the firm as combinations of contracts and 
productive assets, emphasizing the significance of the allocation of property rights to 
those assets for the governance of the enterprise.237 The nature in which property 
rights are defined and enforced, fundamentally impacts the performance of an 
economy: in primis “by assigning ownership to valuable resources and by 
designating who bears the economic rewards and costs of resource-use decisions, 
property rights institutions structure incentives for economic behaviour within the 
society”; and in secundis, “by allocating decision-making authority, the prevailing 
property rights arrangement determines who the key actors are in the economic 
system”.238 
Property rights are defined as the rights to return streams and the rights to make 
strategic decisions in contingencies not explicitly contracted upon.239 Grossman and 
Hart, in their seminal work, distinguish between specific rights, which are specified 
in contracts and residual rights, which cannot be directly contracted upon. Property 
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rights refer to residual rights. They refer to a legal definition of ownership, 
equivalent to delegation of control, as all rights to use an asset “not voluntarily given 
away or that the government or some other party has taken by force”.240 In other 
studies, these rights also refer to residual returns, i.e., the right to spend the firm’s 
money, which has not been contracted for explicitly.241 Residual rights of control are 
preferred to residual rights to income, since the former are not divisible and thus a 
stronger concept as a definition of ownership. Property rights also confer indirectly 
control over human assets by controlling non-human assets. For example, an 
employer can influence a worker by threatening to deprive him of the machine at 
which he works.242  
Therefore, control in the property rights theory plays a central role. It refers to 
strategic decisions. By strategic decisions it means decisions with major implications 
for the cash flows generated by a firm. The exact definition of a strategic decision, 
and therefore of the scope of control, differs according to the adopted assumptions. 
Control may refer to the decision of whether to liquidate, to continue or to sell the 
firm in small companies and venture capital vehicles. The concept of control is 
expanded to include important decisions such as reorganizations of companies and 
decisions to hire and fire top management in larger companies with diluted 
shareholders.243 
Throughout most of the analysis on property rights, control is assumed to be 
binary, i.e., actors either have all control or no control. Shared control in a particular 
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state of nature implies unconstrained ex post bargaining between the parties in 
control. Obviously, this binary definition of control is a simplification of reality. 
Control rights are seldom unambiguously defined; court proceedings determining 
these rights would then be unnecessary. Neither are these rights, as interpreted by 
public courts, absolute; legal restrictions may, for example, prevent individual 
decisions from being implemented without prior consultations with the parties 
affected or other stakeholders may be entitled to a veto on certain strategic 
decisions.244  
Furthermore, the transfer of control from one party to another is often gradual, 
for example, when creditors take over control from shareholders in bankruptcy, 
creditors in many cases obtain influence prior to actual transfer and equity-holders 
often maintain influence over certain strategic decisions for some time. Despite these 
external constraints and qualifications of control rights, the party in control can in 
most cases be distinguished from other stakeholders. According to the property 
rights theory, there is a need to allocate the right to decide or the rights of control in 
the events not specified by the initial contract. This decision right affects the 
distribution of the ex post surplus created by an enterprise and, therefore, the 
incentives to generate this surplus.245  
For delegation of control to be a viable alternative to unconstrained bargaining 
or other forms of intermediate contracts, there must be some safeguards against 
abuse of authority by the controlling party. The legal definition referred to by 
Grossman and Hart suggest that there are definite limits to the scope of control. 
Laws impose such constraints, but the parties could also come to an agreement as to 
the scope.246 In fact, such an understanding of the limits of control, whether explicit 
or implicit, is necessary for the non-controlling party to accept the delegation of 
control in the initial contract. As demonstrated, such legal and moral constraints have 
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been of major significance in the evolution of contractual arrangements throughout 
the history of modern capitalism.247 Some scholars argued that the limits of control 
could also be left to arbitration; an arbiter may be preferable to specifying in great 
detail the ex post decision itself.248 To conclude control is not only hard to define 
unambiguously, it is also hard to observe and measure in a precise manner. Financial 
instruments may differ from state to state in how they are valued, and the control 
component cannot be easily isolated. Furthermore, comparisons across countries are 
distorted by international differences in accounting conventions and statistical 
procedures.249  
Recently, some legal scholars have sought to make further progress in bringing 
together the economic and legal conceptions of property in relation to corporate law. 
It has been suggested that company law not only provides standard terms for the 
parties but also allows assets partitioning in the firm that could not be achieved by 
private contract.250 For other scholars, while proprietary rights better protect 
shareholders’ claims than contracts, because they work more effectively as 
governance mechanisms within the firm, they generate costs for third parties.251 
According to the Coase’s theorem, parties will bargain around inefficient allocations 
of property rights if transaction costs do not exceed the gains from trade. A similar 
argument applies to legal rules that serve a governance function. However, the 
parties are better placed than the lawmakers to decide whether or not the 
involvement of the law adds value, having regard to contractual or market 
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substitutes.252 Therefore, the law should facilitate a freedom of bargaining and 
partitioning of entitlements between the parties in the firm, while at the same time 
minimising costs for third parties.253  
 
 
3.5. Summary of the analysis 
Economic theory has inspired two different perspectives to evaluate the relevance of 
a corporate financial structure and in particular of hybrid financial instruments. The 
first is from a company’s point of view and concerns the optimum leverage namely 
the optimal debt to equity ratio for a given firm. The studies regarding this area deal 
with the potential advantages of the market-value approach. Accordingly, any 
investment project and its concomitant financing plan depends on the fact that this 
can raise the market value of the firm’s shares and realises a return higher than the 
marginal cost of capital to the firm. From this perspective, interests of directors and 
shareholders are perfectly aligned towards the maximisation of the company’s share 
value. 
The second perspective tackles the problem from the investor’s point of view 
and regards the economic theories on corporate governance targeted to mitigate the 
internal conflicts of interest in the firm. Agency costs theory considers all the 
intersections of the economic activities of a number of parties and, in particular, the 
economic agency relations existing among shareholders, directors and bondholders. 
According to this analysis, the optimum amount of debt and equity in a firm is the 
financial structure that reduces the costs arising from those relations to a minimum. 
The property rights theory relaxes the assumptions of perfect contracts and absence 
of litigation costs, which were at the core of the agency costs theory, and defines the 
optimal capital structure as the mix of equity and debt that reduces to a minimum the 
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hold-up problems and disputes generated by the contract incompleteness. These 
studies concern two parallel aspects of equal importance when internal corporate 
conflicts of interest are taken into considerations: the incentives’ setting up and the 
proper allocation of control rights and residual rights.  
On the one side, the firm is studied as a “nexus of contractual relationships”, 
which are source of potential conflicts (“agency costs”), because the interests of 
directors and shareholders diverge. The financial structure plays a role in reducing 
these costs by creating the right incentives for all the parties involved in the firm. On 
the other side, the company is seen as a “joint ownership of common assets”, which 
are jointly owned by shareholders and bondholders. The parties bargain for their 
rights and fix their objectives ex ante but may disagree on the same ex post. This 
creates hold-up problems. The internal corporate mechanism of insolvency optimises 
which party should retain the property, which is expressed as the right to control and 
decide over the assets.  
Part I is dedicated to the first approach that is typically a classification 
approach. The law needs to apply a distinction between equity and debt. Tax, 
accounting as well as regulatory treatment of debt and equity are indeed important 
drivers behind many of the firms’ decisions regarding their capital structure. 
However, economic theory shows very little justification for distinguishing between 
equity and debt. This is demonstrated by the ability of hybrid instruments to blur any 
artificial classification dictated by law and create opportunities of regulatory 
arbitrage in accounting, tax and insolvency law as well as in corporate law.  
In order to take into consideration the governance implications of hybrid 
securities, the thesis sets out a new theoretical framework that puts more emphasis 
on the agency relations and the property law claims embedded in such 
“unconventional” financial instruments. The remaining chapters in Part II are 
entirely dedicated to this functional approach.  
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PART II – GOVERNANCE REGULATION OF HYBRID 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: THE FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 
Chapter 4.  From the Classification to the Functional Approach 
The firm’s capital structure through its financial instruments allocates the company’s 
cash-flow rights among the firm’s investors, specifying the times at which each 
investor is paid their allocation. An investor’s claim may be fixed, or contingent on 
the value of a specified asset or a flow variable, at the discretion of the issuer as in 
the case of common stock dividends. An investor’s claim may also be represented by 
a combination of these features as in the case of hybrid securities. In the same way, 
the financial contracts between the company and its investors assign the levers by 
which they may influence the firm’s decisions. This is most obvious in the case of 
ordinary shareholders who have the right to vote for the appointment or displacement 
of directors, and who can enforce the directors’ fiduciary obligations to the 
corporation. However, not all shareholders have control rights; some investors may 
have contracted them out in return for a higher payout, as for instance in the case of 
preference shareholders. Likewise, some powers of “voice”, which may substantially 
constrain the firm’s decisions, can be assigned to debt-holders through the use of 
“covenants” or so-called “appraisal rights”. Sometimes these covenants may be quite 
broad or restrictive enough, depending on the situation, to require the assent of the 
security-holders to important decisions in the firm, as if they were the controlling 
shareholders. Finally, some financial contracts allow investors to convert their 
security into another security, providing them with the right to switch their 
position/role within in the company.  
This section provides an outline of the main features of corporate law and 
corporate governance in particular. It aims to identify some key characteristics of 
hybrids, which are useful for understanding these securities in context. Accordingly, 
the thesis assesses how hybrids may constrain the board’s discretion to change the 
fundamental allocation of financial and control powers among the firm’s 
participants, and with what conflicts. This functional approach can provide an 
alternative insight into how hybrids can be better understood and the law related to 
them most effectively changed. The investigation of the corporate governance 
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implications that hybrids raise would be impossible under the classification 
approach, which relies on a legal distinction between equity and debt. The analysis 
has shown that hybrids blur this artificial dichotomy, facilitating the so-called 
“regulatory arbitrage”. Conversely, from the point of view of corporate governance, 
a functional analysis of these financial contracts is likely to produce more 
meaningful findings.  
 
4.1. Governance implications of issuing hybrid instruments  
Two ratios should generally be observed in a corporation. The first is risk:return and 
concerns corporate finance, while the second is risk:control concerning corporate 
governance. This assertion comes from the analysis of a company’s allocation of 
cash-flow rights and control power among its investors. Both these rights are relative 
to risk. Therefore, from a corporate finance perspective, a higher risk should involve 
a higher return on the investment, while from a corporate governance point of view, 
voting rights and control power should be allocated to the group of investors with the 
most residual claims in the company, that is the group supporting the highest risk of 
loss and therefore having the best incentives to promote firm value maximization.254  
When a business is conducted through a company limited by shares 
incorporated under the CA 2006, its ordinary shareholders are generally considered 
to be suppliers of long-term finance, which by its nature is also considered as risky 
capital. Because the return on their investment is almost wholly dependent on the 
company’s economic success, they are regarded as residual claimants. This does not 
mean that they are the only group to have residual claims on the company.255 
However, while ordinary shareholders hold mere expectations of a financial return 
from the company’s business, the other groups protect themselves fully through 
contractual provisions.256 Therefore, preferred shareholders, creditors, suppliers and 
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even employees can use these contracts to bargain for whatever protections are 
efficient for the parties while common shareholders, who are mostly vulnerable to 
insider opportunism, thus need board control and fiduciary duty protection to 
advance and protect their interests. The allocation of voting rights to ordinary 
shareholders would also be confirmed by a practice of corporate finance. In fact, if a 
company needs risk capital it will not be able to acquire it on acceptable terms unless 
control rights are allocated to ordinary shareholders, or at least contractual 
entitlements to a higher return on investment are given to them as compensation.257 
If being the most residual claimants in the firm place ordinary shareholders in a full 
control position of the company at first when the company is set up, for the same 
reason, it is understandable why those control rights should be lost when the 
shareholder no longer has an investment to protect.258 The law facilitates the granting 
of such control rights to ordinary shareholders but its mandatory contribution is to 
deprive them of the control rights they have contracted for at the point when their 
investment has disappeared. For this reason, bondholders, who normally have a 
contractual entitlement to regular interest on their loan to the company and to 
repayment of the principal at a fixed point in the future, do obtain control rights 
when certain events put in doubt the company’s ability to pay the interest due or to 
repay the loan on time.  
Studies on agency theory have underlined two main obstacles to a perfect 
allocation of cash-flow rights and control power in a company: information 
asymmetry and the resulting increased risk and opportunistic behaviour of parties, 
which generate costs for the company. These problems arise from contractual 
incompleteness, that is the impossibility of the parties writing a perfect contract 
because of the difficulty of covering in advance and specifying ex ante all the 
possible conduct of the parties in dealing with the various different situations the 
company could encounter. Because of the information asymmetry, some information 
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is observable by only one party who cannot or does not want to communicate it to 
others. As a result, risk and uncertainty are enormously increased. Because of the 
agency costs, the parties cannot control post-financing behaviour by contract because 
either the behaviour itself or future states of the world cannot be verified by third-
party arbiters. This results in the possibility of opportunistic behaviour. In fact, the 
risks and rewards of potential business opportunities may be differentially distributed 
across the stakeholder groups, so that the rewards, if the project is successful, will 
accrue predominantly to some groups, whilst the costs of failure will fall 
predominantly on other stakeholder groups.259 These two problems greatly motivate 
the design of financial contracts and are the main reason for the use of hybrid 
financial instruments. 
The implications of hybrids differ according to some particular features that 
may be frequently found in various companies. I am going to analyse two particular 
situations in which the issuance of hybrid financial instruments has different impacts. 
These are large publicly traded companies and small closely held start-up firms. The 
division between large and small groups is uniquely adopted in this thesis for 
practical purposes. Since it is sometimes not clear when a company no longer 
qualifies as small and becomes large, as for instance in venture capital businesses, it 
does not have to be seen has a categorical distinction. Similarly, the distinction 
between public and private companies must not be seen as categorical. Although 
these two typologies of company generally show contrasting features, it may be 
possible to find exceptions and similarities in both. For instance, public company 
shareholders, who hold their shares listed in a stock market, usually benefit from 
high liquidity. However, small growing public companies traded in the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) sometimes suffer from very low volumes of shares 
exchanged and low liquidity. In the same way, there may be a small private company 
governed by a centralised management of experts and not by the majority 
shareholders. However, it is useful to identify these contrasting core features because 
it is in relation to them that the impact of a hybrid instrument changes.  
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4.1.1.  Large publicly traded companies  
As companies become larger, their needs for capital to carry on their business are 
also likely to increase, to the point where the public needs to be invited to provide 
risk capital for the company, either directly or via intermediaries such as pension 
funds or insurance companies. These companies present a large shareholding body, 
distinct from the management, which is centralised and entrusted to a small group of 
managers.260 The choice of centralised management in public corporations comes 
from the necessity for the company to conduct its business efficiently. The 
independent board helps the company to reduce the costs of organisation and 
accelerates decision-making when business expands.261 
From an economic perspective, the public corporation has the main 
advantage of providing the firm with a low-cost source of equity capital, because of 
its efficiency in spreading risk among well-diversified investors. In a way, the public 
corporation can be thought of as an ingenious risk-management device, a form of 
organisation that allows equity investors to specialise in bearing the residual risk of 
the firm without having to manage it, since they can diversify their own portfolios.262 
On the other hand, managers, who invest all their skills and time in running the firm, 
are risk averse and place high value on the growth, size, and diversification of the 
business. While for such corporations the arguments for centralised management are 
the strongest, it has to be said that centralised management is not without danger for 
shareholders. Since managers are risk averse, they prefer to keep the surplus 
generated by the annual cash flow inside the firm without considering the optimal 
amount of risk-taking and payouts to investors.263 For this reason, the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour and the agency costs in large publicly traded companies are 
the highest, hence the need for corporate governance and incentive compensation to 
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from that of providing risk capital and to a shareholdings dilution in the company. 
261 Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law Series) 2002, 
111-113. 
262 Wruck K.H., ‘Private Equity, Corporate Governance and the Reinvention of the Market of 
Corporate Control’, 20(3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2008, 8. 
263 Easterbrook F.H. and Fischel D.R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991) 21-22.  
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help ensure that managers serve the interests of the residual risk-bearing investors.264 
Therefore, in a publicly traded company, centralised management raises issues 
mainly concerned with how the directors can be made accountable to the 
shareholders. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of the separation between ownership and control 
found fertile ground in publicly traded companies thanks to the easy mechanism of 
transferability of shares existing in the stock market. According to this, the entry and 
exit process of an investor in a corporation is facilitated contrary to what happens in 
small firms or even in medium-large companies not listed. A dissatisfied shareholder 
may simply sell his stake in the stock market if his expectations are not satisfied. 
Therefore, investors in public companies are generally more concerned about the 
liquidity of the stock market, so they can diversify their portfolios, than they are in 
control power. Furthermore, the takeover may work as a mechanism of governance 
for public companies while it is of very little importance for private groups. In 
certain countries such as the United Kingdom, in which the law facilitates the 
removal of directors in the case of takeover, the market for corporate control may 
represent quite a strong incentive for managers to strive for the company’s success, 
maximising its shares market price. However, this may not be the same in the United 
States of America, where law provides directors with effective defensive tools 
against hostile tender offers that make their removal without an agreement from their 
side extremely difficult.265  
Regarding the investment policies, public companies show a greater 
propensity to invest in transparent assets and assets-in-place than private companies. 
Transparent assets are supposed to be assets that are easier to measure. In fact, low 
visibility of corporate assets brings high risk and may constrain the market for 
finance. This is probably one of the reasons why public companies often play a weak 
role in innovation, at least in a direct visible way. Since managers, who are risk 
averse, prefer to diversify their assets and grow according to the economies of scale, 
they will only finance research and development (R&D) or growth opportunity 
                                                
264 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 349-350. 
265 Romano R., A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, in K. Hopt and E. 
Wymeersch (edn), European Takeovers: Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1992) passim; 
Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: Clarendon Law Series) 2002, 
passim.   
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projects if they know the investment will not unreasonably reduce the future 
company’s cash flows. In fact, growth opportunities, options and R&D projects may 
involve in a great amount of finance with the result of lowering profits for some 
years. Shareholders would only accept that if they had a clear understanding of the 
inputs and likely outputs of innovation. Finally, given that negotiations in the stock 
markets are based principally on the discounted value of future expectations related 
to companies, they are particularly influenced by any kind of news or action. Thus, 
changes in the corporate financial structure may be an incentive for managers who 
want to send a positive signal to the market.  
To summarise, large public companies represent centralised management, the 
free transferability of shares and diversified and transparent (hence tangible) assets. 
Therefore, the uncertainty created by the information asymmetry problem between 
managers and investors, concerning the nature of the business and the strategy of the 
company, is reduced by the transparency of its assets and the disclosure rules, aimed 
at protecting the stock market’s investors, that are mandatory for public companies. 
In addition, the easy exit for a dissatisfied investor guarantees a lower level of risk 
than in private start-up firms. Thus, investors in these cases are less concerned about 
control. In contrast, the agency costs created by the separation of ownership and 




4.1.2. Small closely held start-up firms 
Start-up firms generally have a small number of shareholders, all or most of whom 
expect to be involved in the management of the company. This choice of governance 
may also reflect the need to avoid all the public disclosure requirements and to 
minimise the agency problems associated with a centralised management. In fact, the 
opposite problem could arise, namely whether it is worthwhile to require a company 
to have two separate decision-making bodies (board and shareholders’ meetings) 
when the same people crop up on both occasions.266 While vesting the management 
                                                
266 In UK, the current law keeps the two-centre decision-making structure in existence, and so still 
requires those running small companies to distinguish between what they do as directors and what 
they do as shareholders, while making it more convenient for them to operate the company. A more 
radical approach would be to permit the company to opt for rolling the two decision-making bodies 
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in the shareholders may solve one problem that is related to the shareholder-
managers relationship, it is at the potential cost of creating another, namely the risk 
of oppressive conduct on the part of the majority of shareholders against the 
minority.267  
The peculiar flexible governance structure of small private firms has led to 
them being favoured as the most suitable vehicles for investments in innovation. The 
bulk of successful venture capital is invested in the high-technology sector and the 
value of these start-up firms lies in their growth options rather than in their 
marketable assets. For many such firms, the principal assets consist of ideas, human 
capital and growth opportunities, which will be completely worthless, and thus 
unavailable for creditors, in the case of default.268 Therefore, information 
asymmetries are more severe in such firms than in large public companies. Fewer 
factors are observable, and far less verifiable. Indeed, in the absence of tangible 
assets, the opportunity for misbehaviour is greater, and monitoring is more difficult. 
High ratios of intangible to total assets with low liquidation values, as it is the 
case in the R&D investments, may create uncertainty – and consequently high risk – 
in the business of the firm and this constrains the market for finance. This seems to 
be confirmed by the difficulties raising debt finance showed by many private start-up 
firms developing new technologies. They commonly do not generate steady cash 
flows that can be used to make interest payments on debt. Venture capital 
investments often face negative cash flows in the first years. Investors only come 
forward if they have a clear understanding of the inputs to and the likely outputs of 
innovation. When the visibility of innovation is low and there is asymmetric 
information, entrepreneurs and financiers need to engage closely with the firm, to 
develop a firm-specific understanding in order to find the key for future innovative 
                                                                                                                                     
into one, as is permitted in some US jurisdictions. Thus, s. 351 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law permits a close corporation to opt for its affairs to be run solely by the shareholders. 
267 Not surprisingly, company law has developed rules against minority oppression, most strongly in 
the small company context where control of the company is most likely to be in the hands of the 
majority shareholders. See Davies P.L., Introduction to company law (Oxford University Press: 
Clarendon Law Series) 2002, 215-254. 
268 See, for example, Armour J., ‘Personal Insolvency Law and the Demand for Venture Capital’, 5 
EBOR, 2004,  87 – 118; Berger A.N. and G.F. Udell, ‘The economics of small business finance: The 
roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle’, 22(6-8) Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 1998, 613-673; Carpenter R.E. and B.C. Petersen, ‘Capital Market Imperfections, High-
Tech Investment, and New Equity Financing’, 112 Economic Journal, 2002, F54-F72. 
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success.269 Small private start-up firms, which are constituted ad hoc, present the 
perfect vehicle where investors are aware of the risk they support and engage closely 
with the firm in order to develop a firm-specific understanding. At the same time, 
managers can have a high degree of autonomy because investors maintain ultimate 
control over the company in case events become unfavourable.  
These companies are also referred to as “closely held” or “close” companies 
because the transferability of shares will usually be restricted by their statutes and 
the identity of any new shareholder will be regarded as a matter of concern for all the 
shareholders. The company’s control is firmly locked in the hands of the 
entrepreneur who is generally unwilling to cede control rights to outsiders. However, 
when the firm is wealth constrained or needs new finance to expand, the equilibrium 
financial contract will be one that reduces the information asymmetries without 
surrendering control to the financier. 
In summary, small private start-up firms, commonly used in venture capital 
and private equity transactions, present several clear features: an entrepreneur-
manager, a constrained market for finance and investments in illiquid or intangible 
assets with growth opportunities but low visibility. While vesting the management in 
the shareholders reduces some agency costs, the conflict between majority and 
minority shareholders or between shareholders and bondholders is exacerbated. This 
is due to the combination of limited liability and locked-in control that can lead to 
shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour. In addition, the low visibility of assets, 
especially when they are represented by human capital or technical know-how, 
generates an even larger information asymmetry problem and uncertainty than in the 
case of publicly traded companies. Therefore, the risk in these investments is 
generally very high.  
 
 
4.2. The structure of Part II 
While in publicly traded companies, centralised management raises issues mainly 
concerned with how the directors can be made accountable to the shareholders, in a 
closely held start-up, there is a greater risk that some of the shareholders will co-
ordinate their activities so as to control the board and run the company without 
regard to the interests of the non-controlling shareholders or the creditors. The 
analysis of corporate relationships in the case of hybrids is complicated by the fact 
                                                
269 See examples Armour J., ‘Personal Insolvency Law and the Demand for Venture Capital’, 5 
EBOR, 2004,  87 – 118. 
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that such securities do not always attribute a “clear” status in the company to their 
holders. For example, sometimes their position may be swapped for another as in the 
case of convertible securities, or they may receive a fixed “dividend”, which is 
automatically deducted from the firm’s profits as a cost, or their interests may be 
subordinated to the achievement of a final positive result. This complicates the task 
of the law to protect their rights. It is often arguable how far their protection is a 
matter of contract and how far a mandatory matter of company law. British law has 
traditionally permitted broad access on the part of shareholders to the shelter of 
limited liability and has left creditors to protect themselves, largely by contract, 
against the risk of opportunistic behaviour. In this strategy the role of company law 
has been to place creditors in a position where they can bargain effectively with 
companies, for example by requiring the disclosure of relevant information.270  
Indeed, the quantity and quality of information contained in the accounts has 
been improved over time, notably by the development largely by the accounting 
professions of accounting standards, which both reduce the directors’ discretion as to 
how transactions are presented in the accounts and promote comparability across 
companies. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the information contained in the 
public accounts is often out of date, and many large lenders no doubt require the 
production of more up-to-date information as part of the pre-contractual process. In 
addition, as we discussed in Part I, the growing use of hybrid instruments has further 
complicated the role of accounting law with regard to the classification “equity-
debt”. The company law effort to facilitate creditor self-help is mostly evident in the 
case of small private start-up firms in venture capital looking at the flexibility of the 
company’s constitution. In fact, it is at the incorporation stage that shareholders often 
enable financiers to secure representation within the governance organs of the 
company, even in advance of default, if that seems to them an appropriate course of 
action. In any case, the shareholders by ordinary majority can remove a director at 
any time, whether that director was appointed by them or not. Conversely, the 
nominator has no redress other than that which it has stipulated for in the contract, 
which might include, of course, the right to call for repayment of the loan and to 
                                                
270 In the UK by 1948, the filing obligation was applied to the profit and loss account as well as to the 
balance sheet. Both these documents had to be audited by external and professionally qualified 
persons, and the obligation to produce accounts was applied in the case of corporate groups, to the 
group as a whole as well as to the individual companies within it. See CA 2006 at Part 15. 
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appoint a receiver. Equally, the courts have insisted that the nominee director owes 
duties to the company, in the same way as any other director, rather than the 
nominator. Despite this, the greater weight of the policy for dealing with 
opportunism in this strategy lies with private rather than public ordering.271  
The peculiarities of private contracting do not have to be seen only as confined 
to opting out of limited liability. Contract has an equally important role in dealing 
with the consequences of transacting on the basis of limited liability. The lender may 
seek to control the actions of the corporate borrower by inserting provisions in the 
loan contract, requiring the lender’s prior consent to certain courses of action that the 
lender judges might adversely affect the prospects of the loan being repaid. 
Alternatively, the lender may introduce in the terms of the contract anti-dilution 
clauses in order to protect their participation and control in the company. 
Furthermore, a lender may contract for governance rights. The vote attributed to 
shareholders may be conferred to creditors by covenants, the breach of which results 
in the sanction of a default, thereby encouraging compliance, or in the automatic 
appointment of some directors to the board. The variety of protections for creditors 
that can be created in this way is large and will be discussed below. 
This said, keeping in mind the core features of corporate governance and 
finance, I will examine preference shares, convertible bonds and bonds holding 
restrictive covenants for their state-contingent combination of features and their 
function, each in several significant situations arising during the life of a firm 
according to the instrument’s relevance to the particular case studied. The study will 
include the rationale of using hybrids in particular situations where the risks of 
opportunism are evident and so the conflicts of interest among the parties. For each 
case, I will also discuss the legal strategies available for protection in the UK and US 
systems, where these securities are common, with the aim of comparing and 
evaluating them.  
The analysis shows that hybrids of debt generally prefer to bargain for 
contractual protection. In fact, certain clauses included in this kind of financial 
contracts are nowadays standardised in the markets. Conversely, preference 
shareholders, who are often a class of the equity share capital, benefit from the 
                                                
271 In 1982 the Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Chairman: Sir 
Kenneth Cork), Cmnd. 8558, made some use of direct control of opportunistic behaviour. However, 
the Government did not act to follow some recommendations of the Committee (for example to set 
aside 10 per cent of the company’s assets for unsecured creditors in the event of winding up). See 
paras 1523-1549. 
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protection of statutory rules or from ex post remedies, as for instance the regime of 
the variation of class rights and the petition for unfair prejudice or for breach of 
directors’ fiduciary duties. However, the financial entitlements of these securities are 
considered by courts to be contractual in nature. Moreover, when their privileges 
pose limits for the amount of dividends and the repayment of capital in liquidation, 
they are considered as not being part of the equity share capital as defined by s. 548 
of the Companies Act. Therefore, they may not have the protections they relied on. 
At the same time, they have a weaker contractual position compared with creditors. 
Since, as the analysis shows, there are situations in which the interests of ordinary 
and preferred shareholders diverge, they may have a strong incentive to contract for 
their protection. This is particularly true in start-up businesses in private equity and 



















Chapter 5. Significant corporate decisions  
 
I begin my analysis in this part by discussing some significant corporate decisions 
that can create fundamental changes in the relationship between the holders of hybrid 
financial instruments and the other participants in the firm. These situations need 
special attention because they are the main source of conflicts of interest among the 
company’s constituencies. I will discuss when the use of hybrids reduces the 
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opportunities for conflict and when, by contrast, it enhances them. At the same time, 
I will analyse and evaluate how corporate law mitigates the opportunism that can 
accompany these changes, whether a further intervention of the regulator is needed 
or whether these conflicts would be better avoided contractually by the parties 
through free bargaining.  
This chapter concerns the law in the UK and compares it with the evolution of 
the corresponding law of the US. The analysis shows that there is a strong rationale 
for hybrids in private equity and venture capital financing, because the investors in 
these businesses need to modulate the original (normal) allocation of cash-flow 
rights and control rights. At the same time, the simple standard protection provided 
by the law, which acts efficiently for minority shareholders, may not be adequate for 
covering the sophisticate necessities of the parties involved in hybrid financial 
contracts. The study suggests a careful contractual design. 
 
5.1. Contracting for governance rights at a company’s start-up 
Many of the relationships between participants in the firm are structured by contract, 
including contracts with creditors and shareholder agreements, and it is through the 
articles of association that company law can balance the different interests of the 
main participants, allowing for flexibility, constitutional commitments and 
publicity.272 The role of bargaining is clearly observable at the time a business is 
incorporated in a venture capital start-up. The contractual arrangements for venture 
capital are much more complex than for most types of finance. Normally, they 
involve the both sides sharing the up-side potential of the project, providing for both 
equity-type characteristics.273 The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are only 
concerned with the effective allocation of cash-flow and control rights between them 
and not the formal labels attached to these rights. Whether they invest in a business 
through equity or debt is something they care about only if something depends on it. 
Venture capitalists often invest in several different countries each of which has its 
own legal systems. The details of these legal systems are important only insofar as 
                                                
272 Kahan M. and E. Rock, ‘Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as 
Precommitment’, 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2003, 473. 
273 See Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets the real world: an empirical 
analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 281 and 306-308. 
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the investment contracts must consider them.274 
Start-up firms display a high degree of “informational opacity”.275 Investors in 
this sector face severe information asymmetries. This asymmetric information 
generates a great “adverse selection” problem. Therefore entrepreneurs, who are 
generally better informed than outside investors as to the true level of skills and 
abilities to take on a given task, may misrepresent their abilities to them and, these 
misrepresentations may go undetected. Banks, financial intermediates and 
investment funds lacking the information to identify firms with the highest expected 
returns relative to the degree of risk, find it difficult to use the price mechanism to 
distinguish between firms276 and ask for higher interest rates to offset the risk 
incurred in lending money to a company in the absence of collateral. This problem 
may constrain the market for finance of technology-based firms.277 
The adverse selection problem is enhanced in small private companies because 
they are generally unable to provide collateral or adequate guarantees for the funds 
they require and, unlike public companies, they are characterised by lock-in capital 
for a long period of time. The transferability of shares – an essential mechanism in 
public companies for imposing discipline upon managers – is strongly limited in 
private firms, where the rights of exit may be non-existent. Non-management 
purchasers of stock in public companies are passive investors; if they do not like the 
way the company is being run, their solution is to sell their shares. However, 
venture capital operates on an entirely different set of principles. The entrepreneur 
possesses the idea and so he has the incentives and the know-how to develop the 
                                                
274 Kaplan S.N., P.J. Strömberg and M. Frederic, ‘How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect 
Financial Contracts?’ (June 16, 2004) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=557007. In contrast 
to the empirical research carried out by La Porta et al., the variable measuring law and order is 
negatively related to the importance of venture capital finance. The authors found that venture capital 
grows in countries with less law and order. 
275 Berger A.N. and G.F. Udell, ‘The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity 
and debt markets in the financial growth cycle’, 22(6-8) Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 613-
673. 
276 Prior to advancing funds, if the investor offers average terms these will be attractive to low-quality 
entrepreneurs, and unattractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, see Myers S.C. and N.S. Majluf, 
‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not 
Have’, 13 J. Fin. Econ., 1984, 187-221. 
277 As Lund M. and J. Write of the Bank of England Domestic Finance Division stated: “It has 
frequently been argued in economics literature that such problems can lead to credit rationing for 
small and medium-sized enterprises, that is, finance is not made available to all firms with viable 
projects whose net present value is positive”, ‘The Financing of Small Firms in the United Kingdom’, 
Quarterly Bulletin May 1999, 195. See also Stiglitz J.E. and A. Weiss, ‘Credit rationing in markets 
with imperfect information’, American Economic Review, 1981, 407-408. 
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concept and bring it to market. For this reason, he generally likes to maintain 
control of the business and is unwilling to cede it to outsiders.278 While an 
entrepreneur is strongly motivated by private benefits of control, the venture 
capitalist is more concerned about future revenues. However, the typical founder is 
an incomplete businessman, with gaps in experience in matters such as financial 
management and marketing. These gaps are expected to be filled by the venture 
capitalist or by the venture pool of funds, who are generally professional managers 
and can provide access to networks and foster credibility through the signal of their 
reputation. Indeed, the venture capitalist benefits from every potential efficiencies 
improvement when the firm is performing well.279  
The lock-in feature, added to the company’s limited liability, is a source of 
conflict between the entrepreneur-shareholder and the venture capital fund.280 This 
phenomenon is also known as the “moral hazard” problem. If the firm’s income 
realised is inadequate because the business does not succeed, the investor may not 
be able to recognise whether this was due to the entrepreneur’s lack of effort or 
pursuit of private benefits, or simply by bad cyclical economic conditions.281 Such a 
scenario will reduce the entrepreneur’s incentives to apply effort and pursue joint 
benefits, while it will increase his motivation to misallocate the raised funds by 
spending on items that disproportionately benefit him.282 For instance, an 
entrepreneur-scientist may choose to invest finance in research activities that 
increase the fame of the scientist, but produce little return for the investor.283  
                                                
278 Managing the firm confers private non-verifiable benefits to the entrepreneur that are related to a 
reputation that he may use in other business situations. Of course, private benefits accrue only in good 
states of nature given that an entrepreneur does not gain in reputation running a poorly performing 
company. 
279 Black B. and R. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock 
Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ., 1998, 243-277; Bartlett J.W., Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, 
Restructurings and Reorganizations, (Aspen Publishers, 1995) 229-230.  
280 See Williamson O.E., Corporate finance and corporate governance, 43 J. Fin., 1988, 567-591; 
Klein B., R.G. Crawford A.A. Alchian, ‘Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive 
contracting process’, 21 Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, 297-326. For a practical example see 
Joskow P., ‘Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning electric generating 
plants’, Fall. 33 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 1985, 32-80, where the decision to 
locate a coal-fired power plant next to a coal mine left the owners of the power plant vulnerable to 
expropriation and ex post renegotiation. 
281 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 348. 
282 Green R., ‘Investment incentives debt and warrants’, (1984) 13 J. Fin. Econ., 115-117. 
283 Denis D.J., ‘Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence’, 10 J. Corp. Fin., 
2004, 301– 326. 
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Thus, asymmetric information at the time of start-up, and moral hazard, can 
also lead to costly agency conflicts between transacting parties in the form of ex 
ante underinvestment and ex post opportunistic behaviour, also known as “hold-up” 
problems. Knowledge-based start-up firms on a rapid growth trajectory and in the 
need of external finance face a clear trade-off. On one hand, they are often unable to 
issue long-term debt on economic terms due to high financial distress costs, 
especially when these are highly innovative technology-based firms supposed to 
generate a negative cash flow for several years. On the other hand, if plain vanilla 
bonds can be very costly in these circumstances, pure ordinary shares could also 
have significant costs. The management of firms in the early stage of a potential 
successful and innovative business may believe that the current stock price fairly 
reflects the firm’s growth opportunities. Therefore, the issuance of equity would be 
expected to cause an excessive dilution of existing stockholders’ claims and the 
owner-manager may be reluctant to carve in outside investors at today’s stock price. 
At the same time, the venture capitalist invests at risk in situations where a high 
degree of uncertainty exists as to how the venture will develop over time and the 
aptitude and intentions of the entrepreneur cannot be gauged with accuracy.284    
The financing provided for start-up firms differ in risk from the funds lent to 
public companies. This is due to two main factors: first, start-up firms investing in 
high technology usually hold intangible and illiquid assets; second, the investors in 
this sector contribute, in proportion, most of the funds needed to run the business 
without holding the related ownership interests. Therefore, even if these funds are 
provided as senior debt, they generally face the same risk as shares being locked in 
the company for the entire duration of the business development’s cycle and having 
no collateral for satisfying their credit. The absence of collateral means the investors 
cannot simply leave the entrepreneurs to their own devices. Investing in risky assets 
can generate incremental distress costs for sponsoring firms, a problem which is 
referred to as risk management. When these indirect or collateral distress costs are 
sufficiently large, at least in expectation, they can exceed the asset’s net present 
value, thereby turning a positive project into a negative investment. Not surprisingly, 
venture capital funds are concerned about resolving the uncertainty of cash flows and 
they prefer to retain at least residual rights of control in the business’ strategy. For 
these reasons, in venture capital there is a much greater involvement of the providers 
                                                
284 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, 1976, note 385, at 349-350. 
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of funds than is the case with other forms of lending in an attempt to avoid the 
problems arising from asymmetric information and agency relationships.285  
Initially, by isolating the asset in a stand-alone special purpose vehicle, the 
venture capitalist reduces the possibility of risk contamination, the phenomenon 
where a failing asset drags an otherwise healthy sponsoring firm into distress. It also 
reduces the possibility that a risky asset will impose indirect distress costs on a 
sponsoring firm even short of actual default. However, ordinary limited liability is 
not sufficient to solve agency problems and the uncertainty of future cash flows. The 
corporate finance literature in this area has underlined two important issues: first, 
incentive contracts must be designed in a way that optimises the sensitivity of the 
entrepreneur’s wealth to some observable signals of the entrepreneur’s effort (for 
example, output or profits); second, this contract has to include a decision, not only 
on how claims on cash flows should be prioritised among all the participants, but 
also on who has to take control in the various states of nature.286  
 
5.1.1. Limits to the control power of a lender  
There are two limits on the role that lenders can be expected to play as monitors of 
corporate management that, as I have already mentioned, also depend on the type of 
company they are investing in. The first is their self-interest, meaning the lenders’ 
pursued aims. Where lenders perform the mere function of investors, they will 
                                                
285 The argument that financial innovation helps to complete financial markets is an uneasy case 
to beat when the novel security can be priced by equating it to a combination of existing 
securities. See Hakanssan N.H., ‘The Fantastic World of Finance: Progress and The Free Lunch’, 14 
J. Fin. & Quantitative analysis, 1979, 717 and 722-724. It may be, however, that the firm can 
combine existing claims to satisfy investor tastes at a lower cost than financial intermediaries 
providing this service and this would suggest a transaction cost explanation for hybrid instruments. 
See Merton R.C., On The Application of the Continuous-Time Theory of Finance to Financial 
Intermediation and Insurance, 14 Geneva Paper on risk and insurance, 225 (July 1989), where the 
author sets forth a transaction cost explanation for the role of intermediaries in financial 
derivatives markets. Furthermore the development by Merrill Lynch of liquid yield option 
notes (LYONs), which are puttable convertible zero coupon bonds, seems to have been 
motivated by such an attempt to provide retail investors with an attractive package of debt and stock 
options. See McConnell J.J. and E.S. Schwartz, ‘The Origin of LYONs: A Case Study in Financial 
Innovation’, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 1992, 40 and 41-42; Triantis A.J. and G.G. Triantis, 
‘Conversion rights and the design of financial contracts’, 72 Wash. U. L. Q., 1994, 1236 ff.; Contra 
DENT G.W., ‘The Role of Convertible Securities in Corporate Finance’, 21 J. Corp. L., 1996, 250 ff. 
286 See Denis D.J., ‘Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence’, 10 J. Corp. Fin., 
2004, 310; compare with Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets the real world: 
an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 286-295; 
Aghion P. and P. Bolton, ‘An “Incomplete contract” Approach to Financial Contracting’, 59 Review 
of Economic Studies, 1992, 473; Hart O., ‘Financial Contracting’, 39(4) Journal of Economic 
Literature, 2001, 1081-1085. 
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probably opt not to monitor but instead to employ other risk-management techniques 
such as portfolio diversification principles. In fact, since shareholders rather than 
creditors benefit from capital growth, a lender has no incentive to invest resources in 
employing and training staff to monitor a corporate borrower beyond the extent 
necessary to satisfy itself that the company’s ability to meet its obligations under the 
loan is not impaired or placed under threat. However, it is a different case when a 
lender invests in private equity or venture capital. In fact, in private start-up firms, 
the amount of money a financier may contribute is generally the largest share of the 
company’s capital and the incentive to be involved in the governance of the 
company is usually great.287  
The second limit to the power of banks, financiers and institutional investors 
to monitor and control firm decisions to enhance their position, is represented by the 
doctrine of shadow director. When a bondholder exercises control power over the 
firm and, because of this, the firm goes into financial distress and finally insolvency, 
the bondholder may be at risk of being held to be a shadow director.288 In the UK, 
under various statutory provisions, shadow directors may be made liable as if they 
were directors. The main concern is caused by s. 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
According to this provision, directors, including shadow directors, of a company that 
is in insolvent liquidation, may be ordered by the court to make such contribution to 
the company’s assets as the court thinks fit.289 As a result, the bondholder’s 
                                                
287 In the UK, various commentators have described the British banks’ role in corporate 
governance to be negligible as compared with the banks’ involvement in other countries such 
as Germany and Japan where, according to the conventional view, closer relationships tend to 
exist between banks and industrial companies and banks are more willing than within the 
British model to provide long-term debt and equity finance and to participate in the monitoring 
of management through supervisory board structures. Compare Edwards J. and Fischer K., Bank 
Finance and Investment in Germany (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 178-195 and Ferran E., 
Company Law and Corporate finance (Oxford University Press, 2008) 341. 
288 For the UK doctrine see  Millett P., ‘Shadow Directorship: A Real or Imagined Threat to the 
Banks’, Insolvency Practitioner, 1991, 14; Fidler P., Banks as Shadow Directors, 3 JIBL, 1992, at 97; 
Turing D., Tender Liability, Shadow Directors and the Case of Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd, 6 JIBL, 
1994, 244; Bhattacharyya G., ‘Shadow Directors and wrongful Trading Revisited’, 16 Co Law, 1995, 
313 commenting on Re PFTZM Ltd, 2 BCLC, 1995, at 354. For the US doctrine see Bartlett and 
Lapatin, ‘The Status of a Creditor as a “Controlling Person”’, 28 Mercer L. Rev., 1977, 639; Douglas-
Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting From Improper Interference with the Management of a 
Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. Law., 1975, 343; Enstam R.A. and H.P. Kamen, ‘Control and 
the Institutional Investor’, 23 Bus. Law., 1968, 289; Lundgren K.T., ‘Liability of a Creditor in a 
Control Relationship With Its Debtor’, 67 Marq. L. Rev., 1984, 523.. 
289 Under US corporate law, when a creditors, acting in that capacity, exercise control power over the 
firm, they become control persons under the federal securities laws, and thus potentially 
liable for false and misleading statements by the company at risk of losing its limited liability 
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contribution when being considered a shadow director may be even larger than his 
credit with the company. Applications to the court under this section may only be 
brought by liquidators and it must be established that the person from whom a 
contribution is sought knew, or ought to have concluded,290 that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation 
and that the person was a director at that time.291 The court may not make an order 
against someone who it is satisfied took every step that ought to have been taken 
with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors (assuming 
this person knew that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation).  
A shadow director in relation to a company is a person in accordance 
with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accus-
tomed to act, but someone is not deemed a shadow director only because of 
advice given by him in a professional capacity.292 In fact, a bondholder, in order 
to qualify as shadow director, has to control the whole board, or at the very 
least a governing majority.293 The directors must act on that person’s 
instructions or directions as a matter of regular practice and not just on isolated 
occasions.294 Nevertheless, a safer course for lenders may be to express proposals 
for the rehabilitation of the company in the form of conditions to the continuation 
                                                                                                                                     
status with the result of been held personally liable to other creditors or even to the stockholders. See 
the Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). The classic case, Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927), 
concerns a loan to a partnership. See, also K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F. 2d 752 (6th Cir. 
1985); State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 Sw. 2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See also 
Douglas-Hamilton, 1975, note above, 343.  
290 The standard by which a director is judged is based on the general knowledge, skills and 
experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out these functions and also the 
director’s own knowledge, skills and experience: Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214 (2). 
291 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214 (2). 
292 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 251. 
293 That is why the appointment of few bondholders’ representatives on to the board of a borrowing 
company should not expose a lender to shadow directorship liability. Furthermore, in the absence of 
fraud or bad faith, a person appointing a director owes no duty to take care that the director so 
appointed discharges their duties as a director with due diligence and competence. 
294 Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 2) [1994] BCC 766, 775. See also Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 
161, 163, where the judge ruled that to establish that a defendant is a shadow director it is 
necessary to allege and prove: (i) who are the directors of the company, whether de facto or de 
jure; (ii) that the defendant directed those directors how to act in relation to the company or 
that he was one of the persons who did so; (iii) that those directors acted in accordance with 
such directions; and (iv) they were accustomed so to act. 
   
   104 
of their support. In fact, although giving advice in a professional capacity does 
not leave the adviser exposed as a shadow director,295 the line between “advising” 
and “instructing” or “directing” may be difficult to draw.296 
It is not surprising that because of the heavy debt structure of leverage buy-
out transactions, the doctrine of equitable subordination is much discussed in that 
arena. However, in venture capital start-ups, where there is a close involvement of 
the financier with the entrepreneur in the management of the company, the risk of 
being considered a shadow director does not represent a major limit to their 
monitoring and control power. Corporate governance plays a different role in private 
equity and venture capital than it does in the public equity and bond markets.297 In 
fact, high-risk and high-growth businesses at the early stage of their business 
development seem to be the only users of hybrid financial instruments motivated by 
elements outside the world of regulatory arbitrage. When the business grows and 
becomes more stable, the venture capital fund, someone whose comparative 
advantage lies in monitoring young companies, exits and is replaced by public 
shareholders and by public and private bondholders.298 
 
5.1.2. The use of hybrid instruments to align the “ex ante” incentives 
of managers: stage financing and contingent convertible debt  
The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur must deal with the fact that their 
incentives may not be always completely aligned. The entrepreneur receives private 
benefits from retaining ownership of the company that are unrelated to the 
company’s value. Therefore, entrepreneurs may be “inclined to continue and expand 
their ventures even when their contraction or termination is efficient.”299 Conversely, 
the venture capitalist is only interested in its financial returns, which must be 
                                                
295 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 251. 
296 See Re Company (No 005009 of 1987) [1989] BCLC 13. The circumstances that led to the 
shadow directorship allegation against the company’s bank were such that the company had 
reached its overdraft limit and the bank had commissioned a report on its financial affairs, which 
included recommendations that the company then took steps to implement.  
297 Baird D.G. and R.K. Rasmussen, ‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance’, 
154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2006, 1209. 
298 Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, 52(2) Journal of Finance, 1997, 
737-783. 
299 Triantis G.G.. ‘Financial contract design in the world of venture capital’, 68 The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 2001, 305 and 308. 
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adequate to the risk incurred and in line with its investment policy. Therefore, 
venture capital funds may be expected to seek exit too early because of their own 
liquidity or publicity needs. In such a scenario, if one party retains unilateral 
decisions power, that party will be able to extract wealth at the expense of the other. 
In private equity and venture capital investments, funds are generally invested for 
less than ten years, with short extensions from one to three years allowed. During 
this time, some important exit mechanisms, which also represent the best means for 
initial investors to obtain a return, are the initial public offering (IPO) of the 
company,300 although IPOs are costly in a number of ways, and the outright sale of 
the start-up to a large firm.301 In order to align the interests of the parties and provide 
each party with the right incentives, a start-up business needs to tailor its governance 
structure to fit the specific application, which means it has to create asset-specific 
governance systems that allow an optimal allocation of financial and control rights in 
the firm. This purpose is achievable only if hybrid financial instruments are 
issued.302 The sophisticated contractual terms of these securities can be designed 
both to give the management appropriate incentives and to give the investors a 
significant role in the governance of the firm.303  
Venture capitalists generally invest incrementally in companies so as to wrest 
control from entrepreneurs. Therefore, the investment involves a number of stages: if 
a firm is successful, its needs for capital grow rapidly through time. At each stage, 
the funds invested are expected to carry the firm through until the next stage. 
Investors may provide funds for all or some of these stages, which in any case are 
                                                
300 Black B. and R. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock 
Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ., 1998, 243-277 where the authors, comparing the United States and 
Germany, point out that “the existence of an active IPO market is the most important determinant of 
the importance of venture capital in a country”. 
301 An important aspect of venture capital contracts is the allocation of cash flow between the parties. 
Financiers typically receive a fixed fee, usually between 1.5 and 3 per cent of the net asset value, in 
addition to share of the profits. The expected return is around 20 per cent of the profits. See 
Cumming, ‘Contracts and Exit in Venture Capital Finance’, 21(5) Rev. Financ. Stud., 2008, 1978; 
Sahlman W.A., ‘The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations’, 27 J. Fin. Econ., 
1990, 473-521. 
302 Cornelli F. and O. Yosha, ‘Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities’, 70 Review of 
Economic Studies, 2003, 1-32 look at the combined use of convertible securities and staged infusion 
of capital, which are so common in venture capital financing; Berglof E., ‘A control Theory of 
Venture Capital Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1994, 261-263. 
303 Gompers  P.A. and J. Lerner, ‘The Venture Capital Revolution’, 15(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2001, 145-168; Triantis G.G. and R.J. Daniels, ‘The Role of Debt in Interactive 
Corporate Governance’, 83 California Law Review, 1995, 1076-1079. 
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limited in time. For this reason, investors may be inclined to contribute just enough 
working capital to provide the management with sufficient time to either seek the 
sale of the company or achieve a particular business objective or milestone that will 
increase company value so that a future “flat” or “up” round becomes more feasible. 
By staging the advance of funds, venture capital investors make sure the correct 
continuation decision is made. This means that they preserve their ability to limit 
losses by abandoning portfolio companies that are not making satisfactory progress 
or by demanding majority board control in exchange for additional finance.304 These 
control rights granted to the investor are not incompatible with the entrepreneur’s 
preference for control. These rights are used to “add value” to their portfolio 
businesses and not simply to protect the investment value from the entrepreneur’s 
diverging objectives.305   
Start-up firms would typically issue ordinary common shares to the 
entrepreneur and hybrid capital such as preference shares or convertible subordinated 
debt, as profit participating or payment in kind loans, to the venture capital investor. 
In so doing, the entrepreneur retains discretion over the business through the voting 
rights and has a strong incentive to maximise the company’s profits. The 
entrepreneur’s incentives to maximise quickly the potential of the company come 
from the threat of abandonment, coupled with the prospect of dilution from repeated 
outside investments, when the venture capital converts its debt into equity to repay 
its interests306 or takes the control of the board.307 On the other hand, the venture 
capitalist is able to attract, at the end of every tranche financing, most of the 
company’s cash flows, including in the contracts its liquidation preferences in 
multiples of the purchase price. Depending upon each party’s leverage during the 
negotiations, the deal could involve the issuance of participating preference shares or 
                                                
304 See Table 2 in Sahlman W.A., ‘The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations’, 
27 J. Fin. Econ., 1990, 479; Smith, D.G., ‘The Exit Structure of Venture Capital’, 53 UCLA Law 
Review, 2005, 315 and 316; Gompers  P.A., Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of 
Venture Capital, 50 J. Fin., 1995, 1461; Triantis G.G.. ‘Financial contract design in the world of 
venture capital’, 68 The University of Chicago Law Review, 2001, 305-323. 
305 Armour J., ‘Personal Insolvency Law and the Demand for Venture Capital’, 5 European Business 
Organization Law Review, 2004, 104 ff. See also Black B. and R. Gilson, Venture Capital and the 
Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ., 1998, 243-277. 
306 Cornelli F. and O. Yosha, ‘Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities’, 70 Review of 
Economic Studies, 2003, 4. 
307 Smith, D.G., ‘The Exit Structure of Venture Capital’, 53 UCLA Law Review, 2005, 325-329. 
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convertible debt with senior liquidation preferences, which investors would 
presumably value more if the possibility of a relatively worthless common stock is 
considered likely.  
In venture capital, the cash claims of every participant are prioritised in the 
most efficient way, allowing the parties to renegotiate and readjust the expected rate 
of return on the investment according to the changes in the business’ performance. 
Therefore, important factors for venture capitalists are the conversion price, which 
can be contingent on firm performance; preferred return in shareholders’ 
distribution of profits, including a description of critical events that trigger 
liquidation; dividend or interest rate, which is not paid on a current basis, but is 
usually deferred; payment terms, which can sometimes state the dividends or the 
interests accrued and are not paid in cash, but the liquidation preference entitles the 
holders to the face value and the accrued payment and voting rights typically on an 
as-if converted basis. 
 
5.1.2.1. Preference shares as incentive contracts 
Private equity and venture capital funds often invest in businesses that strongly 
depend on human capital. For example, when the activities financed are research and 
development, the assets may be represented by a group of experts, scientists, doctors, 
or engineers working simply on ideas or intuition. Similarly, the registration of 
licences or patent rights and their exploitation need a specific asset-management 
expertise. In such cases, the human capital, meaning the entrepreneurs in technology-
based start-up firms, is often the key to the business’ success. Since the business of 
private equity and venture capital investors is to manage funds and investments made 
with those funds, and not to run companies, the involvement of the management 
becomes extremely important, which also provides it with the right incentive to 
make the business succeed. These incentives may be a share stake in the business. A 
well-motivated management will reduce costs to the minimum needed and invest 
adequately in capital expenditure in order to maximise profits and thus enhance the 
value of the company’s shares.  
Preference shares can be used as incentive contracts because they allow the 
setting up of a financial structure targeted to optimise corporate governance and at 
the same time to allocate the cash flows generated by the business. In practice, the 
private equity fund generally invests in the company mostly through the issuance of 
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preference shares or other hybrids of debt and only in small part in the equity share 
capital, while a large stake of the company’s shares, also referred as “sweet equity”, 
is allocated to the management. The economic price at which the management 
acquire their stake in the business is lower than that paid by the private equity 
investor because the latter has to subscribe to loan notes in addition to its equity. 
Depending on how strong an incentive you want to give the management, the private 
equity fund decides to invest most or all of its additional capital as subordinated 
capital so that the company has all the capital needed and the ownership is not 
diluted.308 
This “sweet equity” advantage is not intended to go to anybody other than the 
management. As a result, there will be a series of prohibitions on the transfer of 
shares by the management to anybody else. The shares will only be transferable to 
some extent to members of the management’s family in order to undertake tax 
planning for capital gains tax and inheritance tax purposes. The private equity 
investor will also wish to have the right to transfer its shares among its own group. It 
is however important that, where permitted transfers are allowed, the ultimate owner 
of the shares falls within the scope of any pre-emptive transfer procedure or 
compulsory transfer procedure.309  
In addition, from the financier’s point of view, the investment is tax deductible 
because the company issues loan notes or preference shares with a fixed cumulative 
return. The hybrid instruments issued will be deeply subordinated to any other bank 
loan and redeemable on a date in the future. Furthermore, the securities will usually 
be subject to the same form of permitted transfer restrictions as apply to the shares 
held by the private equity investors so that the loan note is not freely transferable. 
Often the loan note may be “stapled” to the ordinary shares so that any transfer of 
ordinary shares must be accompanied by the transfer of a corresponding percentage 
of the loan notes. 
 
                                                
308 See Beddow S., The Equity Deal, in C. HALE, Private Equity: a Transactional Analysis (Globe 
Business  Publishing, 2007), 46.   
309 Since managers may change during the life of a company and the objective of the sweet equity is 
to incentivise them to make the business perform to enhance its capital value, if a manager leaves the 
business, he or she no longer requires the incentivisation. Thus a departing manager will be obliged to 
sell his or her stake to an incoming manager, so that the total number of shares in issue does not need 
to increase and the ownership is not diluted. 
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5.1.3. The use of hybrid instruments to reduce the “ex post” hold-up problems    
In theory, as far as information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist is concerned, the best option for the firm would be to issue short-term debt 
that matures at the time favourable information is expected to be revealed to the 
market.310 At that time, the firm may refinance on better terms either by borrowing at 
a lower rate or by issuing equity at a higher price. However, the informational 
advantages of short-term debt financing must be weighed against the risk that the 
borrower may be unable to refinance the debt when it matures or to meet periodic 
coupon obligations during the term of the debt.311 It also has to be said that no 
company that wants to run a stable business could survive without long-term debt 
finance.  
From the other point of view, the venture capitalist prefers to use long-term 
contracts to avoid the “fundamental transformation” that takes place following 
investment in transaction-specific assets.312 In fact, the “bidding situation” that exists 
before the investment is made, becomes a “bargaining situation” after it is made.313 
This uncertainty may threaten the ability of venture capitalists to capture project cash 
flows, thereby reducing expected returns as well as ex ante incentives to invest. For 
this reason, venture capitalists try to structure project companies to limit managerial 
discretion over future decisions as well as to free cash flow. They use financial 
contracts to constrain managerial discretion. Contracts both prescribe and proscribe 
certain actions by involved parties. One of the fundamental agreements in every 
venture company is the so-called “cash flow waterfall”, which defines what the 
various claims of the participants on cash flows are and allocates cash flows 
                                                
310 See Flannery M.J., ‘Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice’, 41 Journal of 
Finance, 1986, 19; Myers S.C. and N.S. Majluf, ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have’, 13 J. Fin. Econ., 1984, 187-188 and 209-210. 
311 Stein J., Convertible bonds as backdoor equity ,financing, 32 J. Fin. Econ., 1992, 3; Constantinides 
G.M. and B.D. Grundy, ‘Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals’, 2 
Rev. Fin. Stud., 1989, 445. 
312 Coase R., ‘The nature of the firm’, 4 Economica, 1937, 386-405; Williamson O.E., Corporate 
finance and corporate governance, 43 J. Fin., 1988,  567-591. 
313 This is common when the company’s assets are represented by human capital, but it may also 
happen with the related parties of the firm that supply critical inputs or buy primary outputs, and host 
nations that supply the legal system and contractual enforcement. Because so many projects involve 
bargaining situations between bilateral monopolists, there is a need to discourage opportunistic 
behaviour before making a large, durable, indivisible capital investment. 
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accordingly. Through the cash flow waterfall, parties agree in advance to virtually all 
capital expenditures, maintenance expenditures, debt service, reserve accounts, and 
shareholder distributions. However, although contracts work well as a first line of 
defence, they are, inevitably, incomplete.314  
Contract incompleteness exists whenever the contracting parties are unable ex 
ante to specify fully the actions to be taken in every possible future “state of nature”. 
On the one hand, some information is observable by only one party, as in the case of 
the entrepreneur who has information about the technological and economic 
prospects of a potential business, but a portion of that is too soft to be communicated 
to investors in a credible manner. This asymmetric information increases the cost of 
capital for the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the parties cannot control post-
financing behaviour by contract because either the behaviour itself or future states of 
the world cannot be verified by third-party arbiters and this generates the well-
known agency problems. Hence, from an incomplete contracting perspective, 
residual risk bearing is inescapable in an ex post sense for all parties contracting with 
the firm. Thus, the incompleteness of contracts means that although only 
shareholders are entitled to the residual profits after all other legally binding claims 
to other parties have been met, in terms of economic consequences any differences in 
the residual claimant status of the various contracting parties is simply a matter of 
degree.  
The problems of information asymmetry and agency costs in an environment of 
uncertainty and high risk may be resolved by the use of convertibles, these securities 
being the best substitutes for equity or debt finance. The explanation of why 
convertibles are so commonly used in venture financing has to be sought in the 
exercise of the conversion feature. In fact, convertible securities address these 
problems by endogenously allocating residual cash flow rights to both the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist as a function of the realised value of the 
company.315 
                                                
314 Hart O., ‘Corporate governance: Some Theory and Implications’, 105 The Economic Journal, 
1995, 84-97. 
315 Denis D.J., “Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence”, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 312. See also Schmidt K.M., ‘Convertible Securities and Venture 
Capital Finance’, 58 J. Fin., 2003, 1139; Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets 
the real world: an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 
2003, 286-295. 
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First of all, there are some evident advantages for an investor stemming from 
the fact that convertible bonds enable their subscribers to change their status in the 
company. As long as they do not convert their securities into equity hold a pure debt 
obligation and as such are entitled to receive a fixed interest and be repaid at 
maturity. The conversion option included in the debt security presents an important 
opportunity for the investor to evaluate the convenience of converting into equity or 
not. In this way, the investor will be able to consider whether to convert into equity 
during the different phases of the company’s life, knowing that if the company is not 
performing well and its share market value is not increasing they can enjoy the 
benefits of a bond.316 
Second, the financier subscribing to convertibles may adjust the conversion 
price according to the achievement or non-achievement of the targets for the period, 
which are set up in the terms of the contract. In so doing they are able to transfer part 
of their risk (but also opportunities because the company will be better priced) to the 
entrepreneur.317 In fact, the use of convertible securities may defer the sale of equity 
or the repayment of debt until private information is revealed to the market, for 
instance, providing funding in tranches against established milestones.318 The parties 
may also agree on a variable conversion price defining, for example, periods within 
which the holder may convert and the issuer may force conversion by exercising its 
call privilege. Therefore the conversion can always be state contingent.319 To 
summarise, convertibles provide the parties with the optimal trade-off between the 
need to make efficient exit decisions and allocate cash flow rights to the venture 
                                                
316 Green R., ‘Investment incentives debt and warrants’, (1984) 13 J. Fin. Econ., 124-125. 
317 For example, in practice it is a common clause the reset mechanism (reset convertibles). According 
to this, the conversion price is initially fixed but adjusts or resets to the share price, not on a 
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5.2. The manager-shareholder conflict in charter amendments: variation of 
class rights 
Corporate charters serve the function of establishing a basic governance structure, 
making it public and accessible to any interested investor. Corporate charters deal 
with the company’s share capital in a significant way by stating the number of share 
classes, their par value and the powers, rights qualifications and restrictions on these 
shares.321 Furthermore, corporate charters allow the entrenchment of terms, typically 
through a special amendment process.322 However, unlike ordinary contracts, the 
parties to the charter can amend them with less than unanimous approval. Thus, the 
extent to which charter provisions entrench governance rules may be a matter of the 
management’s opportunistic behaviour towards the totality of the shareholders, 
where shareholdings are dispersed, or the minority shareholders, in companies with 
concentrated holdings.323 
To amend a charter, UK rules require a supermajority shareholder vote, without 
board initiative.324 This allows large minority shareholders to veto proposed charter 
amendments, but gives no formal say in the matter. By contrast, the US rules create a 
bilateral veto to charter amendments and neither the board nor the shareholders can 
amend it alone.325 By means of charter provisions, shareholders can make credible 
pre-commitments, as is the case under the Delaware approach where shareholders 
can approve an anti-takeover provision in the charter, such as a classified board, 
which maximises the bargaining role of the board in an attempted takeover by 
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reducing the likelihood that they would accept or that an acquirer would make a 
takeover offer with the approval of the board.326 This would not be possible in UK 
where the law requires the unanimity of all the members to make a provision for 
entrenchment.327 
Although, a charter amendment that adversely affects a class of shareholders 
must be approved by a majority of that class voting together, the statutory law has 
sometimes failed to protect minorities in the same way as the preferred shareholders 
who often lack voting rights and who rely in consequence on the charter and the 
rules governing its amendment to protect their interests. The special entitlements 
reserved for the preferred shares have had the consequence of creating a divergence 
of interests among preferred and ordinary shareholders. Therefore, additional 
contractual protections have been attached to these securities. However, such 
protections must be carefully drafted to protect the preference shareholders and to 
not be simply illusory. Historically, the British courts have drawn a sharp distinction 
between variations of the formal rights of a class of shareholders, which requires 
separate approval and changes in the charter that reduce the value of those rights 
without changing them formally.328 
 
 
5.2.1. The position of preference shareholders and their protections: a UK-US 
comparative analysis 
Since the 1920s at the time of the Great Depression in the USA, variations of class 
rights carried out by ordinary shareholders on preference shares have become very 
common. After a period of depressed earnings due to the crisis, many companies 
were becoming profitable again but the management could not declare common 
stock dividends before it paid the often-sizeable preferred stock arrearages that had 
accrued. Since directors often owned common stock, generally the only class of 
stock entitled to elect directors, they were inevitably more responsive to the common 
                                                
326 Kahan M. and E. Rock, ‘Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as 
Precommitment’, 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2003, 473. 
327 s. 22 of the UK CA 2006. 
328 Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed. 
2009) paras. 19-11 ff.; Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 668. 
Similar approach has been taken in the US States, see Bratton W., ‘Venture Capital on the Downside: 
Preferred Stock and Corporate Control’, 100 Mich. L. Rev., 2002, 891, 922-939. 
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shareholders’ interests than to those of the preferred shareholders. In order to pay 
dividends on the common stock, they devised ways to eliminate preferred arrearages 
so that they could immediately declare common stock dividends. This was carried 
out through certificate amendments such as the cancellation or reclassification of 
certain categories of shareholders, mergers with shell corporations or the voluntary 
exchange of new preferred stock without arrearages for old preference shares.329  
Although statutes and certificate provisions often empowered the preference 
shareholders to block these proposals by class vote, many factors prevented them 
from doing so.330 In fact, the class of preference shares was frequently induced to 
cast the necessary votes for what appear to be detrimental and sometimes disastrous 
consequences. For instance, directors were used to create new prior preferred stock 
or increase existing prior preferred stock and offer it in exchange for outstanding 
preference shares. The prior preferred stock was not entitled to arrearages owed on 
the outstanding preference shares and thus, when outstanding preference 
shareholders exchanged their shares, their arrearages were eliminated. However, 
preference shareholders were widely dispersed and lacked control over the proxy 
mechanisms by which they were informed of the terms of the proposed arrearage 
elimination. Thus, managers could obscure essential information concerning these 
proposals in proxy statements. Directors normally controlled the manner in which a 
plan was presented to the shareholders, and even if they were subject to some 
limitations imposed by the usual proxy rules, they could emphasise any real 
advantages that the plan conferred on the preference shareholders, while at the same 
time minimising its disadvantages.331 Furthermore, dividend arrearages were usually 
so large that statutorily they could not be paid without a formal reduction of capital 
and such a reduction often required the common shareholders’ consent. For this 
                                                
329 Dewing A., The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: Ronald Press Co. 5th ed.., 1953) 
1195; Cary W.L. and Eisenberg M., Cases and Materials on Corporations (5th ed., Mineola, 1980) 
1605. 
330 As both the commentators of that time and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
argued, preference shareholders often lacked the power to secure their rights to dividend arrearages. 
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, 
Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, pt. VII, 1938, at 
109; Brudney V., ‘Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications’, 26 Rutgers 
L. Rev., 1973, 445, 446 and 450. 
331 Dodd E.M., ‘Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations’, 55 Harv. L. Rev., 1942, 780 and 792. 
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reason, common shareholders often had the opportunity to demand unfair 
concessions from preferred shareholders.332 
In the US, the courts chose not to intercede on behalf of the preference 
shareholders, permitting the elimination of arrearages by certificate amendment or 
merger in accordance with the theory that preference shareholders purchased their 
stock knowing that their rights were statutorily variable by amendment or merger. 
Similarly, they upheld offers of prior preferred stock without provision for payment 
of past arrearages in exchange for the existing preferred stock on the grounds that 
any exchange was purely voluntary.333 However, in truth, the exchange was often 
more coercive than voluntary: any preference shareholder who refused the exchange 
was left with shares subordinated to the new class of prior preference and, therefore, 
with little hope of ever receiving any payment of the arrearages.334  
To avoid this unfair treatment and to impose equitable limits on the bargaining 
away of arrearages by the preference shareholders, some standards of fairness have 
been developed, although unsuccessfully, by legal scholars. The funding theory, the 
liquidation standard, the investment value doctrine and the surplus test standard were 
supposed to evaluate the fairness of the consideration given in exchange.335 
Unfortunately, these efforts proved to be useless and inappropriate, so that the courts 
almost never adopted them. Instead, the law in this area became practically 
mechanical and all the arrearage eliminations that were minimally consistent with 
                                                
332 Gower L.C.B., Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed. London: Stevens & sons, 1979) 364 
points out the need for protection for the preference shareholders because “though they share the 
disadvantages of debenture-holders they lack their advantages”. 
333 Johnson v. Fuller, (3d Cir.1941), 121 F. (2d) 618; Kreicker v. Nayor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 
N.E. 2d 502 (1940). 
334 Cary W.L. and Eisenberg M., Cases and Materials on Corporations (5th ed., Mineola, 1980) 1620. 
335 See Brudney V., ‘Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications’, 26 
Rutgers L. Rev., 1973, 469 n. 56 where he says “the funding theory measures the arrearage claim by 
the discounted present value of its anticipated payment over a period of years. See Note, The Doctrine 
of Strict Priority in Corporate Recapitalization, 54 Yale L. J., 1945, 840 where it is explained the 
liquidation standard would entitle preference shareholders to their liquidation preference upon 
approval of a proposal to eliminate arrearages. Arrearages elimination would be treated as triggering 
the maturation of the preference shareholders’ liquidation priority. See Dodd E.M., ‘Fair and 
Equitable Recapitalizations’, 55 Harv. L. Rev., 1942, 812 and 816 where he says the investment value 
doctrine would reduce arrearages as well as a stock’s projected dividend stream to present values. 
These values would then be added together and the sum would constitute the consideration the 
preference shareholders must receive in exchange for their arrearages. 
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statutory and certificate provisions were permitted.336 In merger transactions, when 
“constructive fraud”, “bad faith” or “gross unfairness” of the management could not 
be demonstrated, courts did not void arrearage eliminations.337 The sole source of 
protection for preference shareholders against questionable arrearage elimination 
was the preference share contract, namely the applicable statutory provisions and the 
company’s certificate of incorporation.338  
Despite the fact that some commentators argued that the market price of 
preference shares already reflected the arrearage elimination risk inherent in owning 
preferred stock and thus the prospective investors were fully informed of these 
risks,339 in many cases, recapitalisation was only a remote possibility at the time that 
preference shares were issued and artificial structure built up by the ordinary 
shareholders in order to avoid the dividend payments to the preferred shares was an 
even more remote expectation.340 The law cannot or at least need not assume that 
market pricing processes make arrearage elimination fair. Every case has to be 
analysed separately to understand where a real abuse of the majority has occurred. 
Arrearage elimination alters a fundamental characteristic of a preferred stock, that is 
the right to receive a preferential dividend.341 
                                                
336 Johnson v. Fuller, (3d Cir.1941), 121 F. (2d) 618; Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 
I98 (D. Del. 1944); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722, (1949); O'Brien v. 
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 207 Va. 707, 152 S. E. 2d 278, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967). 
337 Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (1943); Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. 
Corp., I36 F.2d 944 (C. C. A. 3d I943); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R. I., 105 R.I. 
36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969). See Buxbaum R.M., ‘Preferred Stock—Law and Draftsmanship’, 42 Cal. L. 
Rev., 1954, 301: “Lack of fairness of a particular plan independently of the admitted power to 
promulgate it is no longer an independent criterion of validity in most jurisdictions”. 
338 Buxbaum R.M., 1954, note above, at 243. 
339 This view follows from the efficient-market hypothesis under which stock prices reflect all 
securities information in the public domain. See Posner R., Economic Analysis of Law (Boston, 1986) 
para 15.4.  
340 For empirical evidence showing “no statistically significant market reaction to any of … seven 
major decisions” of the Delaware courts studied see Weiss E.J. and L.J. White, ‘Of Econometrics and 
Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law’, 75 Calif. L. Rev., 
1987, 551 and 553. 
341 In fact, non-cumulative preference shares are very rare, considering that they cannot be easily sold 
to the public since they do not guarantee any fixed dividend to their shareholders and they subordinate 
the payment of a dividend, first to the existence of the profits in the final accounts of a firm and then 
to the discretion of the board of directors. See Cary W.L. and Eisenberg M., Cases and Materials on 
Corporations (5th ed., Mineola, 1980) 1118. 
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Most US states however, though not Delaware,342 provide appraisal rights for 
charter amendments that materially affect the rights of dissenting shareholders.343 
They allow dissenting shareholders to have the fair value of their shares determined 
by a court appointed appraiser offering them an exit option. In such cases, 
shareholders are then entitled to receive the price determined by the appraiser to be 
the fair value of their shares from the corporation.344  
In addition, the law has facilitated a fair bargaining between the company and 
the preferred stockholders, leaving the parties free to include extra provisions in their 
contract. Most preferred issues stipulated that the preferred stockholders could elect 
directors, normally two, if the preferred dividends were in arrears for a period of six 
quarters.345 In exchange offers transactions, three types of covenant were commonly 
used to protect the preference shareholders: the requirement of consent to create new 
prior stock, to increase existing amounts of preferred stock and to increase existing 
amounts of prior preference shares. However, these covenants proved to be quite 
ineffective, since it was possible and common for a company, when it issued a new 
class of shares, to delegate to the directors the power of setting privileges for each 
series issued without amending the articles, simply by nominating a “series” of an 
already authorised blank class.346  
In contrast with the American experience, British company law has in fact 
made little use of the appraisal rights. In order to protect minorities in relation to 
                                                
342 Not all the states have adopted the Act’s provisions or similar provisions with regard to all the 
devices used by the companies to vary preference shareholders’ class rights, because they felt the 
appraisal rights to be too costly to pursue or too difficult to perfect when they required severance of 
the dissenting shareholder’s interest in the corporation. Manning B., The Shareholder's Appraisal 
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 Yale L. J., 1962, 223 and 226; Stamler J.F., ‘Arrearage 
elimination and the preferred stock contract: a survey and a proposal for reform’, 9 Cardozo L. Rev., 
1988, 1354-1359; Lattin N.D., ‘Minority and Dissenting Shareholders’ Rights in Fundamental 
Changes’, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs., 1958, 307 and 312; Note, Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock 
Under Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J., 1966, at 1453; Note, Protection 
for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58 Columbia Law 
Review, 1958, at 1040, 1058 and 1068. 
343 Model Business Corporation Act ss. 13.01-13.31 (3rd ed. Supp. 1987). Although the Act is 
designed to “motivate the parties to settle their differences in private negotiations”, see Introductory 
Comment at 1354. 
344 Henn H.G., Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (St. Paul, Minn. 
3rd ed., 1983) 997 and 1002. 
345 Exceptions to this listing policy are frequent. See New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, 
1984, A-282. 
346 Buxbaum R.M., ‘The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance’, 73 Cal L Rev, 1985, 
1685. 
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their class rights, British regulators introduced the provisions contained in ss. 125 to 
127 of the CA 1985 and now ss. 630 to 633 of the CA 2006. These provisions 
applied only to companies “whose share capital is divided into shares of different 
classes”, but the new legislation at s. 631 (CA 2006) extended to all companies 
following a recommendation of the CLR.347 Unlike the CA 1985, under the new Act 
it is no longer possible for class rights to be set out in the memorandum,348 and 
where class rights attaching to shares in an existing company are specified in the 
memorandum, these will be deemed, by virtue of s. 28, to be a provision in the 
company’s articles. Class rights can be attached to the shares by the articles, the 
terms of issue, an agreement or a resolution. Under the previous CA, while it was 
clear that when the articles contained a procedure for the variation of class rights, 
that procedure had to be followed, it was uncertain whether in the absence of such a 
procedure class rights were not variable at all without the consent of each individual 
shareholder affected or whether they could be varied simply by using the normal 
variation procedure set out in s. 21 of the CA 2006 (previous s. 9 CA 1985), which 
would give the minority members of the class very little protection.349  
If the company’s articles do not provide a variation procedure, section 630 
subs. (2) and (4) provide that class rights may be varied either where holders of at 
least three-quarters in nominal value of the issued shares of that class consent in 
writing, or if a special resolution passed by the holders of that class sanctions the 
variation. This means that the articles may specify a less demanding procedure for a 
variation of class rights than the statutory scheme or a more onerous regime. 
However, the provisions of s. 630 are expressed to be “without prejudice to any other 
                                                
347 Final Report, para. 7.28. Eventually these recommendations have been introduced in the new 
Company Act 2006 where the new s. 125A extends the statutory provisions on variation of class 
rights to companies without a share capital, as for instance the companies limited by guarantee that, 
since December 1980, cannot be formed with a share capital. These companies may, for example, 
have different classes of members with different voting rights. Before, the question of how members’ 
rights could be varied depended to a large extent on whether provision had been made, either in the 
memorandum or articles, for their variation. This clause inserts a new provision, comparable to those 
for companies with a share capital. Thus there is a minimum requirement that class rights may be 
varied if three-quarters of that class consent in writing or a special resolution of those members 
sanctions the variation. Again, where there is a higher requirement in the articles or elsewhere, this 
would apply. This protection goes towards the direction of Cumbrian Newspapers Group Ltd v 
Cumberland & Westmorland Herald Ltd [1987] Ch. 1. See Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ 
Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed. 2003) 502; Kershaw D., 
Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 670. 
348  See the Companies Act 2006, s. 8. 
349 Ref. Cumbrian Newspapers Group Ltd v Cumberland & Westmorland Herald Ltd [1987] Ch. 1. 
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restriction on the variation of rights”.350 Therefore, if and to the extent that the 
company has adopted a more onerous regime in its articles for the variation of class 
rights, for example by requiring a higher percentage than the statutory minimum, the 
company must comply with it. In addition, if and to the extent that the company has 
protected class rights by making provision for the entrenchment of those rights in its 
articles,351 that protection cannot be circumvented by changing the rights attached to 
a class of shares under this section.352 
This procedure contained in s. 630 of the CA 2006 does not apply to 
corporate actions that may affect the rights of a particular class of shareholders 
without varying those rights. The courts has generally drawn a distinction between 
the rights themselves and the mere enjoyment of those rights, namely between rights 
affected as a “matter of law” and as a “matter of business”.353 Whether the rights are 
affected as a matter of law, the remedy included in s. 633 of the CA 2006 confers a 
right on dissenting preferred shareholders holding not less than an aggregate of 15 
per cent of the issued shares of the class in question to object to a variation of class 
rights applying to the court, within 21 days after the consent was given, for the 
variation to be cancelled. The appeal to the court freezes the effects of the variation 
made. The court on hearing the application may disallow the variation or confirm it 
and the “decision of the court is final”.354  
                                                
350 See CA s. 630 (3). 
351 See CA 2006 s. 22. 
352 See CA 2006 s. 630 (5). In the previous CA, the function of the memorandum was to provide a 
way of entrenching class rights, and the level of protection for the preference shareholders depended 
on it. If there was no variation of rights clause in the company’s constitution applicable to those 
rights, then the rights were variable only with the unanimous consent of the members (s. 125 n. 5) or 
under a scheme of arrangement (s. 126 and s. 425 of the CA 1985). If the rights were attached by the 
memorandum and their variation was expressly prohibited, only a scheme of arrangement would have 
been effective to vary the rights. Even if there was a variation procedure applicable to the rights 
attached by the memorandum, it would have provided the operative procedure only if the variation 
clause was part of the articles at the time of the company’s incorporation and the variation was not 
concerned with the giving authority for the allotment of shares or with a reduction of capital (s. 125 n. 
4). If one of these conditions was not satisfied, the statutory procedure was required (s. 125 n. 3).  
353 The words are those of M.R. Greene in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1946] 1 All E.R. 518. See 
also In White v Bristol Aeroplane Co Limited [1953] 1 All ER 518; Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co 
Ltd v Laurie [1961] Ch 353. 
354 See CA 2006 s. 633 (5). However, according to ss. 459-461 “a member of a company may apply to 
court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground that the company’s affairs are being or 
have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members …” (s. 
459). See Re Suburban and Provincial Stores Ltd [1943] Ch. 156, CA. See also Re Sound City (Films) 
Ltd [1947] Ch. 169, which seems to be the only officially reported case on s. 127 and its predecessors.  
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5.2.2. What constitutes a variation of class rights? 
There has been much controversy and confusion as to what constitutes a variation of 
class rights, especially in relation to the negative effect that a “variation” could 
generate. Generally no problems have ever arisen when a majority decided a 
variation of class rights by adding new rights or enhancing some existing rights 
without reducing any other powers to that class of shareholders. However, a 
distinction is made between the rights themselves and the mere enjoyment of those 
rights, namely between rights affected as a “matter of law” and as a “matter of 
business”.355  
An act of the company, which impinges only on the enjoyment of rights as for 
instance a subdivision or increase of one class of shares, will not amount to a 
variation of the rights, even if the result can be the alteration of the voting 
equilibrium of the classes.356 In the same way, mere economic disadvantage to 
preference shareholders is not sufficient to amount to a variation.357 When preference 
shares are non-participating with respect to dividend, but participating with respect 
to capital on a winding up or reduction of capital, a capitalisation of undistributed 
profits in the form of a bonus issue to the ordinary shareholders is not a variation of 
the preference shareholders’ rights, notwithstanding that the effect is to deny them 
their future participation in those profits.358  
The restrictive approach taken by the courts is also clear in other cases 
regarding operations on the equity capital. For instance, a reduction of capital by 
                                                                                                                                     
Cases in which it might have been invoked (Rights & Issues Investment Trust v Stylo Shoes Ltd 
[1965] Ch. 250) have been taken instead under ss. 459-461. 
355 M.R. Greene in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1946] 1 All E.R. 518. 
356 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1946] 1 All E.R. 512, CA, where the result of the subdivision was 
to deprive the holder of one class of his power to block a special resolution. See also White v Bristol 
Aeroplane Co [1953] Ch. 65, CA, Re John Smith’s Tadcaster Brewery Co [1953] Ch. 308, CA. See 
recently, Citco Banking Corporation NV v. Pusser’s Ltd [2007] UKPC 13. 
357 See for example Adelaide Electric Co v Prudential Assurance [1934] A.C. 122, HL, where the 
alteration in the place of payment of a preferential dividend from England to Australia did not vary 
the rights of the preference shareholders, notwithstanding that the Australian pound was worth less 
than the English one.  
358 Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co v Laurie [1961] Ch. 353. Also see Re Mackenzie & Co. Ltd 
[1916] 2 Ch. 450 in Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed. 2003) 500 and fn.89; Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and 
Materials (OUP, 2009) 671. 
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repayment of irredeemable preference shares in accordance with their rights on a 
winding up was not regarded as a variation or abrogation of their rights;359 nor was 
an issue of further shares ranking pari passu with the existing shares of a class.360 
And where there were preference and ordinary shares, an issue of preferred ordinary 
shares ranking ahead of the ordinary but behind the preference was not a variation of 
the rights of either existing class.361 Because the approach of the courts was more 
targeted at guaranteeing a company’s flexibility in its going concern than a full 
protection of the minority, it has become common to introduce special provisions 
into a company’s articles to protect preference shareholders and it is possible to 
construct a variation of rights clause covering actions affecting the value of the 
shares as a matter of business.362 In such cases, very careful drafting will have to be 
used if such a provision is to be construed as affording any greater safeguards.363 In a 
famous case of variation of class rights,364 the relevant clauses referred to class rights 
being “affected, modified, dealt with or abrogated”. Even if, in the first instance, the 
judge considered their rights to be affected by the decision of the ordinary 
shareholders, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision because it believed only the 
holders’ enjoyment of those rights was affected.365  
                                                
359 Scottish Insurance Corp v Wilson & Clyde Coal Co [1949] A.C. 462, HL; Prudential Assurance 
Co v ChatteRailway Whitfield Collieries [1949] A.C. 512, HL, and this is so even if they are 
participating as regards dividends: Re Saltdean Estate Co Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 829; House of Fraser v 
AGCE Investments Ltd [1987] A.C. 387, HL (Sc.) (this of course does not apply if they are expressly 
given special rights on a reduction of capital). But contrast with Re Old Silkstone Collieries [1954] 
Ch. 169, CA where confirmation of the repayment was refused because it would have deprived the 
preference shareholders of a contingent right to apply for an adjustment of capital under the coal 
nationalisation legislation.  
360 This is expressly provided in Table A 1948, Art. 5, but the position seems to be the same in the 
absence of express provision: see the case cited above, but contrast with Re Schweppes Ltd [1914] 1 
Ch. 322, CA, which, however, concerned s. 45 of the 1908 Act, which forbade “interference” with the 
“preference or special privilege” of a class. 
361 Hodge v James Howell & Co [1958] C.L.Y. 446, CA, The Times. December 13, 1958. See also 
Underwood v London Musical Hall Ltd [1901] 2 Ch 309, where an issue of preference shares ranking 
pari passu with existing preference shares was not a variation of class rights. 
362 Re Northern Engineering Industries Plc [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 704, CA, where a clause in the articles 
deeming a reduction of capital to be a variation of rights was upheld and enforced when the company 
proposed to cancel its preference shares. 
363 See White v Bristol Aeroplane Co [1953] Ch. 65, CA, Re John Smith’s Tadcaster Brewery Co 
[1953] Ch. 308, CA.  
364 White v Bristol Aeroplane Co [1953] Ch. 65, CA. 
365 In Australia, the result of White v Bristol Aeroplane Co has been reversed by s. 197 n. 8 of the 
Corporations Law, which deems the allotment of preference shares ranking equally with existing 
preference shares to be a variation of the rights attached to existing preference shares unless it was 
expressly authorised when the existing preference shares were allotted. 
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5.2.3. Legal strategies for preference shareholders  
In fundamental changes and especially in mergers, preference shareholders can 
potentially be victims of the management’s opportunistic behaviour favouring their 
self-interest or the majority shareholders. The law provides certain requirements that 
give shareholders, included preferred shareholders, the means to challenge a merger 
driven by managerialism. In the EU rules contain a requirement for an expert’s 
report.366 In addition UK company law provides two valuable tools to deal with 
corporate restructuring and mergers.367 These are the possibility to use a scheme of 
arrangement under s. 895 of the Companies Act 2006 or, especially for small 
companies, a solvent winding up under s. 110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to transfer 
or sell the whole or part of a company’s business or property to another company.  
A scheme of arrangement involves several stages. When an arrangement is 
proposed, the main concern is whether the members and creditors should be split into 
different classes for the purposes of voting on the scheme. Following the issue of the 
Practice Statement in 2002, any potential problems must be drawn to the court’s 
attention by the applicant company at the initial stage.368 Then meetings of those 
parties impacted by the scheme are held. If an issue of identifying classes is brought 
to the court’s attention, the court will then decide whether to postpone the meeting in 
order to resolve the issue and evaluate how those particular parties would be affected 
by a scheme. The dissenting parties could argue that the majority did not fairly 
represent the class. The court has full discretion whether to sanction the scheme even 
if meetings have approved it. However the approach of the court to date has always 
been to reduce the chances of success of the dissenting parties opposing the scheme 
on this ground.369 The rationale is that an increase of the class meetings would 
                                                
366 If the requisite of the substantial approval is not obtained or the meetings have not been properly 
conducted the court approval of the scheme can be made mandatory. See Davies P.L., Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed. 2009) para. 29-8. See the 
requirement in Council Directives 78/855/EEC and 82/891/EEC later amended by Directive 
2007/63/EC where in art. 10 it is stated: “Neither an examination of the draft terms of merger nor an 
expert report shall be required if all the shareholders and the holders of other securities conferring the 
right to vote of each of the companies involved in the merger have so agreed.”  
367 Davies P.L., 2009, note above, 1073-1079. 
368 Practice Statement (Ch D: Scheme of Arrangement with Creditors) [2002] 1 WLR 1345. 
369 The test was set by Bowen LJ in Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573, 583 and 
then refined by Chadwick LJ in Re Hawk Insurance Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 241; [2002] BCC 300. 
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undermine the scheme’s effectiveness and consequently weaken its usefulness as a 
statutory tool for companies.370  
Schemes, therefore, could raise issues of minority oppression. In fact, if a 
scheme is approved it will bind all of the affected creditors and members, even if 
they dissent. It is the court’s role to take into account all the reasons and exigencies 
of the parties and counterbalance the minority protection with the company’s 
interest. In order to do it, the court has generally drawn a line of distinction between 
solvent and insolvent schemes for the purpose of finding the correct comparator to 
define the classes impacted by the scheme. In fact, not all the company’s securities 
may be affected by a scheme. In cases in which the company was in bad financial 
distress, the court approved a scheme despite the lack of consent of the ordinary 
shareholders.371 The same principle was used to exclude a group of deferred 
creditors372 and a group of mezzanine lenders where the value of the assets of the 
company was significantly and demonstrably less than the value of the senior 
debt.373 
Despite of all, in practice schemes are predominantly adopted as an alternative 
to a takeover or to effect an arrangement between a company and its creditors where 
the company is in financial distress. This is for several reasons. Firstly because a 
scheme used to effect a merger is more uncertain in its success. While in a transfer of 
shares by way of a takeover, shareholders can decide on the transfer approval, in a 
scheme of arrangement, each category, whether members or creditors, has an 
opportunity to veto it. Moreover, in certain circumstances, mergers and divisions of 
public companies share additional requirements imposed by the EU company law 
directives.374 However, these constraints do not apply where a scheme is used to 
effect a takeover because the bidder and the target remain separate companies after 
the scheme has been effected. 
Furthermore, for smaller companies wishing to effect a merger a more 
appealing alternative may be provided by s. 110 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
                                                
370 It has not occurred to date that the court accepted not to sanction a scheme on this basis. 
371 Re Tea Corporation Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. 
372 Re British & Commonwealth Holdings plc (No 3) [1992] BCL 323. 
373 Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch); [2010] BCC 209.  
374 Counsel directives 78/855/EEC and 82/891/EEC also known as Third and Sixth directives. 
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Accordingly, a solvent winding up can be effected to transfer the business of the  
company. In contrast with the scheme, as long as a members’ voluntary liquidation is 
used, no confirmation by the court is required. However, in this case the company 
must be solvent. In addition, whereas under a scheme of arrangement, once the court 
has sanctioned it, dissenters are bound, under s. 110 procedure the parties retain a 
right to exit at a fair value.375  
In the US, public companies pursuing a merger customarily seek to protect 
themselves from shareholder suits by soliciting fairness opinions from investment 
bankers, which shareholders can peruse before they vote.376 This increases the 
efficiency of shareholder voting. The US also protects shareholders, providing 
appraisal rights that allow dissatisfied shareholders to escape the financial effects of 
organic changes approved by the majority, by selling their shares back to the 
corporation at a reasonable price in certain circumstances. The appraisal remedy also 
protects shareholders as a class by making unpopular decisions more expensive for 
management to pursue. In practice, however, cumbersome procedures, delay and 
uncertainty discourage small shareholders from seeking appraisal rights. In addition, 
many US states further limit appraisal rights by introducing a so-called “stock 
market exception” to their availability in corporate mergers.377 Accordingly, 
shareholders do not receive appraisal rights if the merger consideration consists of 
stock in a publicly traded company rather than cash, debt, or closely-held equity. 
There are two reasons for this: appraisal rights ought to protect the liquidity rather 
than the value of minority shares, and the valuation provided by the market, while 
imperfect, is unlikely to be systematically less accurate than that provided by a court. 
However, in light of this, it is unclear why appraisal rights are available when 
shareholders receive cash, this hypothesis being the most liquid merger consideration 
possible. Therefore, appraisal rights are of little use to shareholders who wish to 
challenge the price they receive in stock mergers between public companies.378 
                                                
375 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 111. However, a reorganization under s. 110 can be extremely expensive if 
a certain number of members elect to be bough out. 
376 See for example, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 Atlantic Reporter (A.2d) 858 (Delaware Supreme 
Court 1985) where the sale of a company without a valuation report and with little deliberation is 
grossly negligent despite the premium price. 
377 s. 13.02 RMBCA; s. 262 DGCL. 
378 See Mahoney, P. and M. Weinstein, ‘The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums’, 1 American 
Law and Economics Review, 1999, 239 where the authors observe 1,350 mergers involving public 
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These difficulties may explain why community law does not require appraisal rights 
as an element of the merger process, although they are offered on a limited basis in 
some jurisdictions.379  
 
5.3. Shareholder-convertible bondholder agency problems  
There are situations in which the management has the incentive and the ability to 
increase the company’s level of risk through the adoption of significant decisions or 
investment policies that do not necessarily maximise the value of the firm as a whole 
but simply benefit shareholders by transferring wealth away from bondholders. In so 
doing, the risk of loss passes to the bondholders, since the shares are protected by the 
company’s limited liability, but the potential gain mostly benefits the shareholders 
because the return on bonds is limited.380 Asset substitution or the risk-shifting 
problem is opportunistic behaviour that concretises when managers liquidate some 
assets to reinvest the money in additional risky projects, increasing the grade of risk 
for which the investors accepted to finance the company.381 This manager-creditor 
conflict is a typical agency cost of debt.382  
This opportunism is common, for instance, in the sale of assets, especially 
when it reaches the level of disposal of substantially the whole of the company’s 
assets. This type of occurrence is usually the result of corporate restructuring or is a 
prelude to a merger or to the cessation of business. Such a transaction may 
jeopardise the lender because it literally separates the assets for which the loan was 
contributed from the company that contracted the debt contract, leaving the lender 
with no sufficient collateral for satisfaction. Any sale of producing assets raises 
                                                                                                                                     
companies from 1975-1991; SELIGMAN J., ‘Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy’, 52 George 
Washington Law Review, 1984, 829, where he observed 20 mergers from 1972-1981. 
379 Rock, Davies, Kanda and Kraakman, ‘Fundamental Changes’, in Kraakman R. et al. (eds) The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2009, 2nd ed.) 191. 
380 Green R., ‘Investment incentives debt and warrants’, (1984) 13 J. Fin. Econ., 115-136; Narayanan 
M.P., ‘On the Resolution of Agency Problems by Complex Financial Instruments: A Comment’, 42 J. 
Fin. 1987, 1083; Haugen R.A. and LW Senbet, ‘Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital 
Though Options’, 36 J. Fin., 1981, 629 and 640. 
381 See Lewis C.M. Rogalski R.J. and Seward J.K., ‘Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries and 
Convertible Debt Security Design, 7 Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1998, at 32-59 where the 
authors state “the relevant risk is not only the risk of the company’s existing operations, but 
also the risk of any future operations in which the company may become involved over the life of 
the bond”. 
382 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 350. 
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questions concerning the adequacy of the sale price and the reinvestment of the 
proceeds. A similar result is obtained if managers, looking for an increased access to 
liquidity, actively trade subsidiaries and divisions in a market for going concern 
assets, often through asset securitisation. The danger is that assets that would 
previously have been available to repay the borrower’s creditors will be claimed first 
by the creditors of the transferee subsidiary.383  
A lender cannot explicitly direct the use of asset sales proceeds to a particular 
project viewed with favour, because of the limited liability constraint, which 
prevents the dictation of positive instructions. However, the borrower company can 
be restricted, subject to limited exceptions, by actions such as making acquisitions or 
disposals, changing the nature of its business and by merging with other 
companies.384 Mergers and consolidations, included takeovers, pool the assets and 
liabilities of two or more corporations into a single corporation, which is either one 
of the combining entities (“the surviving company”) or an entirely new company 
(“the emerging company”). The result is that the conversion right would be 
destroyed for all practical purposes, given that after the merger or takeover becomes 
effective, there will be no market in the shares of the issuer, which would have 
become a subsidiary of the bidder. A merger could damage a lender even though the 
surviving corporation is a larger firm, because its claim will be diluted and 
subordinated to other claims. In all the above mentioned cases, the convertible 
bondholders need to protect the fragile nature of the conversion privilege.385 
 
   
5.3.1. The protection of convertible bondholders in mergers and acquisitions 
European jurisdictions offer special protections to creditors when firms undergo 
mergers and similar organic changes. Although creditors lack the power to stop 
mergers, they are entitled to demand adequate safeguards when a merger puts their 
                                                
383 Ferran E., Company Law and Corporate finance (Oxford University Press, 1999) 517-520. 
384 See Myers S.C. , ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, 5 Journal of Financial Economics, 
1977, 156-158; Smith C.W. and J.B. Warner, ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants’, 7 Journal of Financial Economics, 1979, 153.  
385 Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 700 
ff. 
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claims at risk.386 These safeguards often extend to a requirement that their claims be 
secured by the surviving or emerging company or that their claims be discharged 
before the merger, which may act as a disincentive to merger. In the US, where the 
jurisdictions seem to be less creditor-friendly than in the EU, the protection of 
creditors can be achieved contractually in two ways: prohibiting some types of 
conduct that would dilute or destroy the conversion privilege with the use of 
appraisal rights,387 or requiring notice to convertible bondholders in advance of a 
particular event, such as merger or reconstruction, which would enable exercise of 
the privilege prior to the event taking place. While the latter is a more flexible 
approach, the former largely reduces corporate management discretion and issuers 
often resist the imposition of such clauses in practice. It may also be the case that 
under the law of the place of incorporation a fetter on corporate power by such 
contractual provision is void.388 Covenants dealing with prospective mergers range 
from very permissive to very strict. Available modes of regulating these transactions 
are to subordinate the permission of the merger to the compliance of the borrower 
with all covenants ex post the merger or to a right of redemption in the lender (put 
option).389 Alternatively, a notice provision clause requires the issuer to give specific 
notice to convertible bondholders after the public announcement of an impending 
takeover, merger, consolidation or reconstruction, so that convertible bondholders 
may exercise their conversion option, if they so wish.390  
In the case of an occurrence similar to a takeover bid, notice provisions are 
usually linked to an obligation on the part of the issuer of the convertible to procure a 
like offer that is extended to the holder of any ordinary shares allotted or issued to 
                                                
386 Art. 13 Third Company Law Directive 
387 Generally, voting rights are not an exclusive prerogative of shareholders. Other stakeholders may 
also have the right to vote in certain determined situations. See 56 Del. Laws, c. 50, s. 221 (1967), 
which states: “every corporation may in its certificate of incorporation confer upon the holders of any 
bonds, debentures or other obligations issued or to be issued by the corporation the power to vote in 
respect to the corporate affairs and management of the corporation to the extent and in the manner 
provided in the certificate of incorporation […]”. A similar provision is contained in the New York 
Business Corporations Law. 
388 As for example in many European jurisdictions. 
389 Bratton W.W., ‘Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and 
Practice, Substance and Process’, 7 EBOR, 2006, 55 ff. and 63 ff. 
390 Notification prior to the announcement of such an event may breach provisions in applicable 
insider dealing laws such as the UK’s Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and the 
comparable rules in the US developed under rule 10b-5 of the US Securities Exchange Act 1934. 
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convertible bondholders who exercise their conversion rights during the period of 
such an offer. This obligation would be owed primarily to the trustee of the bond 
issue if there were a trust deed and would in practice be contained in the trust deed. 
In the case of mergers, consolidations and reconstructions, which result in the issuer 
ceasing to exist as an entity, the notice provisions are linked to a clause that imposes 
on the issuer an obligation to procure that the corporation which results or survives 
from the merger executes legal instruments or documents legally necessary to ensure 
that each convertible bondholder is not prejudiced by the mergers, consolidations or 
reconstructions. This is achieved by requiring the issuer to ensure that convertible 
bondholders shall have rights of convertibility into the amount of shares or other 
securities or property that they would have received had they converted prior to the 
merger, consolidation or reconstruction. It is important to point out that these 
provisions are only of benefit to the convertible bondholder when the market price of 
the issuer, at the date of the announcement of the transaction, is above the conversion 
price. If the market price were below the conversion price the consequences for the 
convertible bondholder would be highly disadvantageous, even with the benefit of 
the clauses.391  
On the other hand, according to the courts of common law, convertible 
bondholders are entitled only to such shares, cash or other property that the trust 
deed provides for. It would be impossible under English law, by appropriate clauses 
in a convertible bond instrument or trust deed, to impose direct obligations on a 
bidder in a takeover offer for the issuer of the convertible bondholders in the 
company, due to the absence of contractual privity. For this reason, the bond 
instrument and the trust deed impose obligations only on the issuer and the trustee 
when the issuer is subject to a takeover bid. As regards convertible securities issued 
by UK companies, a degree of protection against the takeover of an issuer is 
provided in Rule 15 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Although express 
                                                
391 See the US case of Broad v. Rockwell International Corporation 642 F2d 929 (1981), where 
Collins, a radio company incorporated in the State of Iowa, issued $40 million aggregate principal 
amount of convertible bonds maturing in 1987 at a low coupon rate. Collins’ stock was trading at 
around $60 per share at the time of the issue and the conversion price of the bonds was fixed at $72.5 
per share. In 1971, however, the share price had fallen to $21 per share and had on occasion fallen to 
$9.75 per share during that year until two years later when the company was acquired by Rockwell 
International Corporation at $25 per share. 
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consent is generally not required in convertible bond issues,392 under Rule 15 where 
an offer is made for the equity share capital of a company, an “appropriate offer” 
must also be made to the holders of convertible securities and equality of treatment is 
required.393  
According to Rule 15(a), the adequacy of an offer or proposal is measured by 
its “see-through” value, which is the value of the Rule 15 securities by reference to 
the value of the voting equity offer.394 In the case of “options, warrants and other 
rights to be subscribed to, these should be calculated net of any exercise price”.395 In 
the case of convertibles, which do not have an exercise price, the “see-through value 
will always be positive and an offer or proposal at no less than see-through value 
will be required, even if that offer or proposal is below the market price of the 
convertible securities”.396 If a convertible security’s market price (if any) is higher 
than its see-through value, because for example the convertible is trading as a fixed 
income security, a Rule 15 offer or proposal does not need to be at market price or 
above.397 Similarly, as long as the offer is made at no less than see-through value, a 
proposal addressed to holders of Rule 15 securities does not need to include the same 
form of consideration as offered under the voting equity offer.398  
Where the voting equity offer is a securities exchange offer and offeror 
securities are also being offered to the holders of Rule 15 securities, the exchange 
ratio offered to holders of Rule 15 securities shall be no less favourable than that 
offered under the voting equity offer. Alternatively, if the convertible securities 
include an adjustment mechanism that affects the exercise terms of the securities in 
the event of an offer for the offeree company, an “appropriate” offer or proposal 
should normally take the adjusted exercise terms into account.399   
                                                
392 However, this consent is usually required for convertible preference shares issued in private 
companies. 
393 See Rule 15(a) of the City Code on Takeovers. The same concept is stated in the Company Act 
2006 at s. 989 under Part 28 Ch. 3 where convertible securities and voting debentures (s. 990) are 
treated as shares in the company for the purposes of a takeover bid. 
394 Rule 15, s 2.1. 
395 Rule 15, s 2.2. 
396 Rule 15, s 2.5. 
397 Rule 15, s 2.6. 
398 Rule 15, s 2.7. 
399 The Takeover Panel, Appropriate offers and proposals under Rule 15, amended 30/03/09, practice 
statement No. 24, ss 2.8-2.11. 
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This protection can be formalised in the terms and conditions that may permit 
bondholders to convert their bonds at an adjusted conversion price (to compensate 
for early conversion) on announcement that a bid has been declared unconditional in 
all respects.400 Under Rule 15(b), the board of the offeree company “must obtain 
competent independent advice on a Rule 15 offer or proposal and the substance of 
such advice must be made known to the holders of Rule 15 securities, together with 
the board’s views on the offer or proposal”.401 
Whenever practicable, the offer or proposal should be sent to holders of 
convertible securities at the same time as the offer document is published or as soon 
as possible thereafter, after the voting equity offer becomes or is declared wholly 
unconditional.402 The offer or proposal must be open for at least 21 days following 
the date on which the relevant documentation is sent to convertibles’ holders and for 
no less than 14 days after the date on which it would otherwise have expired, if the 
voting equity offer has become or is declared unconditional with regard to 
acceptances.403  
A company may decide to implement a takeover in the UK also by means of a 
scheme of arrangement. In such a case a certain set of rules under the Company Act 
2006 applies.404 A scheme of arrangement is a statutory procedure under s. 897 that 
permits a company to propose an arrangement to its shareholders or creditors or any 
class of them. Provided that the scheme is approved by the requisite majorities of 
shareholders or creditors or any class of them and subsequently approved by the 
court, it is binding on the totality of those shareholders or creditors or any class of 
them who were entitled to vote, irrespective of whether or how they voted.405 
                                                
400 In continental jurisdictions, provision may have to be made for events such as a French fusion, a 
merger mechanism where the issuer may cease to exist as a separate legal entity and holders receive 
an interest in the merged entity.  
401 Rule 15, s 3.1. 
402 Rule 15(c) of the City Code on Takeovers. 
403 The Takeover Panel, Appropriate offer, ult. cit., at 7-8. 
404 In the Company Act 2006, Part 26 deals with arrangements and reconstructions and Part 27 deals 
with mergers and divisions of public companies (previously s. 425 of the Company Act 1985). 
405 In UK the scheme of arrangement has become the structure of choice for implementing takeovers 
and its trend is extremely positive. In 2007, 47 targets were acquired, worth in aggregate 
approximately £58 billion (The Times, 14 January 2008). In addition, of the UK public M&A deals 
announced in 2007 with a value of £250 million and above, 28 were announced or subsequently 
structured as schemes of arrangement while just eight were structured as contractual takeover offers. 
See for example, the mergers of Iberdrola SA and Scottish Power Plc, Glaxo Wellcome and 
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Following the announcement of a recommended offer by an acquirer company to the 
shareholders of a target company, the trustees of the bond issues have to notify the 
bondholders that a document setting out the full terms of the Scheme has been sent 
to the shareholders and that a copy of this document can obtained from the specified 
offices of the Paying, Transfer, Conversion and Exchange Agents and the Registrar. 
Included in that document are details of the impact of the proposed acquisition on the 
bonds in order to provide that bondholders, who convert their bonds after the date in 
which the scheme becomes effective, will automatically receive consideration.   
 
 
5.3.2.  The protection of convertible bondholders in assets disposal   
The law offers creditors protection, particularly in the case of corporate division, 
which happens when the assets and liabilities of a single corporation are divided into 
two or more surviving corporations, one of which may be the dividing corporation 
itself. The risk is that creditors’ claims will be impaired because the division of 
assets and liabilities, which is determined in the division contract, is not pro rata as 
between the receiving companies. To this end, EC law makes companies receiving 
assets through a division jointly and severally responsible to pre-division creditors, 
even though the liability of the receiving companies other than the one to which the 
debt was transferred may be limited to the value of the assets transferred.406 
However, the law in assets disposal transactions provides little protection. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that if an investor holds a convertible bond the 
above-mentioned scenario differs. The advantage of a well-drafted convertible is that 
its value is not affected much by changes in company risk. In fact, while the risk 
reduces the value of the bond portion of a convertible, it also increases the value of 
the option included by increasing volatility of the share market price, thus providing 
the investor with a hedge if the firm turns out to be riskier than expected. In other 
words, it could be concluded that convertibles are relatively insensitive to the 
variance of the firm’s returns because they can always participate in the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                     
SmithKline Beecham, Halifax and Bank of Scotland, and the bid announced for Scottish & Newcastle 
Plc by Heineken and Carlsberg on 25 January 2008.   
406 Art. 12 of the Directive 82/891/EEC (Sixth Company Law Directive) [1982] O.J. L 378/47 
(applicable to open companies). 
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profits through their conversion privilege.407  
In truth, these types of transactions could virtually destroy the value of the 
conversion privilege. In asset disposals or cessation of business, where a company 
transfers all its assets but not its liabilities to another company in consideration of 
shares in that company or cash, the company that issued a convertible bond is still 
legally capable of effecting the conversion but the conversion privilege will be of 
little value if the company is listed in a stock market. This is because the transaction 
would probably cause downward pressure on the market price of the shares of that 
company.  
The problem could be handled by introducing in the debt contract a clause that 
establishes a partaking adjustment to the conversion price. In particular, this clause 
requires that, if a substantial asset transfer is effected by the issuer of convertibles, 
the holder of convertibles will be given the and amount of shares and other securities 
and property, including cash, as were issued upon such a sale to a holder of the 
number of shares of common stock into which such convertible security might have 
been converted immediately prior to the assets sale. Shareholders do not receive any 
property upon the company’s sale of all, or substantially all, of its assets, though they 
may receive property if the company is liquidated or dissolved following a sale. 
However, in cases where stockholders are cashed out or receive debt securities, the 
partaking clause is inadequate to avoid the risk dilution. In other words, if the 
ordinary shareholders of the issuer are not given rights to convert their shareholdings 
into the shares of the purchasing company, the convertible bondholder is without 
remedy.408 Furthermore, the wording of this anti-dilution provision with respect to 
assets sales has often created ambiguity. The clause is uncertain as to how the 
bondholder has protection only if the sale is followed by liquidation or dissolution, 
or also where the issuer who sells off assets receives a shareholding in the 
purchasing corporation as consideration without completing the merger. In a seminal 
                                                
407 Since higher risk makes the equity component more valuable while decreasing the value of the 
straight debt component of convertible debt, post-conversion equity ownership should be higher in 
riskier firms or in firms in which uncertainty and risk are key-factors. See Brennan M. and E.S. 
Schwartz, ‘The Case for Convertibles’, 1 J. Applied Corp. Finance, 1988, 58; Green R., ‘Investment 
incentives debt and warrants’, (1984) 13 J. Fin. Econ., 130. 
408 Kahan M., “Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities”, 2 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. (1995), 
159-162. 
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US case,409 the issuer of convertibles transferred 75 per cent of all its assets for cash. 
The trust indenture contained the usual provision that the convertible bondholder 
would be entitled to common stock in the corporation that made substantial 
purchases of the issuer’s assets. The court held that the clause did not apply in the 
event of a cash transfer but applied only where stock of the purchases was exchanged 
for assets in the seller. The court’s reasoning was influenced by the notion that the 
convertible bondholders could still convert the bonds into the stock of the issuer.410 
However, this ignores the diluting effect of such a substantial assets transfer for a 
cash consideration, since cash is a non-performing asset in a company’s balance 
sheet and does not facilitate stock appreciation by profit generation.411  
Nowadays, the practice in the “straight” sterling bond market has also 
highlighted the benefit to bondholders of the so-called “Spens clause”, which 
provides for a termination payment that compensates the bondholders when a bond is 
redeemed before its maturity or where a substantial part of the assets of the issuer or 
a material subsidiary is disposed of (as an event of default), and/or following a 
“restructuring event”. Such an event might occur when there is a sale or cessation of 
the major part of the issuer’s business typically in conjunction with a “negative 
rating event” (normally where bonds fall below the investment grade status of BBB-
Baa3).  
Finally, especially in private firms, the practice has evolved of the use of loan 
covenants. The content of these covenants may vary in their intensity. Financiers 
generally protect themselves by limiting the aggregate amount of assets that a 
company is allowed to sell yearly through the use of a book value or fair value cap 
along with a fair value standard to govern the terms of permitted sales, or by barring 
                                                
409 BSF Co v Philadelphia National Bank, 42 Del Ch. 106, 204 A2d 746 (Sup. Court 1964).   
410 The judgement of the US Courts seems homogeneous in that direction. See more recently: 
Hollinger v Hollinger Int'l (Del Ch 2004), US Bank NA v Angeion Corp (Ct App Minn 2000), 
General Motors Class H Shareholders Litigation (Del Ch 1999), Apple Computer Inc v Exponential 
Technology Inc (Del Ch 1999), Cyrix Corp v Intel Corp v SGS Thomson (ED Texas 1992), Sharon 
Steel Corp v Chase Manhattan Bank (2d Cir 1982), Story v Kennecott Copper Corp (NY Sup C 
1977). 
411 See Kling L.R. and E. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions 
(New York, 2005) Vol.1, 4.09 and footnotes; Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of 
Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 695. 
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sales of assets in excess of, say, 10 per cent of net worth per year.412 Furthermore, a 
transfer from a wholly owned subsidiary to another group company could also be 
problematic in that the other shareholders in the transferee company or undertaking 
will acquire an interest in the assets which ranks equally with that of the borrower. 
Hence, if the covenant is qualified so as to permit intra-group transfers, this will 
usually exclude transfers by the borrower itself and may also exclude or restrict 
transfers other than between wholly owned subsidiaries. In the latter case, a 
limitation on the subsidiary indebtedness clause is also generally included, 
particularly if the loan issue has been carried out at the holding company level 
whereas the business is conducted through the holding company’s operating 
subsidiaries. Of course, a disposals covenant must necessarily be qualified so as to 
permit disposals of assets in the ordinary course of business, although the 
introduction of a substance test may sow the seeds of potential future difficulties in 
interpretation and application. Nevertheless, stricter clauses may forbid any sale of 




5.3.3. Other situations of potential dilution: the distribution of dividends 
Another significant corporate decision that can dilute the conversion privilege of a 
convertible bondholder concerns the distribution of dividends and the ordinary 
dividend policy adopted by the managers. The parties rarely contract for anti-dilution 
provisions because it is often arguable whether the convertible bondholders really 
suffer from dilution. It has been said that whether a distribution of dividends must be 
considered an abuse of the shareholders over the creditors or simply the 
concretisation of a dividend policy, may be a subjective thing to decide. A payment 
of dividends, whether in cash or kind, can indeed deprive the company’s share value, 
because part of the equity capital is repaid to the shareholders. If a dividend policy is 
such that, alter the issue of the convertible, the rate of dividend payments is 
increased so that the conversion privilege is diluted due to a much slower increase 
                                                
412 Bratton W.W., ‘Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and 
Practice, Substance and Process’, 7 EBOR, 2006, 55 ff.  
413 Gompers  P.A. and J. Lerner, ‘The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture 
Partnership Agreements’, 39 Journal of Law and Economics, October 1996, 463-98. 
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in the appreciation of the market value of the underlying shares, the result is similar 
to a subdivision of shares – a so-called “stock split”. Such prejudicial behaviour 
could result not only in a decrease of the conversion privilege but also in the 
detriment of the safety capital made available for the repayments to the ordinary 
bondholders.414  
The law intervenes in this sense to protect the creditors with a set of rules on 
capital maintenance. In UK company law – as introduced by the implementation of 
the Second EU Directive415 – a public company can distribute a dividend only out of 
profit,416 provided that the distribution does not reduce the amount of net assets to an 
amount less than the aggregate of its called-up share capital plus its non-distributable 
reserves.417 However, a distribution of dividends may still dilute a company’s share 
value while complying with the rules on capital maintenance. A method of control 
would be a clause that restricts dividend payments to a particular percentage of the 
net corporate revenues or an adjustment of the conversion price on the occurrence 
of such an event.  
The main difficulty in connection with the adjustment of the conversion price 
is to determine what is meant by capital distribution. In order to identify a “diluting” 
capital distribution, it is necessary to define what constitutes an “ordinary” 
distribution of dividends. Generally, the conversion price of a convertible bond is 
initially set with the presumption that an anticipated level of dividend will be paid 
each year. An adjustment to the conversion price based upon payment of that 
dividend would violate the “fixed for fixed” requirement as the relative economic 
rights of the convertible bondholders and the ordinary shareholders would not be 
preserved – i.e. it would change the capital structure.418 However an adjustment to 
                                                
414 See Berle A., Corporate Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 Columbia L. Rev., 1931, 
1239; Hills G.S., ‘Convertible Securities Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship’, 19(1) California L. 
Rev., 1930, 21-22 and 36; Kaplan S.N., ‘Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses 
in Convertible Securities’, 33 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev., 1965, 3 n.7; Glover S.I., Solving Dilution 
Problems, 51 Bus. Law., 1996, 1269. 
415 Directive 77/91/EEC 
416 s. 830(1) of the UK Company Act 2006. 
417 s. 831 of the UK Company Act 2006. The position is similar in some US states. See 
Model Business Corporations Act s. 40 and s. 2; Virginia Corporation Law of 1956 s. 43, 
which prohibited the so-called “nimble dividend”, which is the payment of dividends from 
current earnings while there is no accrued revenue surplus. 
418 See IAS 32.11 of IFRS 7. 
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the conversion ratio for a dividend in excess of the anticipated level – for example a 
special dividend that is effectively a return of capital that is a proportional reduction 
of all ordinary shares – is unlikely to violate the “fixed for fixed” requirement. Such 
an adjustment would be viewed as preserving the relative economic rights of the 
convertible bondholders and the ordinary shareholders.419 
A practice has evolved whereby a “diluting” dividend is identified as a 
“capital distribution” and thereby affects the conversion price of the bond. Mainly, a 
capital distribution usually includes any extraordinary or special dividend, 
distribution or similar, in cash or in kind, which is something over certain normal 
thresholds.420 The board of directors, which makes the decisions with respect to 
these types of transactions, has a fiduciary duty to common stockholders, but not 
necessarily to holders of convertible securities.421 Consequently, one can expect to 
see protection against structural changes in the underlying common stock in all 
types of convertible securities issued by both public and private issuers. However, 
since some of the anti-dilution clauses may excessively limit the power and the 
discretion of the management, it is normally easier to find covenants as the 
“dividend stopper” in loans to private companies and in high-yield securities. 
Provisions usually seen in practice in bond instruments and trust deeds in the 
international markets do not seek to control this type of dilution.422 
Courts in the US applying ordinary English common law principles have 
refused to interfere with corporate dividend policy in the absence of express clauses 
in the bond instrument or trust deed and in the absence of fraud.423 A convertible 
                                                
419 Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials (5th ed., New York, 2003) 452-453. 
420 Fuller G., Corporate Borrowing: Law and Practice, (Jordan Publishing, 4th ed., 2009), 318. 
421 Glover S.I., Solving Dilution Problems, 51 Bus. Law., 1996, 1248-49. See also Irvine J.M., ‘Some 
Comments Regarding “Anti-Dilution” Provisions Applicable to Convertible Securities’, 13 Bus. Law., 
1958, 732; Hills G.S., ‘Convertible Securities Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship’, 19(1) California L. 
Rev., 1930, 21-23; Kaplan S.N., ‘Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in 
Convertible Securities’, 33 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev., 1965, 4-5. 
422   See Wood P., International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions, (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007) 92. 
423 See Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 347 A.2d 
133 (Del. Supr. 1975), where the court refused to interfere at the insistance of convertible bondholders 
even though the cash dividend was unusually large in the context of dividend policy in the previous 
years. The court’s intervention was sought based on a breach of fiduciary duty given the absence of 
any fraud or any contractual provision controlling dividend policy. However, the Harff ruling does not 
rule out interpreting the concept of “fraud” as meaning a duty of good faith towards convertible 
bondholders. Such an interpretation would give the courts a power to intervene on behalf of 
convertible bondholders in the face of acceleration in the site and/or frequency of dividend 
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bondholder is assumed to be already protected because the convertible security is 
remunerated with a fixed interest agreed by contract and its holder can always 
convert it into common shares of the company if he or she likes. Therefore, a 
privilege holder is not entitled, upon the conversion of a corporate obligation, to 
receive accrued interest thereon to the conversion date. Likewise, the corporation 
cannot require the privilege holder to reimburse it for dividends accrued or earned on 
the shares issued or on account of the undivided surplus represented by such shares. 
In fact, immediately upon conversion the privilege holder abandons his right to 
receive interest and acquires such dividend rights as the stock issued to him may 
carry. A privilege holder who effects conversion and becomes a stockholder is 
thereby entitled to share with other stockholders of the same class in all subsequent 
cash or stock dividends.424 
Pursuant to the provisions of practically every conversion instrument, however, 
an adjustment of interest is made upon the conversion of bonds or debentures into 
common or preferred stock, but in approximately half of such cases, the instrument 
makes no provision for an adjustment of dividends.425 The computation of interest 
adjustments upon coupon obligations or fully registered obligations without coupons 
is comparatively simple as in each case the interest is computed from the last interest 
payment date to the date of conversion at the established rate. Accrued interest, 
whether represented by not-yet matured coupons or not, is abandoned upon 
conversion as the obligation itself and all not-yet matured coupons are surrendered. 
Generally, the conversion instrument requires no adjustments of dividends on the 
shares surrendered or on the shares issued, but if adjustments are made with respect 
                                                                                                                                     
distributions. For an analysis of this case, see Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of 
Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 695-97 and Mitchell L.E., The Fairness Rights of Corporate 
Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 1990, 1203.  
424 Hills G.S., ‘Convertible Securities Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship’, 19(1) California L. Rev., 
1930, 37 ff.; Ferran E., Company Law and Corporate finance (Oxford University Press, 1999) 521-
522. 
425 See Kahan M., “Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities”, 2 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 
(1995), 154 where the author writes […] “About 42% of... the sample offered no [anti- dilution] 
protection to [convertible] bondholders for [cash] dividends.” See also Bratton W.W., ‘The 
Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 695 n.114 where the author 
notes that of a sample of forty-six convertible bonds, thirty-five permitted cash dividends out of 
surplus without adjustment and eleven permitted all cash dividends without adjustment, while forty-
four provided for adjustments for distributions in kind. 
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to one class of shares, they are also made with respect to the other. It is unusual to 
have adjustments of dividends on one class alone.426  
The adjustment of dividends on common or preferred stock is more difficult, as 
several matters must be considered: dividends on preferred stock may or may not be 
cumulative; common stock dividends may be regular or extraordinary, and may be 
payable in cash or stock; dividends may be passed or reduced on the next dividend 
payment date following the conversion date. Moreover, where distributions are 
made to shareholders by way of capitalisation issues or capital distributions, or 
where a rights issue or securities issue by way of rights is made to existing 
shareholders, the question arises whether bondholders who convert immediately 
prior to such events would be given the same rights to receive such distributions.  
As a matter of strict law, since they are not shareholders as of the record 
date of the distribution they would not receive the benefit of the distribution. 
However, provision can be included in the trust deed to permit bondholders who 
exercise their conversion rights immediately after the record date for such 
distribution or issue to have the same rights to the distribution or issue possessed 
by existing shareholders.427 In such an event, while no adjustment to the 
conversion price is to be made, the convertible bondholder acquires rights to the 
distribution or issue that will be commensurate with the amount of shares he 
would have received if an adjustment had been made to the conversion price 
immediately after the record date of the distribution. The converting bondholder 
does not, however, get the additional benefit that would accrue from a conversion 
price adjustment.428  
Thus, the issuer is usually required to give notice to convertible bondholders in 
the event of rights issues, issue of shares for cash, or when the issue of any other 
securities (e.g. warrants to subscribe) to shareholders is made at a subscription price 
below the current market price of the shares or where the conversion or subscription 
                                                
426 Klein W.A., The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1975), 565. 
427 Sometimes the period allowed for conversion after the date of decision of a dividend distribution 
may be 15 days, and sometimes it is expressly stated in the terms of the contract that a bondholder 
shall not convert his bonds into shares of the company during the period starting from the day after 
the date of declaration of a dividend distribution until the date of payment of the dividends. 
428 See the Lloyds Banking Group plc ECN deed poll paragraph (b)(iii) of the GBP7.5 billion 
(aggregate value) Enhanced Capital Notes or contingent capital bonds (Cocos)) issued by LBG 
Capital No.1 plc or LBG Capital No.2 plc, 3 November 2009. 
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price of securities already in issue is altered so that it is less than the market price for 
the underlying shares prevailing at the time of the alteration. Two types of notice are 
usually required to be given for the benefit of convertible bondholders. The first 
requires the issuer (or the guarantor as the case may be) to give notice to the trustee 
by issuing a certificate stating that a particular event that gives rise to the adjustment 
has occurred. In the certificate, the issuer has to specify the date on which such an 
adjustment takes effect and any other information required by the trustee. The 
second requires the issuer (or the guarantor), within a specified time (usually 14 
days) after the notice is given to the trustee, to give a second notice through a 
financial newspaper to the bondholders informing them of the event and the 
adjustment of the conversion price. This covenant, however, does not protect the 
conversion rights of a bondholder who may have exercised his conversion option 
during the 14-day period prior to notice being given to bondholders. The trustee may 
be under a fiduciary obligation to notify bondholders immediately so that some do 
not expose themselves to incurring losses by converting their bonds prior to the 
adjustment date. This need for advance notice to bondholders is dealt with in a 
separate clause, but only with respect to certain adjustment events.429  
 
5.4. An evaluation of the rationale and protection for hybrids    
This analysis shows that, in private equity and venture capital financing, where funds 
are often contributed in businesses that strongly depend on human capital, preference 
shares can be used as incentive contracts to align management and investors’ 
interests. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that convertible instruments 
present an optimal solution to the trade-off between the firm’s need to allocate cash 
flow rights to the venture capitalists and the need to make efficient exit decisions. 
Regarding the protection available for preference shareholders and convertible 
bondholders, the law in the UK and US tries to facilitate bargaining between the 
parties without interfering too much in business decisions. In fact, for the protection 
of preference shareholders, both the legal systems prefer to adopt ex post standards 
strategies, although US jurisdiction provides an exit strategy, in the form of appraisal 
                                                
429 Hills G.S., ‘Convertible Securities Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship’, 19(1) California L. Rev., 
1930, 20; Kaplan S.N., ‘Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in Convertible 
Securities’, 33 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev., 1965, 12-14; Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and 
Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 680-681. 
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rights for dissatisfied shareholders while, in the UK, companies’ restructuring and 
mergers are also dealt with in accordance with a scheme of arrangement. For 
creditors’ protection in public companies, contractual rights seem to be sufficient, 
although British law also implemented the EU directives on capital maintenance and 
on mergers and demergers that provide a further safeguard for creditors.430  
However, the analysis also shows that the practice of the markets has 
developed especially in the US but also in the UK, contractual standard clauses for 
convertible bondholders to protect the conversion privilege that, in certain crucial 
situations, would be otherwise destroyed by the shareholder-manager’s opportunism. 
Conversely, the UK statutory protection for preference shareholders regarding the 
variation of the class rights regime appears inadequate to fully protect the special 
class of investors in start-up businesses where particular financial and control rights 
are assigned for achieving particular objective targets. The UK courts make a 
distinction between rights affected as a “matter of law” and as a “matter of 
business”, concluding that if an act of the company impinges only on the enjoyment 
of those rights, it is unlikely to amount to their variation. However, in private equity 
and venture capital transactions, a right affected even as a matter of business may 
completely change the incentives of the parties and create conflicts in the firm. This 





Chapter 6. Financing through hybrid instruments: risks opportunism and 
legal strategies for mitigation 
The analysis continues in this chapter, where convertible preference shares, 
convertible bonds and bonds with restrictive covenants are studied. Convertibles 
show a strong rationale for their use in reorganisation and restructuring transactions 
because they largely reduce the agency costs of debt and the asymmetric information 
that can be a critical factor in the presence of great uncertainty in the business. 
Instead, bonds and preference shares holding restrictive covenants and veto rights, 
                                                
430 Respectively the Second Directive 77/91/ECC O.J. L 26/1, the Third Directive 78/855/EEC O.J. L 
295 and the Sixth Directive 82/891/EEC O.J. L 378/47. 
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which are becoming common in the US markets, provide the investors with strong 
protection against claim dilution. However, these advantages do not come without 
costs. On the one hand is the need of the founder investor (angel) not to be 
excessively diluted in their control and financial rights; on the other is the danger 
that an excess of veto rights can hinder a company’s capitalisation. I discuss these 
conflicts in this chapter, highlighting some common legal strategies to avoid these 
problems. These strategies show the importance of contractual design in order to 
avoid the economic and ownership dilution of interests in the firm. Although this 
chapter concerns primary UK company law, the use of certain contractual clauses in 
relation to hybrids it is adaptable to the corporate law of other jurisdictions and 
especially in the Unites States where these provisions are already common. 
 
 
6.1. The use of convertible bonds to reorganise and restructure a firm  
Corporate capital structure may have a decisive signalling role in stock markets, 
since a company’s grade of risk also depends on its financial obligations. Assumed 
managers have insider information that outside investors do not know and, to the 
extent that they aim to maximise the wealth of the company, such managers have an 
incentive to issue new equity when they believe the company is overvalued or at 
least not undervalued. Investors, who are aware of these managers’ behaviour, 
respond to announcements by lowering their estimates of the issuers’ value to 
compensate for their informational disadvantage. The result is a negative market 
reaction to new equity offerings and a dilution of the value of the existing 
shareholders’ claims.431 
When directors decide to issue debt notes, however, they suggest to the market 
that they have private information, which is an optimistic belief in the future 
business of the company. They would not issue debt notes if they were not aware of 
the company’s capacity to generate cash flows sufficient to repay the passive 
interests on bonds. In light of this, the unwillingness of such companies to issue 
straight equity, when viewed together with their inability to issue long-term debt, and 
                                                
431 Asquith P. and D.W. Mullins, ‘Equity Issues and Offering Dilution’, 15 Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1986, 61 and 70-71; see also Myers S.C. and N.S. Majluf, ‘Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decision When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have’, 13 J. Fin. Econ., 
1984, 187-188 and 209-210. 
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the consequent issue of convertible bonds instead, send a positive “signal” to the 
market about the management’s confidence in the future. The company in so doing 
decides to conserve value by raising deferred equity on better terms in the future 
instead of issuing undervalued equity today.432 The issue of convertibles provides the 
market with a positive signal, thus reducing the negative impact on the shares price 
following the announcement. Although the negative effect will remain, economic 
research shows that it is likely to be less pronounced than if the ordinary stock was 
issued directly.433 At the same time, this is an indirect way to increase equity at times 
when some private information will be revealed to the market. For this reason, some 
authors have argued that convertible securities are “backdoor equity” finance.434 
Directors may have a further tool for signalling when a call provision is 
included in the terms of the convertible contract. If the equity price does rise, the 
issuer can typically accelerate the debt by exercising their call privilege and thereby 
forcing the conversion into equity. Based on its favourable private information, the 
firm expects that the debt-holder will choose to convert. The benefit from deferring 
the issuance of equity through convertible debt financing is qualified by the effect of 
the firm’s exercise of its call privilege. A firm that calls its convertible debt in order 
to force conversion communicates to the market its expectation that impending 
difficulties may make the firm’s debt obligations more difficult to service or that its 
equity is now overvalued. However, the delay in calling the debt has a cost: the risk 
of financial distress until conversion, which the holder usually has the incentive to 
defer until the last possible moment.435 
                                                
432 See Lewis, C. M., Rogalski, R. J. and Seward, J. K., “Understanding the Design of Convertible 
Debt”, 11 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, (1998), 45–53; Ross S.A., The Determination of 
Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach, 8 Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 23-40; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984, note above, at 187-221; See Harris M. and A. Raviv, ‘Capital Structure and 
the Informational Role of Debt’, 20 Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 55-86; Harris M. and A. 
Raviv, ‘The Theory of Capital Structure’, 46 The Journal of Finance, 1991, 302 and 320. 
433 In response to the announcement of new equity issue, a company’s stock price falls by about 3 per 
cent on average, while stock price falls from 1-2 per cent in the case of an announcement of 
convertible debt. See Smith C.W., Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1986, at 8-10. Some authors have shown that the issuance of 
callable convertible debt may not avoid, but rather simply postpone, the negative 
information effect of equity financing unless the firm refrains from calling the debt and waits 
for the holder to convert. See Mikkelson W.H., ‘Convertible Calls and Security Returns’, 9 J. Fin. 
Econ., 1981, 237; Asquith P. and D.W. Mullins, ‘Convertible Debt: Corporate Call Policy and 
Voluntary Conversion’, 46 J. Finance, 1991, 1273 and 1277. 
434 Stein J., Convertible bonds as backdoor equity ,financing, 32 J. Fin. Econ., 1992, 19-20. 
435 See Lewis C.M., ‘Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries and Convertible Security Design’, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1998, 50 where “the intuition for the role of convertible debt as 
“backdoor equity” financing rests on the trade-off between the sale of mispriced corporate securities 
and the costs of financial distress”.  
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In addition, there are some evident advantages for an investor stemming from 
the fact that convertible bonds enable their subscribers to change their status in the 
company. Managers could invest too much in potentially negative net present value 
projects in order to guarantee the continuation of the business, although this may 
imply a decrease in the cash flow (also called an overinvestment problem). 
Alternatively, the company’s business may prove to be less profitable than expected. 
However, convertible bondholders as long as they do not convert their securities into 
equity hold a pure debt obligation and as such are entitled to receive a fixed interest 
and be repaid at maturity. The conversion option included in the debt security 
presents an important opportunity for the investor to evaluate the convenience of 
converting into equity or not. Convertibles are generally issued with a conversion 
price that guarantees their holders a premium over the present share market value on 
conversion of the securities. In this way, the investor will be able to consider whether 
to convert into equity during the different phases of the company’s life, knowing that 
if the company is not performing well and its share market value is not increasing 
they can enjoy the benefits of a bond.  
 
6.2. The manager-convertible bondholder conflict  
The use of convertible bonds to provide finance to a firm in its start-up phase 
or in a time of restructuring can reduce asymmetric information problems and give 
parties the right incentives. However, this is not immune from conflicts of interest 
(and it may be arguable whether, in such cases, these categories of investors are 
adequately protected by the law). The motive for investors to acquire convertible 
bonds is the desire to secure an opportunity to participate in the business of the 
issuing corporation for a fixed price. The bargaining the investors usually think they 
are engaging in is based on their perception that the value of the shares into which 
the bond may be converted will rise due to the future commercial and financial 
performance of the corporate entity in question, and the general upward trend of 
share values in the stock markets where the shares are traded. However, the value to 
investors of convertibles may be difficult to analyse comprehensively and any 
simplification of their value may be a misconception.436 
                                                
436 See Kahan M., “Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities”, 2 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 
(1995), 147, 148 n.3; Brennan M.J. and E.S. Schwartz, ‘Analyzing Convertible Bonds’, 15 J. Fin. and 
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Corporations are not static. Their capital structure changes and the share of 
stock of today, while legally an identical unit to the share of yesterday, 
commercially, may have become entirely different. Within the time that the 
corporation issues the bond and the privilege of conversion comes into effect, the 
assets and the surplus already accumulated at the beginning and forming a part of 
the book value of the stock can significantly change. A company can decide to 
proceed with actions that may be detrimental for the holders of a convertible bond 
because this opportunistic behaviour could reduce the value of the conversion 
privilege. For instance, a company may have decided to distribute its entire surplus 
as dividends or have paid a dividend in kind issuing additional shares of the same 
class, or have created an issue of preference shares placing the ordinary shares in a 
highly unattractive position with regard to both assets and dividends. Moreover a 
company may have reduced the par value of its shares, divided them into many 
shares of a less par value, or made them over into non par value shares. A company 
may have carried out transactions that could have influenced its shareholding, such 
as having merged, consolidated or even dissolved. The entire capital structure may 
have been radically altered without changing the nature or ending the existence of 
the shares themselves. Any such behaviour could be fatal for the hopes of the 
privilege holder.437  
In the relationship between convertible bondholders and managers, the 
conflict of objectives revolves around the conversion privilege. The investor’s 
objective is to preserve and maximise the value of the conversion privilege and he 
has an interest in deterring any action by the issuer that would devalue or destroy 
that privilege. The issuer is not concerned with the value of the conversion privilege 
after the bonds have been placed with investors, although he has an interest in the 
timing of the conversion. In a rising market for the underlying shares, the investor 
would like to postpone conversion as long as possible to a point just prior to the 
                                                                                                                                     
Quantitative Analysis, 1980, 407; Fuller G., Corporate Borrowing: Law and Practice, (Jordan 
Publishing, 4th ed., 2009) 64 ff.; Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible 
Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 681-689; Buxbaum R.M., ‘Preferred Stock—Law and Draftsmanship’, 42 
Cal. L. Rev., 1954, 243; Hills G.S., ‘Convertible Securities Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship’, 19(1) 
California L. Rev., 1930, 20-39; Klein W.A., The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. (1975), 547; Berle A., Studies in the Law of Corporate Finance (Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 
1928) 131 ff. 
437 Fuller G., Corporate Borrowing: Law and Practice, (Jordan Publishing, 4th ed., 2009) 65; Bratton 
W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials (5th ed., New York, 2003) 420. 
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final maturity of the bond. This would enable the investor to maximise the gain on 
the exchange of the bond for shares. From the issuer’s viewpoint the sooner he can 
compel the bondholders to convert the bonds into the underlying shares the more 
advantageous it is for him. An issuer may also wish to redeem the convertibles to 
prevent a continuing equity “overhang”, namely the contingent obligation to issue 
further equity on conversion.438 The higher the options overhang of a company the 
higher the level of growth the company must generate to compensate its investors, 
because the overhang may reduce the cash flow diluting the investors’ returns.439  
 
6.2.1. The timing of the conversion and the issuer’s call option  
The first area of potential conflict between issuer and bond investor concerns the 
timing of the conversion. The timing conflict is resolved by conferring on the issuer 
a call option or early redemption option, with respect to the convertible that enables 
him to redeem all or some of the bonds from time to time, prior to maturity, during a 
specified period in the life of the bond. This call option in effect enables the issuer to 
force the convertible bondholder to exercise his conversion option. This is because in 
the exercise of the issuer’s option of redemption prior to conversion, the bond 
instrument must by its terms be tendered by the holder to the issuer for payment and 
cannot thereafter be converted by the bondholder. If the bondholder wishes to derive 
any benefit from the conversion privilege, he must exercise the conversion option 
prior to redemption of the bonds by the issuer.440  
Nevertheless, the conversion privilege will be of little value to the bondholder 
if the redemption option can be exercised by the issuer prior to a time at which the 
market price of the shares exceeds the conversion price for the underlying shares. 
Thus, in order to enable the issuer to force conversion without harming the value of 
the conversion privilege, some contractual agreements and covenants have been 
                                                
438 In fact, stock-based compensation awarded to executives, directors and key employees of the 
company dilutes the shareholdings of common shareholders.  
439 Brennan M.J.M. and E.S. Schwartz, ‘Convertible Bonds: Valuation Operational Strategies for Call 
and Conversion’, 32 J. of Fin., 1977, 3699, but see Klein’s response in Klein W.A., The Convertible 
Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1975), 547 and 558-9. 
440 Otherwise, it would be as if the investor lent money at a cheaper rate without having anything in 
return.   
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developed by legal practitioners.441 In the international markets, an issuer is usually 
not permitted to make a call until a set period after issue, often between one and 
three years. Alternatively, the issuer is prohibited from calling the bond until the 
average market price for the underlying shares over a given period exceeds the 
conversion price, usually by about 15-30 per cent but sometimes by up to 50 per 
cent. Such a provision is usually applicable in the three-year period immediately 
after the issue of the bond. In addition, whether or not the issuer exercises his call 
option, he usually has to pay a “call premium” to the holder. This is an amount in 
excess of the principal or face value of the bond. This premium is usually on a 
sliding scale, being at its highest in the first year when a call is permissible (that is, at 
the end of the three-year period), and diminishing as time lapses.442  
When an issuer decides to exercise its right to call the convertibles, it must 
give notice of redemption to convertible bondholders in advance. A notice period is 
usually a minimum of 45 days and not more than 60 days but this may vary in 
practice. This enables the bondholders to exercise their conversion option prior to the 
actual redemption of bonds after the call has been published.443 The issuer is usually 
required to specify the conversion price and the current stock market price of the 
shares. In the markets’ practice, to ensure bondholders are not prejudiced by a failure 
to exercise their conversion option, trust deeds are usually used to confer a power on 
trustees (within a certain number of days after the date for redemption) to subscribe 
to shares on behalf of such bondholders. This power is operative only where the 
trustee is satisfied that such shares could be sold on the open market during the 
subscription period at a price that would exceed the principal and interest on the 
bonds. The trustee is given the discretion to effect the exercise on their behalf, 
normally where the proceeds of exercise and sale of the resulting shares would be in 
excess of 5 per cent above the redemption value of the bonds. If the trustee decides 
to exercise this power, he then has a duty to sell the shares, which are allotted in 
                                                
441 In the US the period seems to be two years. See Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and 
Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 678; Wood P., Law and Practice of 
International Finance (England: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) s. 9.07(8). 
442 See examples in Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials (5th ed., New York: 
Foundation Press, 2003) 438, 440-452; Brudney V., and Bratton W.W., Brudney and Chirelstein’s 
Corporate Finance (5th ed. Foundation Press 2003) 248 ff. 
443 Katzin J.S., ‘Financial and Legal Problems in the use of Convertible Securities’, Business Lawyer, 
January 1969, 366. 
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accordance with the un-presented bonds, and credit the net proceeds to an account 
for the benefit of such bondholders. The paying agent for the issue is then required to 
distribute the proceeds pro rata to all bondholders who are entitled.444  
The usual rule is that bondholders will be entitled to the proceeds if they 
present their bonds to the paying agent with all un-matured coupons. This clause is 
referred to as the “widows and orphans” clause and is intended to protect the 
interests of those bondholders who may not be as vigilant as others in exercising 
their rights of conversion. Such a clause is also of benefit to the issuer. The 
company exercises its call option with the aim of forcing bondholders to convert 
their bonds and not trigger the payment obligations of the company regarding 
bonds, which are being redeemed or called. It is, indeed, undesirable from the 
issuer’s point of view if some recalcitrant bondholders refuse to convert and do not 
present bonds by the date fixed for redemption. This is because, while a bond 
cannot be converted under its terms after redemption date, the bond survives as a 
debt obligation of the issuer and must be redeemed by the issuer through payment in 
full of the principal value.445 
The conversion premium is sensible to the conversion’s privilege durability, 
the longer its life, the greater its value. Conversely, the premium is reduced if the 
issuer retains the power to shorten the duration of the conversion privilege. However, 
even if its issuer does not redeem a convertible bond before maturity, the holders of 
the conversion privilege may still worry about the protection of the conversion 
premium. Indeed certain forms of corporate action may adversely affect, dilute or 
even completely destroy the value of the conversion option. The conflicts in this 
regard arise when the issuer tries to retain its complete freedom of corporate action 
and the bondholder seeks to preserve the value of his option, limiting the issuer’s 
discretion instead. Typically, convertible securities convert into a number of shares 
of common stock, calculated by dividing the initial purchase price (sometimes plus 
accrued but unpaid interest or dividends) by a fixed conversion price. As a 
consequence and without a provision to the contrary, actions taken by an issuer that 
                                                
444 For a recent sample of convertible bond structure see the offering circular dated October 2010 of 
Hengdeli Holding Limited with the Trustee in London and the registrar in Luxembourg at  
http://info.sgx.com/listprosp.nsf/1ac605da77093c4648256c6100174f0a/b4e8e27164538514482577d5
00249b4b/$FILE/Hengdeli%20-%20Offering%20Circular%20(2010.10.13).pdf (accessed January 
2011). 
445 Ferran E., Principles of corporate finance law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 520 ff. 
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increase the number (or decrease the value) of shares of its common stock 
outstanding will also decrease or “dilute” the value of the conversion right.446 In fact, 
when the convertible bondholder has a right to convert his bond at a fixed conversion 
price per share and the value of the underlying shares has been halved, the 
bondholder’s ability to convert at a profit has been diminished.447 The date on which 
the necessary adjustment takes place will be the date giving rise to the adjustment or, 
if earlier, the record date for determining which shares and shareholders are to 
participate in the event. This is to protect bondholders, who have converted before 
the event.448  
 
6.2.2. Value dilution of the conversion option  
Another type of company behaviour that would normally depress share values and 
thus prejudice the value of the conversion option is the issuance of additional shares 
for less than a fixed consideration.449 In this way while the number of shares in the 
market increases, the value of the company’s equity decreases, diluting the future 
participation of the convertible bondholder.450 Likewise, the issuance of other 
securities, convertible into the same class of shares at a lesser rate or price, and the 
                                                
446 A company incorporated under the UK Companies Act 2006 with a share capital may subdivide its 
shares into shares of a smaller amount by ordinary resolution if authorised by its articles to alter the 
memorandum of the company; see s. 618 of the Companies Act 2006. In the US these are called 
“stock splits”. 
447 Let’s assume, for example, that a company has a market value of £15 per share while the 
conversion price of its convertible bonds is £10. Thus the conversion right is “in the money”. 
However, if the issuer decides to split the share capital giving 5 new shares to any holder of 1 old 
share then the market price of each share will fall to £3 and so doing it will extinguish the value of 
the conversion right.  
448 Let us assume, for example, that a company carries out a share split on 1 June of each share held 
by each person on the Register of Members on 1 May and the bondholder exercises their right to 
convert on 2 May. Despite converting on 2 June while the record date for adjustment was 1 May, the 
bondholder will receive the benefit from the adjustment to the conversion price. 
449 Under the provisions of s. 561 of the UK Companies Act 2006 such equity securities must usually 
be issued to existing shareholders. See, however, the exceptions in ss. 564-566. The position is similar 
under the laws of New York and most American states. See the New York Business Corporations 
Law s. 622 and the comments of J. Hallows in Fuller v Krogh 15 Wis 2d 4121962 where he said: “A 
pre-emptive right of a shareholder in a corporation is recognised so universally as to have become 
axiomatic in corporation law.” Although the doctrine of pre-emptive rights was not known to English 
common law, it has been known to American law at least since 1807 after Gray v Portland Bank 3 
Mass 364 (1807). See Gower L.C.B., ‘Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation 
Law’, 69 Harvard L. Rev., 1956, 1369. 
450 For example, a company has an issued capital of £200, consisting of 100 shares trading at £2 per 
share. The company has also issued a convertible bond giving the holders the right to convert 
for £2.50 per share. It issues 20 new shares for £1.60 each and receives £32 for them. The new 
conversion price will be 2.50x((100+16)/(100+20))=£2.42. 
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issuance of other classes of shares having a preference upon redemption, liquidation 
or dissolution are also detrimental for convertible bondholders. In fact, the position 
of the common stock in respect of which the privilege was granted, may become far 
less valuable than was the case when the privilege holder purchased his warrant or 
his convertible obligation.451  
In start-up business, though not exclusively, the investor usually makes their 
investment by way of instalments conditional on the achievement of certain firm’s 
objectives that, if achieved, will open the way to another tranche of investor’s 
finance. However, if, for example, because of economic downturn periods, the 
milestones for the subsequent instalments are not achieved, the investor may have 
an option to subscribe to the next tranche at a discounted price to the first. This 
stage of financing is known as the “down round”, a round of investing when 
fortunes for the start-up have declined. The rationale underlying a down round is to 
provide the company with necessary cash to survive the current difficult economic 
times long enough to achieve additional business milestones, in order to increase its 
potential value either for the next round of financing or an ultimate liquidity 
event.452  
The clear painful consequence of a down round is the dilution experienced by 
existing and future shareholders including any holder of convertible securities. In 
order to protect the convertible bondholders, a number of anti-dilution clauses may 
be incorporated into the terms and conditions of the convertible security depending 
on the particular circumstances of the issue. The anti-dilution provision is triggered 
each and every time the company decides to raise new funds from its investors, 
offering securities at a price below that previously paid by the company’s investors. 
However, not all issuances of new shares are a cause of value dilution. For instance, 
when a new investor subscribes at a price equal to, or more than, the price paid by 
the existing investor, the anti-dilution provision will not operate, as the existing 
investor is happy to accept dilution on this basis. This stage of capital financing is 
known as the “up round”. 
                                                
451 However, see Ratner D.L., ‘Dilution and Anti-Dilution: A Reply to Professor Kaplan’, 33 Univ. 
Of Chicago L. Rev., 1966, 494 who argues persuasively that there is no dilution effect when the new 
issuance is at or above market price but below the conversion price. See also Glover S.I., Solving 
Dilution Problems, 51 Bus. Law., 1996, 1281. 
452 Birdthistle W.A. and Henderson M.T., ‘One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private 
Equity’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 2009, 56 ff. 
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Furthermore, the parties will typically accept that certain issues or grants of 
new securities should not trigger the anti-dilution provision and these will be 
expressly excluded from the definition of new securities. These grants and issues 
will usually include, for instance, the grant of options under an employee share 
scheme, an executive management incentive scheme or other incentive scheme that 
has been approved by the investor, or the issue of shares to satisfy the exercise of 
such options. Venture capital investors acknowledge that some form of option pool 
is necessary to give management and employees incentives, and usually agree a 
maximum number of shares for allocation under such schemes. In any event, the 
existing investor will already have accounted for dilution arising from the exercise 
of such options by agreeing the share capitalisation of the company following the 
investment and will therefore agree that options or shares issued in these 
circumstances will not trigger the anti-dilution provision. In addition, there may be 
other cases not contemplated by the investment documents where the existing 
investor is ready to accept dilution as the lesser of two evils when, for instance, the 
company is in financial distress and the only alternative is liquidation. In such a 
situation, the articles of association should expressly exclude such issues from the 
definition of new securities or provide that, where the existing investor agrees, the 
firm can issue new securities at less than the subscription price paid by the protected 
investor without triggering the anti-dilution provisions. Eventually, it has become 
increasingly common for the anti-dilution provision to compensate the protected 
investor for the dilution suffered by the issue of new securities in a down round by 
issuing additional bonus shares. If the existing investor has paid a premium for their 
shares, the issue of the anti-dilution bonus shares fully paid up to nominal value will 
itself trigger the anti-dilution provisions. This would not be reasonable and such 
issues should be expressly excluded from the definition of new securities. Shares 
issued in connection with lease finance arrangements, banking facilities and other 




                                                
453 See British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) drafting notes of articles of association at 
http://admin.bvca.co.uk/library/documents/Articles_of_Association_-_Drafting_Notes.pdf  
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6.2.2.1. Price-based methods of anti-dilution  
There are two methods commonly used for providing the existing investor with anti-
dilution protection: the issue of additional shares and the adjustment of the 
conversion rate. The method of compensating an investor for the dilutive effect of a 
down round is for the company to issue additional shares to the existing investor. 
The company can compensate the investor by way of a bonus issue of shares if it 
fulfils all the requirements set out in the Companies Act 2006.454 A bonus issue to 
holders of convertible securities does not differ from a bonus issue to all the existing 
shareholders. In order for a company to make a bonus issue to holders of convertible 
securities, it must have authority to make such an issue under its articles of 
association: usually this will be expressly provided for in the articles adopted when 
the existing investor invests. Depending upon the charter of the company, only 
certain classes of shares may be entitled to bonus issues, or may be entitled to bonus 
issues in preference to other classes. Bonus issues made under the anti-dilution 
provisions are usually expressly excluded from any pre-emptive offers that have to 
be made to shareholders.455 In addition, the Company Act 2006 expressly empowers 
the directors of a company, if authorised by an ordinary resolution, to capitalise 
certain profits or reserves in paying up in full un-issued shares in the company.456 
Since there is now no “authorised capital” limit, a company’s changes to issued 
capital must be notified to the Registrar at Companies House each time a new 
allotment is made.457  
Critically, the company must have sufficient distributable profits, non-
distributable reserves or other reserves such as a share premium account or capital 
redemption reserve at the relevant time to capitalise and apply for paying up the 
additional shares in full. The anti-dilution provision should normally state that if the 
company is unable to make a bonus issue, then the protected investor could subscribe 
to the additional shares at nominal value. The protected investor, therefore, will need 
                                                
454 Let us assume that a convertible bond gives the bondholders the right to convert one bond into one 
share of the company. If the company decides to carry out a stock split and allocate three new shares 
for each old share, then the anti-dilution provision will provide the bondholder converting its 
securities with one share plus two additional new shares to compensate its dilution. 
455 s. 570 of the CA 2006. 
456 s. 551 of the CA 2006. 
457 s. 555 of the CA 2006. 
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to ensure that the nominal value of any additional shares is low enough that they do 
not have to pay a significant amount to exercise their rights. The additional shares 
can be preferred shares or ordinary shares.458  
The second method of compensating an investor for the dilutive effect is the 
conversion rate method, which involves the mechanism used to calculate the number 
of ordinary shares into which the convertible securities convert. This amount is 
usually calculated by multiplying the number of convertible bonds held by the 
investor by the applicable conversion rate. The conversion rate will start at an initial 
rate of one for one and every time a down round occurs triggering the anti-dilution 
protection, the conversion rate is adjusted to more than one for one to account for the 
dilutive effect of the down round.459 Regardless of whether the conversion rate or the 
additional share method is used, the anti-dilution provision often provides for 
adjustments to be made to the share capital following a down round, which, in the 
absence of manifest error, are normally then binding on all shareholders. This avoids 
any disagreement as to what the adjustment under the anti-dilution provision should 
be.460  
6.2.2.2. Full ratchet and weighted average ratchet anti-dilution provisions 
While the founders and management of a start-up firm usually accept that anti-
dilution protection is unavoidable in order to raise further finance for the company, 
there is usually some debate as to the level of protection afforded to the protected 
investor. The most draconian adjustment is for the protected investor to receive full 
anti-dilution protection if there is an issue of new securities at less than the price paid 
by such investor. A full ratchet adjustment will compensate the protected investor 
                                                
458 The “bonus issue” is the most common anti-dilution mechanic in the UK. A set out standards of it 
can be found in the BVCA Model Documents at 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PEVCExplained/StandardIndustryDocuments (accessed January 2011). 
459 Let us assume that a convertible bond gives the bondholders the right to convert into shares at a 
conversion rate of one to one and each share has a nominal value of £15. If the company decides to 
carry out a stock split replacing each share of £15 with five new shares of £3, the terms of the anti-
dilution provision will normally provide to adjust the conversion rate consequently into five shares to 
one bond. See other examples in Broadwin D.A., ‘An Introduction to Anti-dilution Provisions (Part 
1)’, Prac. Law., June 2004, 29. 
460 Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 681-
689, in particular at 687; See some US cases: Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and Materials 
(5th ed., New York, 2003) 421-437; Kaplan S.N., ‘Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution 
Clauses in Convertible Securities’, 33 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev., 1965, 18; Kaplan S.N., ‘Some 
Further Comments on Anti-Dilution Clauses’, 23 Bus. Law., 1968, 893; Ratner D.L., ‘Dilution and 
Anti-Dilution: A Reply to Professor Kaplan’, 33 Univ. Of Chicago L. Rev., 1966, 494, 496-497. 
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reducing the conversion price to the exact price per share paid in the dilutive 
issuance, in effect allowing the holder of the convertible security to receive stock at 
that lower price.461  
Theoretically, this approach fully protects the investor against economic 
dilution from the initial investment; after the adjustment, the securities receivable 
upon conversion will have the same aggregate value as the initial investment. Some 
scholars view full ratchet anti-dilution protection as unfair because of, among other 
things, the potential for substantial dilution to common shareholders, regardless of 
the size of the dilutive issuance.462 Therefore, this approach is used almost 
exclusively in venture capital deals, where the common stockholders tend to be 
founders and managers. Because the parties in these transactions agree on a price 
based on numerous assumptions, significant valuation gaps can exist. Venture 
capitalists argue that if a subsequent round of financing is raised at a lower valuation, 
the assumptions underlying the original valuation were by definition incorrect and 
the investor should be fully protected. Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs often feel that, 
because a decrease in valuation may be caused by many factors, for example, a fall 
in the general market, the impact of a drop in valuation should be shared and 
therefore a different method of adjustment is more appropriate. Not surprisingly, 
even in venture transactions, use of full ratchet anti-dilution protection is rare. This 
type of protection is used most often in riskier transactions or in periods of economic 
turmoil.463 
The amount of equity issued in the down round as anti-dilution provision 
should be considered in the context of the company’s overall share structure. This is 
achieved by averaging the price across the different rounds of financing, taking into 
account the issued (and sometimes to be issued) share capital of the company. As the 
weighted average ratchet method looks at the actual effect of the issue of new 
                                                
461 See Katzin J.S., ‘Financial and Legal Problems in the use of Convertible Securities’, Business 
Lawyer, January 1969, 365; Kaplan S.N., 1965, note above, 7. 
462 Woronoff M.A. and J.A. Rosen, ‘Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible 
Securities’, Fordham Law Review, 2005, 118-119; Broadwin D.A., ‘An Introduction to Anti-dilution 
Provisions (Part 1)’, Prac. Law., June 2004, 36: “[A] full ratchet provision can have a draconian 
effect on the common stock. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that the full ratchet provision does 
not take into account the number of shares issued at the low price.”  
463 See Broadwin D.A., ‘An Introduction to Anti-dilution Provisions (Part 1)’, Prac. Law., June 2004, 
34; Woronoff M.A. and J.A. Rosen, ‘Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible 
Securities’, Fordham Law Review, 2005, 117-119.   
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securities across the company’s share capital, it is much more equitable to the non-
investor shareholders compared to the full ratchet. For example, under the full 
ratchet method, if only one down round share is issued, the protected investor would 
still get an adjustment in respect of all their shares, resulting in the non-investor 
shareholders being severely affected. Weighted average ratchet can be “broad 
based”, meaning that they look at the dilutive effect of the issue of new securities on 
all the company’s share capital plus all securities that would be issued on the 
exercise of all outstanding options, warrants and other convertible securities. On the 
other hand, a “narrow-based” ratchet only looks at the effect of the down round issue 
on the issued share capital of the company. Therefore, with a narrow-based ratchet, 
the protected investor will receive a greater adjustment than is the case with a broad-
based ratchet.464 
When calculating the protected investor’s position after the operation of an 
anti-dilution provision, both the method and the type of protection must be 
considered. Different formulae have been devised to calculate the full ratchet and 
weighted average ratchet (both broad and narrow) anti-dilution protection using both 
the bonus issue method and the conversion rate method with different results for 
every formula. There are advantages and disadvantages to both the (bonus issue and 
conversion rate) methods. With the bonus issue method, the benefit to the protected 
investor can be seen immediately. The additional shares are issued at the time of the 
down round, meaning the protected investor knows exactly how many shares they 
have got and the capitalisation of the company is clear. With the conversion rate 
method, the shareholders will not be able to see the effects of the anti-dilution 
provisions until the preferred shares are converted into ordinary shares. From the 
investor’s perspective, where the conversion rate method is used, the rights of the 
convertible securities should be expressed to be “on an as converted basis”, that is, as 
the convertible securities at the applicable conversion rate at the relevant time. So on 
a poll vote “on an as converted basis”, on a return of capital, winding up or 
liquidation, the remaining assets of the company would be distributed to the 
                                                
464 Broadwin D.A., ‘An Introduction to Anti-dilution Provisions (Part 1)’, Prac. Law., June 2004, 35; 
Woronoff and Rosen, 2005, note above, 119-121.  
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convertible security-holders “on an as converted basis”; dividends, if declared, 
would be allocated to the shareholders “on as converted basis”.465 
However, the transparency of the bonus issue method is also its downfall. As 
the additional shares are issued simultaneously with the down round, the 
entrepreneur/shareholder can immediately see the dilutive effect of the shares being 
subscribed to by the new investors in the down round, together with the additional 
shares issued to compensate the protected investor, which does little for motivation 
levels. Under the conversion rate method, the protected investor does not get their 
additional shares until conversion into ordinary shares, so the immediate effects of 
the dilution caused by the operation of the anti-dilution provisions are not so obvious 
(although if the rights are adjusted “on an as converted basis”, then the impact is the 
same). If the company has entered into a series of down rounds, it may be difficult to 
keep track of the exact adjustments to be made under the conversion rate method. 
With the bonus issue method, shares are issued simultaneously with the down round.  
The grant of any options falling within the definition of new securities 
exercisable at a down round price will trigger an adjustment under the anti-dilution 
provision. However, if the options are never exercised and lapse, the non-protected 
shareholders will argue that a readjustment needs to be made to ensure that the 
protected investor is in the same economic position he would have been in had the 
options never been granted. If the conversion rate method is used, then this is easily 
remedied, as the option grant can be ignored when calculating the rate for the 
conversion of the protected investor’s shares into ordinary shares. However, making 
such a readjustment is difficult where the bonus issue method has been used as 
shares have already been issued to compensate the protected investor. One solution 
to this problem may be to convert some of the additional shares into economically 
valueless deferred shares on the lapse of such options. This would add to the 
complexity of drafting and require the rights attaching to such deferred shares to be 
included in the articles of association.  
For this reason, it is also quite common to use a market-price formula, which 
is designed to protect the holder of a convertible security against economic dilution 
from current share market value. Therefore, the market-price formula provides for 
                                                
465 Katzin J.S., ‘Financial and Legal Problems in the use of Convertible Securities’, Business Lawyer, 
January 1969, 366. 
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adjustments when additional shares of common stock are sold at a price below their 
current market value. This formula assumes there is no harm to holders of 
convertible securities when additional shares of common stock are issued at or above 
the prevailing market price, even if below the conversion price. This is based upon a 
presumption that the original conversion price was set by fully informed parties. This 
presumption is most likely to be true in the public company context, and as would 
therefore be expected, the market-price formula is found almost exclusively in anti-
dilution provisions of convertible securities issued by public companies.466 
Smaller public companies with less liquid trading markets for their common 
stock raise different issues. Their trading market is less liquid and more volatile. In 
addition, information barriers are more likely to exist, increasing the probability of a 
disparity between the initial conversion price and the fair market value on the date 
the convertible security is issued. Therefore, holders of convertible securities in 
small public companies often treat these issuers like private companies and seek 
price protection through a conversion-price formula.467 
Although there may be some anti-dilution provisions included by the parties 
in their contracts, it is arguable whether convertible bondholders always need that 
protection. Ideally, a proper formula should discriminate between subsequent sales 
that truly dilute the convertible securities and those that merely reflect market 
information about the issuer. So, sales at or above market price should never trigger 
adjustments even if they fall below the original conversion price. This is the reason 
why large publicly traded companies often avoid any anti-dilution provision in their 
convertible issues. If the market fully values their securities, including the risk of 
dilutive events, sub-market-value issuance is very rare, and investors can rely on 
hedging techniques to limit the risks.468    
 
 
                                                
466 Ratner D.L., ‘Dilution and Anti-Dilution: A Reply to Professor Kaplan’, 33 Univ. Of Chicago L. 
Rev., 1966, 498-499. 
467 Broadwin D.A., ‘An Introduction to Anti-dilution Provisions (Part 1)’, Prac. Law., June 2004, 27. 
468 Woronoff M.A. and J.A. Rosen, ‘Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible 
Securities’, Fordham Law Review, 2005, 123 ff. 
   
   157 
6.3. The majority-minority conflict in venture capital financing: the investor’s 
claim dilution  
The reduction in the current price of a stock due to the increase in the number of 
shares is not the only dilution suffered by a non-subscriber member. An issuance of 
new shares decided by the majority shareholders may result in the shifting of 
fundamental positions of the stock, like ownership percentage and voting control, 
other than earnings per share and the value of individual shares. Therefore, the 
dilution can be costly for two reasons: the economic loss of value of the investment 
and the dilution of the investor’s ownership interest and control rights in the 
company. This is exactly the case in a down round financing in venture capital 
recapitalisations. A down round is a stage of financing when fortunes for the start-
up have declined because of economic downturn periods or because the milestones 
for the subsequent instalments are not achieved.469 
A new start-up business normally requires a large amount of funds to grow and 
expand. During the company’s life, more than one investment fund or financier will 
probably contribute finance to the business because when new finance is needed, 
investors who purchased securities in earlier stages of financing may be more limited 
in their ability to support the company or may prefer to wait for an acceptable exit 
event.470 The staging of investments in private equity and venture capital financing 
ensures that a company’s investors will hold different amounts of the company’s 
capital, issued at different prices at each stage of financing and with different cash-
flow and liquidation rights. These differences may encourage the venture capital 
investors to develop conflicting interests concerning the price at which they should 
sell their participation through a company exit event, or the price at which the 
company should issue new securities in the future.471 
Although shareholders as a category risk dilution from new equity, minority 
shareholders including preference shareholders, who are holders of non-voting 
                                                
469 Birdthistle W.A. and Henderson M.T., One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private 
Equity, The University of Chicago Law Review, 2009, 56 ff. 
470 Fried J.M. and Ganor M., ‘Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups’, 81 New York 
University L. Rev., 2006, 993 ff. 
471 Bartlett R.P., ‘The Agency Costs of Venture Capital’, 54 UCLA L. Rev., 2006, 64 ff.; Bartlett R.P., 
‘Understanding Price-Based Antidilution Protection: Five Principles to Apply When Negotiating a 
Down-Round Financing’, 59 Bus. Law., 2003, 23 and 24-25; Woronoff M.A. and J.A. Rosen, 
‘Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities’, Fordham Law Review, 2005, 112 
ff. 
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shares, face the largest risk, because they are typically not protected by shareholder 
decision rights. While the law facilitates creditor self-help in contracting for special 
anti-dilution provisions, it protects minority shareholders with specific norms, rules 
and standards.472 
 
6.3.1. Existing legal remedies in the UK and US 
Since 1980, UK legislation implementing the Second EC Directive has provided a 
statutory pre-emption right.473 According to this, the new issues of “equity 
securities”474 must be offered first to ordinary shareholders on a pre-emptive basis 
excluding the company itself as holder of treasury shares. However, while pre-
emptive rights are a default option for public companies in all European 
jurisdictions, the UK grants them as the statutory default for closely-held companies. 
If shareholders are to receive pre-emptive rights, a company’s articles of 
incorporation must provide for them. In addition, where the issuer is a company 
registered in England and Wales, ss. 549-551 of the Company Act 2006475 limits this 
possibility of abuse by providing as a general rule that it is a criminal offence for 
directors knowingly involved476 to allot shares or grant options to subscribe to shares 
or issue securities convertible into shares (“relevant securities”) without the authority 
of the members given either in the articles or by ordinary resolution.477  
Unfortunately, this set of rules, norms and standards does not apply to 
preference shareholders but only to the ordinary shareholders, namely shareholders 
other than shareholders that with respect to dividends and capital carry a right to 
                                                
472 Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed. 
2009) 837 ff.   
473 The relevant provisions are in CA 2006 ss. 560-577 introduced by the Company Act 1985 
implementing the Council Directive 77/91/EEC (Art. 29). See in the Stock Exchange: Listing 
Rules, Ch. 13, para. 13.8. For an overview of the operation of pre-emption rights in France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, see Myners P., The Impact of Shareholders’ Pre-Emption 
Rights on a Public Company’s Ability to Raise New Capital (London, DTI, 2004), annex B. 
474 The definition of “equity securities” includes securities that have the right to subscribe for or 
convert into a company’s ordinary shares. See, s. 560 CA 2006. 
475 Previously s. 80 of the 1985 Act to which the 1989 Act added s. 80A. 
476 s. 549(3) and 549(4) CA 2006. However, such failure does not affect the validity of the allotment. 
See s. 549(6). 
477 This may help to explain in part why the “shareholder rights plan” or “poison pill” against 
takeovers is rare in the UK, for the effectiveness of the plan depends heavily upon the directors being 
able to adopt it without shareholder approval. 
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participate only to a specified extent in a distribution.478 Therefore, preferred 
stockholders will have to bargain with the company, where possible, for their 
protection. The decision of the law not to intervene on behalf of the preference 
shareholders has to be counterbalanced with the cost of having pre-emptive rights as 
a device for protection.479 Pre-emptive rights can hinder a company’s capacity to 
raise new funds, by forcing companies to solicit their own shareholders before 
turning to the market and limiting the directors’ ability to issue blocks of shares with 
significant voting power. These constraints may also explain why public companies 
in the US have practically abandoned pre-emptive rights,480 while they seem more 
popular in closely-held corporations.481 For the same reasons, rights issues came to 
the foreground of policy concern in Europe in mid 2008 because of severe 
difficulties encountered by several banks that found themselves under credit-crunch-
engendered pressure to shore up their balance sheets by raising new equity.482   
Another remedy available in the UK for the minorities’ protection is provided 
by s. 994 of the CA 2006 that allows minority shareholders, including preferred 
shareholders, to file a petition alleging that their minority shareholding has been 
“unfairly prejudiced” by the behaviour of the majority and seeking a right to be 
bought out at a fair price.483 The courts will focus on the ‘conduct of the company’ 
and on the ‘unfairness of the prejudice complained’ and will apply an objective test 
in order to filter the suitable cases for resolution by way of an unfair prejudice 
petition. Accordingly, they will consider whether the conduct of the company, in its 
broader connotation, namely any action taken by, or on behalf of the company, by 
                                                
478 s. 560(1) CA 2006. 
479 See, recently Ferran E., Company Law and Corporate finance (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
525-528; DTI, Pre-emption Rights: Final Report, February 2005 (URN 05/679).  
480 In US jurisdictions, the statutory default is a rule of no pre-emptive rights for public as well as 
close companies. 
481 See Clark R.C., Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986) 719; Hamilton R., The Law of 
Corporations in the Nutshell (West. 5th ed., 2000) 196. 
482 Under the London Stock Exchange’s Admission and Disclosure Standards the minimum period for 
which an open offer has to remain open is 15 days (Para 3.9.), compared to the minimum of 21 days 
that is stipulated in the Companies Act 2006, while the FSA recently reduced the minimum rights 
issue offer period under the Listing Rules from 21 days to 10 business days (LR 9.5.6). The recent EC 
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007, [2007] OJ 
L184/17 has recently settled on 14 days as the minimum period for the exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies. 
483 See s. 994 CA 2006 (re-enacting s.459 of the CA 1985). 
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any company’s organs, but not only484, is prejudicial to the interests of the members 
of the company. The unfair prejudice remedy addresses corporate conduct that 
affects the interests of a person only as a member and in a commercial sense, not the 
personal interests of the member. However, a member interests extends beyond their 
formal legal rights to all its ‘legitimate expectations’.485   
Only once the court has established that the conduct complained of is 
prejudicial to the interests of the members, it will consider whether the prejudice 
complained of is unfair. Traditionally, the courts have not interfered with how 
directors manage their corporate business affairs. Therefore, they will not intervene 
in any technical or trivial breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. Such conduct 
must be shown to be unfair for a petition to succeed. The definition of what 
constitutes an “unfairly prejudicial” conduct has been explored and redefined in case 
law.486 
If the court accepts that the petitioner’s interests have been unfairly prejudiced 
by the conduct of the company’s affairs, the court has a wide discretion to order a 
variety of reliefs. The most common remedy is the buy-out of the minority 
shareholder’s shares by the other “unfair” members of the company or by the 
company itself, at a fair price.487 Accordingly, the court will ask for expert valuation 
evidence in order to determine a “fair price” for the shares, unless the parties can 
                                                
484 Re Phoneer Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 241; Re Citybranch Group Ltd v Rackind [2004] 4 All ER 735. 
See also Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd [1993] BCLC 360. 
485 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 14. For a discussion see Kershaw D., Company 
Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP 2009), 625-630. 
486 For example, O’Neill-v-Phillips [1999] 1WLR 1092; O’Neill v Phillips [1992] 2 All ER 961; Re 
Marchday Group [1998] BCC 800; Re BSB Holdings Limited (No: 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155; Re Saul D 
Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14. Similarly, Hawks-v-Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999 & [2009] 
EWCA Civ 291; Re a Company (No: 00709 of 1992) [1997] 2 BCLC 739; Re Alchemea Ltd [1998] 
BCC 964. Furthermore, where a member’s participation was diluted by a proposed or actual decision 
of the company to allot further shares to other parties only to reduce the member’s influence in the 
company. For selective or otherwise improper share issues, see In the matter of Sunrise Radio Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 2893; In the matter of Gate of India (Tynemouth) Ltd [2008] EWHC 959; Re a 
Company (No: 0026712 of 1984) [1985] BCLC 80; Re a Company (No: 007623 of 1984) [1986] 2 
BCC 99,191. For unfair calls on shares, see Re a Company (No: 008126 of 1989) [1992] BCC 542; 
Re D.R. Chemicals Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 39; Randall-v-S & F (Quarries) Ltd (unreported) 12 October 
1994; Re Regional Airports Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 30; Dalby-v-Bodilly [2004] EWCA 307. Finally, any 
corporate action or decision that damages the different classes of shareholders and involves breaches 
of duty by directors, see Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No: 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155. See also Re Sunrise Radio 
Ltd; Kohli v Lit and others - [2010] 1 BCLC 367 [2010] 1 BCLC 367. 
487 Sudhir Sethi-v-(1) Patel & (2) Scitec Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1830; Re Nuneaton Borough AFC 
Ltd (No: 2) [1991] BCC 44; Re Nuneaton Borough AFC Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 792; Re D. R. Chemicals 
Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 39. 
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agree the price to be paid. The courts will examine the level of involvement of the 
petitioner in the company’s business at the time the petition was presented and, if of 
minor importance, will discount the value of the shares to reflect the minority status 
of the petitioner.488 Despite its efficacy, the unfair prejudice remedy produces cases 
often lengthy and fact-intensive while time is crucial for a start-up business in high-
technology sector.489 
 
6.3.2.  Loan covenants, veto rights and pay-to-play clauses  
When a company is in financial distress and the existing investor does not have the 
capacity or the willingness to support further stages of financing, two sorts of 
problems may concretise. The existing investors, who are unable to subscribe a new 
round of financing, could suffer from an “expropriation” of value if another investor 
shows up and contributes new finance. Prior venture capital funds sometimes cannot 
even recover the amount initially invested, to the advantage of a new venture capital 
investor. At the same time, investors, who are willing to risk additional capital, 
expect their co-investors to share the risk. A troublesome issue in the anti-dilution 
area is the “free rider” problem, occurring when a start-up firm, facing a down 
round, obtains the support of only some of the existing venture capital investors, 
while the others enjoy the benefits of that support because of the automatic operation 
of the anti-dilution provisions, without putting up any additional capital. Neither a 
price-based anti-dilution provision nor existing mandatory legal strategies are 
sometimes enough to protect the entrepreneur and the investors from possible 
opportunistic behaviours such as free riding and expropriation of value respectively. 
These kinds of abuses are better dealt with the contractual bargain of the parties 
involved.  
                                                
488 Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2010] IBCLC 367; Fowler v Gruber [2010] IBCLC 563; Re McCarthy 
Surfacing Ltd [2008] EWHC 2279; Re Campbell Irvine (Holdings) Ltd (No:2) [2006] EWHC 583; 
Strahan-v-Wilcock [2006] EWCA Civ 13; Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd-v-Larvin [2002] EWCA Civ 
1740; Re Jayflex Construction Ltd [2003] EWHC 2008; CVC Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd-v-
Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108; Re Planet Organic Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 366; Re Elgindata Ltd 
[1991] BCLC 959; Howie-v-Crawford [1990] BCC 330. 
489 See Re Unisoft Ltd (No 2) [1994] BCC 766 where the judge noted that 994 petitions ‘have become 
notorious to the judges of this court for their length, their unpredictability of management and for the 
enormous and appalling costs …’.  
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It is almost common practice for the investor in venture capital financing to 
obtain special covenants to protect its investment against claim dilution. These 
covenants vary in their intensity ranging from provisions that regulate the incurrence 
of new debt, allowing it when justified by the firm’s financial condition to severe 
control rights that in certain particular circumstances assign to the investor a real 
right to veto a firm’s decision such as a debt restructuring. Standard covenants 
dealing with claim dilution may achieve their finality obliging, for example, a 
company to seek new equity capital for new ventures that the firm wants to 
pursue.490 In fact, if the venture were to be financed by additional borrowed funds 
with preferential rights or priority in liquidation, this would dilute the value of 
each prior investor’s claim in the event of failure putting the company’s solvency 
at risk, but investors would not reap the benefits of success since they do not 
share in capital growth.491 In addition, an over-reliance on debt can result in 
companies rejecting potentially profitable opportunities because substantial 
benefits from those opportunities will accrue to lenders rather than to 
shareholders. In this way, covenants restricting borrowing may reduce the 
incentive to over-invest or shift risk.492  
Conversely, control rights such as appraisal rights or veto rights give the 
investor a right to veto a particular company’s decisions that may jeopardise their 
claim regardless of the level of control they possess as a result of their equity 
holdings. These veto rights provide a way to restore their bargaining power.493 The 
British reluctance to adopt these techniques on a widespread basis contrasts with the 
laws in the US, where it is currently common to provide appraisal rights “in 
                                                
490 These restrictions are normally expressed in fixed debt-equity ratio, net worth minimum, current 
ratio, working capital minimum and a ratio of interest:dividend payable to net profit, which means a 
restriction on making payments of dividends on shares and/or payments of interest and repayments of 
principal on the junior debt. See Nash R., J. Netter and A. Poulsen, ‘Determinants of Contractual 
Relations between Shareholders and Bondholders: Investment Opportunities and Restrictive 
Covenants, 9 J. Corp. Fin., 2003, 201 and 215; Bratton W.W., ‘Bond Covenants and Creditor 
Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process’, 7 EBOR, 2006, 39. 
491 Fischel D.R., ‘The Economics of Lender Liability’, 99 Yale Law Journal, 1989, 131. 
492 Myers S.C. , ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, 5 Journal of Financial Economics, 1977, 
147; Sappideen R., ‘Fiduciary Obligations to Corporate Creditors’, JBL, 1991, 365; Smith C.W.  and 
J.B. Warner, ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, 7 Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1979, 117 and 124. 
493 Bratton W., ‘Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control’, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev., 2002, 895; Bartlett R.P., ‘The Agency Costs of Venture Capital’, 54 UCLA L. Rev., 2006, 74 
and 75. 
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connection with mergers, sales and exchanges of substantially all assets of the 
corporation, and charter amendments that materially and adversely affect the right of 
the dissenting shareholder”.494 However for public companies in the UK, just as the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers provides affiliation rights for shareholders as a 
class, it also provides an exit right for minority shareholders through its mandatory 
bid rule.495  
The appraisal rights or veto rights, however, do not come without 
disadvantages. An analysis of the practical problems with preference shares with 
veto rights shows that they cause a misalignment of the interests and objectives of 
different classes of shareholders or investors in a variety of situations and this can 
block the company’s ability to act in its own best interest.496 The venture capital fund 
holding control rights may have economic interests that differ from other investors 
owing to the capital-time investment constraint and investment return incentives. 
Consequently, the possibility exists that these veto rights may be used in a manner 
that adversely affects the wealth of a particular group of investors in much the same 
way that a manager may use his or her discretionary decision-making power to 
adversely affect the wealth of all stockholders. It goes without saying that it poses a 
constraint to the company’s capacity to raise new funds. If the initial investor can 
veto any attempt to restructure with the justification of this being against their 
interests, or impose stricter conditions for potentially interested investors, it is likely 
that the management’s negotiation for attracting new investors will be a harder 
task.497 
However, in the US where the investors only rely on ex post legal remedies for 
protection, the Courts seem to avail the company’s interests above everything at the 
expense of the single investor.498 Therefore, investors have a strong incentive in 
contracting for their rights and expectations with particular care. Especially in 
                                                
494 Clark R.C., Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986) 443.  
495 City Code, rule 9 that requires a person who has acquired control over 30 per cent or more of the 
voting shares in a company to offer to buy out the remaining shareholders at the highest price paid for 
the shares in the controlling block.  
496 Bartlett R.P., ‘The Agency Costs of Venture Capital’, 54 UCLA L. Rev., 2006, 78. 
497 Maynard O. and W. Bains, ‘Shares and Entrepreneurship in Biotechnology’, 8 JCLS, 2008, part I, 
8-9; Fried J.M. and Ganor M., ‘Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups’, 81 New York 
University L. Rev., 2006, 1003. 
498 Re: Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, et al., CA. No. Civ.A. 19719 (Del. Ch. July 15, 
2002).  
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distressed situations, the technicality in the contract can be decisive for the efficacy 
of the provision. Veto rights, as well as any other preferential right and limits of 
preferred stock, have to be “expressly and clearly stated” and will not be “presumed 
or implied”.499 The parties who negotiate the charter are presumed to have full 
knowledge of the law and to recognise that all preferred shareholder rights must be 
set forth explicitly.500 
In order to avoid the “free rider” problem and encourage existing investors to 
support a company, especially in down rounds, legal practitioners have designed the 
so-called “pay-to-play” provisions. These clauses require the investors of a company 
in financial distress to make an additional investment in the company or suffer the 
consequences of a dilution of their rights. In particular, if a protected investor does 
not take up a pre-defined percentage of their entitlement to the new securities under 
the pre-emption provisions (a non-participating investor), they lose some or all of 
their anti-dilution protections.501  
The provision can take a variety of forms. Typically, the existing preference 
shares or convertible securities of the investors failing to participate in a dilutive 
financing are converted into a new series of preference shares, often referred to as 
the “shadow series”. The shadow series is usually identical to the existing series of 
preference shares in terms of the preferential rights to income, capital and dividends, 
except it may have no pre-emption rights (pay to play class). The adverse 
consequences of non-participation may include the loss of the liquidation preference 
or voting rights held by the non-participating preferred stockholders, less anti-
dilution protection such as weighted average-price instead of full ratchet protection. 
In more extreme cases, the non-player’s existing securities are converted into 
common shares and they lose the company board seats associated with the earlier 
round preferred stock, or some combination of the foregoing advantages.502  
                                                
499 See the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Elliot Associates L.P. v. Avatex Corp. 715 A.2d 843 
(Del. 1998), see also Telecom-SNI Investors, L.L.C. v. Sorrento Networks, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19038-
NC, 2001 WL 1117505 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001). 
500 Since in the Elliot case, the parties failed to provide for the possibility of a merger in the language 
of the original charter, the court applied the typical rules for a merger authorisation vote: a merger 
was authorised by a simple majority vote of all outstanding classes of stock.  
501 Bartlett R.P., ‘The Agency Costs of Venture Capital’, 54 UCLA L. Rev., 2006, 57; Maynard O. and 
W. Bains, ‘Shares and Entrepreneurship in Biotechnology’, 8 JCLS, 2008, part I, 8-9. 
502 Bartlett J.W., Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restructurings and Reorganizations, 
(Aspen Publishers, 1995) 209; Gompers  P.A. and Lerner J., The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, 
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The justification for pay-to-play provisions is that when the company is in 
financial distress such provisions are necessary to raise capital and, in some cases, 
avoid bankruptcy. If a pay-to-play provision is incorporated into the articles of 
association, advisers must ensure that, as regards class rights, the pay-to-play class 
and the original preferred shares are treated as a single class. This stops a non-
participating investor, who may well be the sole shareholder of the pay-to-play class, 
being able to use their class rights to veto, for example, a subsequent financing of the 
company. Conversely, the holders of convertible obligations are in a different 
position because they are not stockholders and have no pre-emptive right to 
subscribe to new stock, although the issuance of new stock might also dilute or 
destroy the value of their conversion privilege.  
 
6.4. An evaluation of the rationale and protections for hybrids  
Convertible bonds and convertible preference shares are indeed an optimal tool for 
refinancing a firm or raising some funds for a project. The study of their peculiar 
features emphasises their capacity to reduce the shareholder’s opportunism without 
depriving the investors – at least in the case of convertible bonds – of the advantage 
of having a contractual right against the company. As far as convertible instruments 
are concerned, the conflict of objectives revolves around the conversion privilege. It 
is common, especially in private equity and venture capital transactions where the 
finance is supplied through subsequent instalments conditional on the achievement 
of certain milestones, to have new tranches of finance offered at a discounted price 
to the previous rounds: the so-called down rounds. The down rounds cause dilution 
and give the opportunity to the new entries to capture most of the benefits at the 
expense of previous investors. Convertible bonds are an articulated and consolidated 
standardised practice to protect investors’ rights from these problems: the anti-
dilution clauses. However, not all the issuances of new shares are a cause of value 
dilution. For instance, when a new investor subscribes at a price equal to, or more 
                                                                                                                                     
Mass.: MIT Press, 2nd eds. 2004) 171 ff. For some judgements of the US courts see WatchMark 
Corp. v. ARGO Global Capital, LLC, et. Al, Del. Supr. 2004; Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. 
Vague, Del. Ch. 2002. The courts upheld in their judgments the applicable “pay-to-play” provisions 
by focusing on procedural fairness and strict contract construction principles, rejecting equitable 
arguments rooted in the notion of substantive unfairness, and rejected the notion that a fiduciary duty 
was owed to the early round minority stockholders to not impair their rights. 
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than, the price paid by the existing investor, the anti-dilution provision will not 
operate, as the existing investor is happy to accept dilution on this basis. Similarly, a 
proper formula should distinguish between subsequent sales that truly dilute the 
convertible securities and those that merely reflect market information about the 
issuer. For instance, sales at or above the market price should never trigger 
adjustments even if they fall below the original conversion price. This is also why 
large publicly traded companies often avoid any anti-dilution clauses in their issues. 
If the risk of dilution is already discounted in the market, that sub-market-value 
issuance is very unlikely to happen.  
Nevertheless, investors may suffer from ownership dilution that is the pro rata 
dilution of their voting and control powers. The UK law limits the possibility of 
abuse by providing as a general rule pre-emptive rights for shareholders. However, 
these norms and standards only refer to ordinary shareholders and do not apply for 
preference shareholders. Moreover, pre-emption rights are optional for private 
companies and can also be opted out of in public companies’ charters. US and UK 
jurisdictions rely on a standards strategy: the duty of loyalty or the fiduciary duties in 
general. Therefore, a preferred shareholder may file a petition alleging that their 
minority shareholding has been unfairly prejudiced by the behaviour of the majority. 
This approach allows the courts to leave directors the discretion to manage the 
affairs of the company without interfering excessively. This ex post legal strategy 
seems robust. However, in the case of private equity and venture capital, it may not 
be enough, as demonstrated by the veto rights and appraisal rights attached to 
preference shares in the US market. These severe control rights given to the investor 
can be counterbalanced by special provisions such as pay-to-play clauses that are 
targeted to avoid the opposite opportunistic behaviour namely the free rider problem. 
The equilibrium must be found by the parties in the bargain, because only the parties 
are able to identify their risks and contract for protection. Again, since all the 
preferred rights must be explicitly stated in the contracts, the parties negotiating the 






   


























Chapter 7. Control Transactions  
In this chapter, I discuss the legal remedies and strategies available to preference 
shareholders for addressing the principal-agent problems that arise when a person – 
the acquirer – attempts, through offers to the company’s shareholders, to acquire 
sufficient voting shares in a company to gain control of the company. These agency 
issues refer to the shareholder-board conflict in companies with dispersed 
shareholdings and the majority-minority conflict in firm in which there is a 
controlling shareholder or shareholding group. The difference between control 
transactions and mergers and acquisitions is that while a merger involves corporate 
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decisions, control transactions are effected by private contract between the acquirer 
and the shareholders individually.503  
The usefulness of hybrids in private equity and venture capital is most evident 
in control transactions, where the parties must design the firm’s capital structure not 
only to align ex ante the right incentives to achieve the target, but also to resolve 
distributional conflicts and make use of the right to sell control in the event of a 
future sale of the firm. IPO and sale of the start-up firm are two of the main exit 
mechanisms adopted by private equity and venture capital investors. However, since 
this kind of businesses is developed in high uncertainty, these events may occur 
prematurely or in bad economic conditions, when least desired. As a result it is 
possible that a hostile takeover bidder will approach the firm with the sole aim of 
expropriating wealth from the parties involved. For this reason, it is essential that 
whoever has the power to sell makes the decision that is most efficient for all the 
parties. This is possible with hybrid instruments, because they provide an asset-
specific governance system that allows an optimal allocation of control rights and 
financial rights in the firm. Contractual design through the use of hybrids also seems 
the most efficient way of protecting investors’ rights in private equity financing and 
in start-up businesses, which have great unexploited potential and very uncertain 
conditions. The issues discussed in this chapter are discussed in a UK and US 
context, since certain particular clauses have international application. 
  
7.1. The agency conflict in control transactions  
The shareholders of the target company, both as a class and as non-controlling 
shareholders, mainly suffer from agency and co-ordination costs. Consequently, with 
respect to the acquirer, they face significant co-ordination problems, because the 
decision to accept or reject the bid is normally made by the shareholders 
individually, rather than by way of a collective decision that binds everyone. With 
respect to the target management, the shareholders still face agency issues, since the 
board’s recommendation to them, for or against the offer, may not be disinterested. 
In particular for the preference shareholders, who are a non-voting class of 
                                                
503 Of course, the acquirer often has a free choice regarding whether to structure the bid as a 
contractual offer or as a merger proposal. In the UK, the rules for control shifts can be applied to 
acquisitions through statutory mergers on the grounds that many of the principles are applicable for 
both control shifts and statutory mergers. 
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shareholders, the overwhelming problems are related to price: a preference 
shareholder as well as a minority shareholder can miss the opportunity to sell shares 
at a high price or can be forced to sell at too low a price.504  
The co-ordination problems of shareholders may be mitigated to some degree 
through the board’s negotiations with the potential acquirer. The agency costs may 
be reduced by the mandatory bid rule introduced by the EU Takeover Directive,505 
which obliges the acquirer of shares to make a general offer to the other shareholders 
once it has acquired sufficient shares by private contract, whether on or off market, 
to obtain control of the target.506 In fact, although the acquirer’s offer may be value-
increasing for the target company’s shareholders as a whole, the non-controlling 
shareholders may not obtain their pro rata share of that value in the future. However, 
the mandatory bid rule, by prohibiting partial offers for the acquisition of control 
over the whole of the company’s assets, constitutes a pre-emptive strike at majority 
oppression of minority shareholders.507 By extension, the law requires comparable 
offers to be made for all classes of equity shares in the target, whether those classes 
carry voting rights or not.508   
In closely held companies, however, the application of the mandatory bid rule 
is questioned as it can result in high costs for minority shareholders. It is arguable 
whether this rule should be applied to a transfer of a controlling position, so as to 
require the acquirer to make a public offer, where they would otherwise not wish to 
do so, and on the same terms as those accepted by the controlling seller.509 Indeed, 
                                                
504 For an analysis of these costs and the related legal strategies, see Davies P. and K. Hopt, ‘Control 
Transactions’ in Kraakman R. et al. (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (OUP 2009, 2nd ed.) 225-273.  
505 EU Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC.  
506 See art. 5 of the Takeover Directive. The Directive leaves the triggering threshold to be decided by 
the member states, most of which, including the UK, put the triggering percentage near 30 per cent, 
while Latvia, Malta and Poland put it at 50 per cent or higher. 
507 One argument in favour of the mandatory bid rule is that it may force the buyer to end up with a 
larger block of shares, producing a greater incentive alignment between the buyer and the remaining 
dispersed shareholders. This would result in a smaller extraction of private benefits. See Gromb D., 
M. Burkart, and F. Panunzi, ‘Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control’, 
55 Journal of Finance, 2000, 647-677. 
508 The City Code contains both such rules. See Rules 14 (offers where more than one class of equity 
share) and 36 (partial offers). 
509 The Directive leaves the member states with scope for specific exceptions. Some, but by no means 
all, takeover regimes have responded to these concerns, either in the formulation of the rules relating 
to the fixing of the price for the general offer or by extending the list of exceptions to the rule.  
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some privately negotiated trades may occur because the buyer expects to extract 
more private benefits than the seller does in spite of the fact that the firm is expected 
to be worth less under the control of the buyer. Such transactions would not occur 
under the mandatory bid rule because the dispersed shareholders would have to be 
paid the same as the seller, which is more than their shares were worth before the 
trade. However, the rule may deter value-increasing takeovers because the takeover 
price fails to compensate the block owner for their private benefits.510  
Since it is very difficult to establish ex ante whether the minority shareholders 
will be disadvantaged by the sale of the controlling block, the regulatory choice 
hesitates between reliance on general corporate law to protect the minority against 
unfairness in the future and giving the minority an exit right at the time of the control 
shift.511 Nevertheless, mandatory exit rights and mandatory sharing of bid premiums 
for minority shareholders are a strong disincentive for any controlling shareholder to 
sell the control stake if the private benefits of control are high. In fact, the acquirer 
will have to bid for the whole share capital and will generally be reluctant to offer 
the transferor any premium for control if he or she does not want to overpay for the 
share capital taken as a whole. Accordingly, some systems do allow variations 
between the price offered to the minority and that paid for the controlling shares, or 
permit partial bids in certain cases. The UK City Code is unusual in applying the 
mandatory bid rule to any acquisition of voting shares by a shareholder holding 
between 30 and 50 per cent of the voting shares.512  
These problems are particularly enhanced in venture capital control 
transactions. When an outside competitor – the acquirer – who possesses both 
adequate capital and knowledge, appears and takes over the firm, considerable 
majority/minority distributional conflicts can arise, generated by the inefficient 
allocation of the private benefits of control in the firm.513 Two main agency conflicts 
                                                
510 Bebchuk L., ‘Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control’, 109 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1994, 957-993. See also Dyck A. and L. Zingales, ‘Private benefits of control: An 
international comparison’, 59 Journal of Finance, 2004, 537-599 where the Authors extricate the 
private benefits of control from the increase in the share value due to the change in control, in order to 
perform an empirical evaluation of the costs and benefits of the mandatory bid rule  
511 See Davies P. and K. Hopt, ‘Control Transactions’ in Kraakman R. et al. (eds) The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2009, 2nd ed.) 256-263. 
512 See Commission of European Communities, Report on the Implementation of the Directive on 
Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268, February 2007, at 6. 
513 Berglof E., ‘A control Theory of Venture Capital Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and 
Organization, 1994, 248. 
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can be identified in this case: the expropriation of managerial quasi-rents, also 
known as the entrepreneur’s private benefits of control and asset stripping, which is a 
potential abuse by the controlling parties of the non-controlling parties. For instance, 
the acquirer may be more efficient in running the firm, but may also fire 
management without compensation and dilute firm value by transferring assets to 
themselves in connection with liquidation.514 Furthermore, even if the parties – 
investor and entrepreneur - agree ex ante to allow for a future sale of the business, 
they may disagree ex post. Therefore, there is a trade-off between, on the one hand, 
the wish of the initial contracting parties to benefit from potential efficiency 
improvements performed by a potential future competitor who buys the firm and, on 
the other hand, their desire to protect themselves against dilution. These problems 
are related to two generic state-contingent conflicts in entrepreneurial finance: one 
relates to private benefits in good “state of nature” and the other involves the value 
of the firm in bad states.515  
It seems that since the sale of the firm is a verifiable event, contracts could be 
made contingent on a sale. However, because the parties’ willingness to sell may be 
affected by the “state of nature”, that is how the company is performing and the type 
of buyer, just making the contract contingent on the event of a sale is not 
sufficient.516 This is also why the allocation of control rights and incentives should 
not be separated. When private benefits are an important part of managerial 
compensation schemes, state-contingent conflicts may arise and this separation may 
not hold. In order to mitigate these conflicts the decision to trade should be given to 
the party most vulnerable to dilution, namely the residual claimants.517 
 
 
7.1.1. The exit event in venture capital start-up firms 
Young growth-oriented firms, particularly in high-technology industries, frequently 
require substantial capital to develop and deploy their ideas. Several factors limit 
their access to capital: uncertainty, asymmetric information, the nature of firm assets 
and conditions in the relevant financial and product markets. As the firm develops 
                                                
514 Jensen M.C., ‘The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence’, The Midland Corporate 
Finance Journal, 1986, 12. 
515 Asset stripping is more likely when a firm’s assets are worth more in alternative uses outside the 
firm. 
516 Aghion P. and P. Bolton, ‘An “Incomplete contract” Approach to Financial Contracting’, 59 
Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 476; Berglof E., ‘A control Theory of Venture Capital Finance’, 
10 Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1994, 249. 
517 Berglof, 1994, note above, 256. 
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and growths over time, these factors can change in rapid and anticipated ways. Thus, 
the ability to change dynamically is an essential skill to remain competitive in the 
market, but also a major problem for those contributing the finance. Careful 
designing of financial contracts and firm strategies can alleviate many potential 
obstacles. Therefore, the manner in which firms are financed is important; each 
source and type of investor may be appropriate for a firm at different points in its 
life. But the form of financing is crucial to reducing conflicts. As long as the 
endeavour progresses well, entrepreneurs are well-positioned to make the decisions. 
Control rights remain largely vested in them and their management teams. The 
venture capital fund is content with a minority of the board. If during the stages of 
financing the entrepreneur faces situations of financial distress, they can always 
decide to dilute their control, letting the venture capital fund convert some of its 
securities to equity or to subscribe to new rounds.518  
However, a control ‘flip’ should be provided as and when the company gets in 
trouble, meaning that the venture capital fund gains outright control of the board in 
such cases, leaving the entrepreneur with a great incentive to operate for the 
company’s success. For instance, control flips can occur when certain standards are 
not met or because certain negative covenants in a stock purchase agreement have 
been violated. The optimal allocation of control between inside and outside 
shareholders is determined by the trade-off between protecting the private benefits of 
the entrepreneur and the free-riding of the venture capital fund.519 The parties to 
venture capital arrangements must design the firm’s capital structure to resolve 
distributional conflicts and make use of the right to sell control, which is itself a 
fundamental property right influencing compensation to the initial contracting parties 
in the event of a future sale of the firm.520 
In economic terms, no problems arise if trading with the acquirer can improve 
the situation for both initial contracting parties or, vice versa, if both parties are made 
worse off by trading with the acquirer and they will not trade in that case. However, 
when there are constraints on the ex post side contracting, the acquirer may collude 
                                                
518 Aghion P. and P. Bolton, ‘An “Incomplete contract” Approach to Financial Contracting’, 59 
Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 473-494. 
519 Grossman S. and O. Hart, ‘One-Share One-Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’, 20 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 175-202; Zingales L., ‘Insider Ownership and the Decision to 
go Public’, (1995) 62 Rev. Econ. Stud., 425-448. 
520 Alchian A. and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization’, 62 
American Economic Review, 1972, 777-795. 
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with one of the initial contracting parties to extract surplus from the other. For 
example, an outside investor could take over a firm that is performing well and fire 
its entrepreneur if he does not have the right to sell control of the firm without 
compensating him for his private benefits. Alternatively, a new owner could acquire 
a firm which is performing badly or is insolvent for a small price and take out assets 
from the firm without paying their full market value, thus harming the interests of 
the venture capital fund if its financial rights are not protected contractually or it 
does not control the firm. Furthermore, in the absence of adequate investment 
protections when ownership and management are transferred, venture capital funds 
will hardly contribute new finance or at will least demand much higher shares of 
revenue.521  
The solution would be to write a perfectly contingent contract. Such a 
contract would ensure that the proper action is taken by allocating decision-making 
authority to the person with the right incentives, depending on the “state of nature”. 
The difficulties involved in writing such comprehensive contracts include the 
verifiability of the state of nature, which is normally only observable and not 
verifiable.522 Furthermore, a company’s state of nature can be extremely difficult to 
describe. It really is just a general sense of how the company is doing, and many 
variables encompass such an evaluation. As a result, the contract cannot link a 
specified decision-maker to the appropriate state of nature and contracting parties 
can only avoid costly ex post bargaining by allocating control over strategic 
decisions to one of the parties.523  
Alternatively, the return of the parties will increase if they can make this 
allocation contingent on some verifiable variables correlated with the state of nature, 
designing the financial structure so as to extract more from a potential buyer.524 For 
example, the parties could agree in advance to allocate control power to the financier 
or the entrepreneur depending on certain signals reflecting the company’s states of 
                                                
521 See the importance of control allocation in Berglof E., ‘A control Theory of Venture Capital 
Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1994, 249. 
522 For a discussion of verifiability of state of nature by public court see Tirole J., Hierarchies 
and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 1986, at 181-214. See also Hart O., Firms, Contracts and Financial Structures (Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 38 and 73; Scott R.E. and G.G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 The Yale Law Journal, 2006, 814-879; Scott R.E. and G.G. Triantis, ‘Incomplete 
Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’, University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law 
and Economics, 2005, Working Paper Series n. 23. 
523 Grossman S. and O. Hart, ‘The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration’, 94 Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 691-719. 
524 Aghion P. and P. Bolton, ‘An “Incomplete contract” Approach to Financial Contracting’, 59 
Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 473-494. 
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nature. If the signals are correct, contingent control may be preferable to unilateral 
control of one of the parties.525 As we will discuss, hybrid financial instruments as 




7.1.2. The use of convertible instruments as a device to allocate control   
Different control and revenue allocations can be achieved by the parties through the 
use of the standard financial contracts debt and equity. Equity ensures the 
entrepreneur compensation for his private benefits by giving him the right to sell 
control and allowing the external investor to benefit as a free rider from efficiency 
improvements brought about by a rival management team, but only when the firm is 
performing well. Conversely, debt protects external investors in times of financial 
distress by transferring the right to sell control to them when debt repayments are not 
met or negative covenants are missed. The basic mechanisms for control transfer 
associated with equity and debt, namely takeover and insolvency, complement each 
other. Under the assumption of perfect markets, takeover optimises between 
outsiders and insiders while bankruptcy does so among shareholders and debt-
holders.527 Given that convertible preference shares or bonds can be made state-
contingent, they are the most suitable to achieve the optimal allocation of control 
rights, and protect the initial contracting parties as much as possible against 
dilution.528   
This is easy to demonstrate. When only equity capital is issued in a start-up 
firm, the control power is allocated independently by the state of nature. One party 
holds or both parties share – in case of joint ownership – control in all states of 
nature. In such a context, whether the entrepreneur issues voting or non-voting 
shares to the venture capital fund, the conflicts of interest remain. If he issues non-
                                                
525 Gordon Smith D., “The Exit Structure of Venture Capital”, 53 UCLA L. Rev., (Dec.) 2005, 322; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1992, note above, 486. 
526 See Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets the real world: an empirical 
analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 281 and 283 footnote 5.  
527 Davies P.L., ‘Shareholder Value, Company Law and Security Markets Law: A British View’, in E. 
Wymeersch and K. Hopt (edn), Company Law and Financial Markets (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 261-288. 
528 Berglof E., ‘A control Theory of Venture Capital Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and 
Organization, 1994, 253. The author examines six venture capital contracts: non-voting or 
minority equity, equity, voting or majority equity, joint ownership, standard debt and 
convertible debt or a combination of debt and non-voting equity. See also Sahlman W.A., ‘The 
Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations’, 27 J. Fin. Econ., 1990, 473-521; 
Bratton W., ‘Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control’, 100 Mich. L. 
Rev., 2002, 891, 900-901. 
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voting equity, he will be compensated in case of a takeover, because he enjoys his 
private benefits of control as well as the venture capital fund, which will be able to 
enjoy the benefits of efficiency improvement, but only if the company is performing 
well. By contrast, in a time of the company’s financial distress, the private benefits 
of the entrepreneur are non-existent and the venture capitalist may be subject to costs 
of asset stripping. The situation is even worse if the entrepreneur issues voting shares 
to the venture capital fund.529 In fact, the venture capital fund, which is in control of 
the firm, will sell it as long as the price is higher or equivalent to what it would get in 
the absence of a buyer. The entrepreneur loses his job but he retains his equity 
holdings. Consequently, he can share in potential value-increasing actions but his 
private benefits of control are expropriated if the firm is performing well and, in 
addition, assets are siphoned off when the firm is in financial distress.530  
In joint ownership, the venture capital fund can extract some of the value of the 
private benefits from the entrepreneur before consenting to a sale. However, since 
the entrepreneur initially has great bargaining power, the possibility to extract private 
benefits in case of a sale merely leads the entrepreneur to offer the venture capital 
fund a power share of verifiable revenues. In conclusion, not all equity financing 
may be optimal. A possible solution has come from strategies of governance that part 
of the doctrine has defined as “shared control”.531 In a shared control situation, for 
example, the venture capitalist owns a majority of the voting stock of the portfolio 
company, as long as he does not control a majority of the board of directors. Such a 
situation, although unusual in the market,532 would facilitate the transfer of control 
among the parties in certain cases in which there is no reliable signal that could 
trigger the shift in control.533  
                                                
529 Fried J.M. and Ganor M., ‘Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups’, 81 New York 
University L. Rev., 2006, 994 ff. 
530 To ensure that the entrepreneur is properly compensated for his private benefits, voting equity 
could be combined with a payout triggered by a sale of the firm (a golden parachute). Such a clause 
would extract more from the buyer. However, the entrepreneur should not be compensated in bad 
states of nature, where he enjoys no private benefits. For this reason compensation would have to be 
contingent on the state of nature, which is assumed not to be verifiable. See Berglof E., ‘A control 
Theory of Venture Capital Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1994, 256. 
531 The key feature of Bratton’s interpretation of the model is the notion of “shared control” – an 
“open-ended balance of power in the boardroom [where the] venture capitalist... gets no unilateral 
power to control the assets and terminate the entrepreneur on the downside”. See Bratton W., 
‘Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control’, 100 Mich. L. Rev., 2002, 
895. 
532 Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets the real world: an empirical analysis 
of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 287. 
533 See Bratton, 2002, note 634 above at 893 and 912 where the author is interested in “downside” 
protection, which he says consists of two powers: (1) the “power to replace the firm’s managers (or 
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Assuming it is possible to stipulate a recognisable signal, since the two agency 
conflicts occur in different states of nature and between different parties, the parties 
may be able to extract more from a buyer by making the allocation of control 
contingent on the state of nature through debt financing. Therefore, the entrepreneur 
should hold all the voting rights and the venture capital fund should participate as 
debt-holder. In so doing, when the firm is performing well and a bid offer appears, 
the entrepreneur, who is the person vulnerable to expropriation of private benefits, is 
fully protected. Conversely, if the potential buyer shows up following the realisation 
of a state of insolvency, control shifts to the venture capital fund, which cares most 
about firm value. The problem, however, is that while control is optimally allocated, 
the allocation of rights to revenues is such that the initial contracting parties do not 
benefit from efficiency improvements brought about by a buyer when the firm is 
growing well.534 If, for example, the buyer were less efficient than the entrepreneur, 
joint ownership would extract more from the buyer.535  
The optimum would be to combine the protection against asset stripping 
offered by the contractual rights of a debt loan with the possibility of enjoying the 
benefits of a bid offer through issuing equity. The solution is to assign convertible 
preference shares or convertible bonds to the venture capital fund.536 Convertible 
securities protect the venture capital fund against dilution when the firm is 
performing poorly by ensuring the liquidation value of the firm under the original 
entrepreneur. If the firm is performing well, asset stripping is not a problem, and 
debt is converted into (better if non-voting) equity and the venture capital fund can 
fully benefit from efficiency improvements as well as the entrepreneur. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                     
alternatively, to force premature sale or liquidation of the firm)” and (2) the “power to protect the 
venture [capital] contract itself from opportunistic amendment”.  
534 The venture capitalist shares with the entrepreneur expectations of equity holders independently of 
the securities held, see Kaplan S.N. and P. Strömberg, ‘Financial contracting meets the real world: an 
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts’, 70 Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 281 and 306-
308. 
535 Of course there may be considerable costs associated with unconstrained ex post bargaining, in 
which case all-debt financing is more attractive. 
536 See, for example, Admati A.R. and Pfeiderer P., ‘Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of 
Venture Capitalists’, 49(2) Journal of Finance, 1994, 371 on the anoptimal use of “fixed-fraction 
contracts” to resolve agency problems in venture capital transactions; Bergemann D. and U. Hege, 
‘Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning’, 22 J. Bank. & Fin., 1998, 703 on the 
optimal mix of debt and equity to address moral hazard risks posed by entrepreneurs; Berglof E., ‘A 
control Theory of Venture Capital Finance’, 10 Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1994, 
247 on the optimal contract design to reduce conflicts of interest between the financier and the 
entrepreneur; Hellmann T., The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 Rand J. 
Econ., 1998, at 57 on the optimal use of control rights; Schmidt K., ‘Convertible securities and 
venture capital finance’, 58 J. FIN., 2003, 1139 on the optimal use of convertibles to induce efficient 
investment by entrepreneurs and investors; Black B. and R. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure 
of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ., 1998, 243, 253; Sahlman W.A., 
‘The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations’, 27 J. Fin. Econ., 1990, 473. 
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the conversion privilege of convertible debt allows the parties to contract on non-
verifiable but observable information, which is the signal related to a state of nature. 
The main focus of exit theory, both in legal and economic literature, has been the 
trade-off between “liquidity” and “control”.537 The right levels of liquidity and 
control in each stage of a start-up firm can be adjusted through contractual rights. In 
designing an optimal financial contract, investors and entrepreneurs strive to provide 
incentives for efficient monitoring while allowing investors to obtain the maximum 
level of liquidity consistent with such monitoring.538 In fact, the allocation of voting 
control, decision rights and financial rights generated by convertibles recognises the 
importance of both residual cash flow rights539 as well as asset control rights540 in 
resolving information asymmetry and agency conflicts among deal participants.  
 
 
7.2. Existing legal strategies for preference shareholders protection 
7.2.1. The UK Takeover Panel and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
In the absence of home-grown takeover remedies the Takeover Panel is the arbitrator 
and referee of mergers and acquisitions in the UK. The Panel normally prohibits a 
target company from taking legal action that would have the effect of frustrating an 
offer, unless shareholder permission is obtained. The Takeover Panel consists of 
representatives from the London Stock Exchange, the Bank of England, major 
merchant banks and institutional investors. Its task is to administer a set of rules 
known as the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Takeover Code). It also 
operates to ensure that takeovers are conducted in a timely and efficient manner and 
that target companies are not subject to speculative and prolonged takeover bids. It is 
                                                
537 See, for example, Coffee J.C. Jr., ‘Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor voice’, 91 
Columbia Law Review, 1991, 1277; Faure-Grimaud A. and D. Gromb, ‘Public Trading and Private 
Incentives’, 17 Rev. Fin. Stud., 2004, 985; Kahan M. and A. Winton, ‘Ownership Structure, 
Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention’, 53 J. Fin., 1998, 99; Maug E., ‘Large Shareholders as 
Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between Liquidity and Control?’, 53 J. Fin., 1998, 65; Roe M.J., 
‘Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies’, 27 J. Fin. Econ., 
1990, 7. 
538 Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. and Tirole, J., ‘Exit options in corporate finance: liquidity versus 
incentives’, 8(3) European Finance Review, 2004, 7. 
539 Jensen M. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 307. 
540 The Property Rights Theory see Grossman S. and O. Hart, ‘The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: 
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, 94 Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 691-719.  
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not, however, concerned with the “financial or commercial advantages [or 
disadvantages] of a takeover”.541  
The Takeover Panel’s supervision differs significantly from the US framework 
for regulating takeovers with regards to several aspects: the time, the type and the 
flexibility of the intervention.542 The Panel imposes little or no delay on the takeover 
effort, addressing takeover issues in real time. Furthermore, it operates a pro-active 
and flexible regulatory approach, which falls outside of the courts, allowing it to 
adjust to the regulatory requirements of a changing business environment. As a 
consequence, lawyers play little role in the Takeover Panel, which is staffed 
predominately by financial groups. The Panel is more business focused than legal 
and, in contrast to the US, tactical litigation as a takeover defence is virtually ruled 
out of the takeover process. Instead all objections and appeals are heard directly by 
the Panel to which Courts has recognised full jurisdiction.543 
The Takeover Code also provides protection for the minority shareholders, 
including preference shareholders, from possible abuses by stating: “where a 
company has more than one class of equity share capital, a comparable offer must be 
made for each class whether such capital carries voting rights or not”.544 A 
comparable offer need not necessarily be an identical offer.545 A bid offer either via 
private treaty with a small number of important shareholders or via purchases of 
shares on the market, or by way of a general and public offer to all the shareholders 
of the target company is clearly facilitated if the target’s shares are traded on a public 
market. If this is the case and the offer concerns two or more classes of equity share 
capital, “the ratio of the offer values should normally be equal to the average of the 
ratios of the middle market quotations over the course of the six months preceding 
the commencement of the offer period”.546 Any other ratio adopted by the parties has 
                                                
541 The Takeover Panel, Code Committee, Consultation on aspects of the takeover code, 2010/6. 
542 Armour J. and D.A. Skeel, “Who Write the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar 
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation”, 95 Geo. L.J., 2007, 1744. 
543 R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] 2 WLR 699. See also Regina v. 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc. [1990] 1 Q.B. 146; Idem, [1990] BCLC 
255. 
544 See Rule 14.1 of the “Blue Book” (Takeover Code). 
545 See Rule 14.2 of the “Blue Book”: “where an offer is made for more than one class of share, 
separate offers must be made for each class”. 
546 See Rule 14.1 of the “Blue Book” comparability of the offer. 
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to be fully justified. Similarly, if one or more of the classes of equity share capital 
are not listed, the ratio of the offer values must be justified to the Panel in 
advance.547  
When an offer for non-voting shares only is being made, comparable offers for 
voting classes are not required. In addition, “an offer for non-voting equity share 
capital should not be made conditional on any particular level of acceptances with 
respect to that class, or on the approval of that class, unless the offer for the voting 
equity share capital is also conditional on the success of the offer for the non-voting 
equity share capital”.548 In any case, it is always better to consult the Panel in 
advance, because the Panel, for the purpose of this Rule, may disregard as equity 
share capital certain classes of shares recognised as such by the Companies Act 2006 
but holding in practice very limited equity rights.  
The possible abuse by the acquirer in offering an undervalued price for special 
categories of preferred shares may be limited to a certain extent by the market 
arbitrage effect when the shares are listed on the stock market. When the 
undervalued class of shares is listed in a stock market and any information regarding 
the firm is disclosed, the arbitrage effect, although not without cost, will equalise the 
difference between the classes of shares. Every time the price offered for a preferred 
class of shares, largely in a takeover transaction, undervalues those shares in the 
market, qualified investors as private equity or hedge funds, if the profits offset the 
costs, might always buy those shares. They would thus acquire consistent ownership 
interest and control power in the class of share to oppose the unfair transaction, 
taking legal action against the company.549  
However, if the shares are not listed on a public market their evaluation may be 
more arbitrary and difficult to oppose. In cases where preference shares are not 
included in the relevant securities category and therefore do not receive an offer, 
their shareholders may be left with no other remedy to avoid the wealth 
expropriation conducted by the majority shareholders. A possible means of tackling 
                                                
547 See “Blue Book” notes on Rule 14.1. 
548 See Rule 14.1 of the “Blue Book”. 
549 This is the case of Elliott Associates LP. They took on Cincinnati-based P&G in 2003, after the 
world’s biggest consumer products company bid for Wella AG, a German hair care products 
company. Procter & Gamble offered the founding family and Wella management, which held all of 
the voting stock, 92.50 Euros ($133.40) a share, or $6.9 billion, to acquire the company. The offer 
was 42 per cent more than the 65 Euros offered to holders of nonvoting, preferred shares. 
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this problem could be to petition the court for relief on the grounds that the conduct 
of the company has been or is prejudicial to the interests of some part of its members 
or an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be so 
prejudicial.550 The issue of a petition may amount to an abuse of process, even 
though there has been unfair prejudice, if it is clear that the petitioner will have to 
sell his shares to the respondent and the petitioner has unreasonably rejected a 
reasonable offer to purchase his shares at a fair price.551 However, over the years not 
many cases have arisen, and although the courts have always had jurisdiction to 
review the panel’s decision,552 there have been no grounds for interfering and the 
courts have declined to intervene.553 
 
 
7.2.2. The standard strategy: the duty of loyalty in a UK-US comparative perspective 
In common law countries a further protection comes from the fiduciary standards. In 
the UK, for instance, a director must “act in a way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole”.554 The common law obligation already compels directors to behave in 
the best interests of the shareholders as a whole, but s. 172 potentially departs from 
that position by requiring that, in promoting the success of the company, the director 
must have regard to a number of other stakeholder interests, such as the company’s 
                                                
550 See s. 994 of the CA 2006 “unfair prejudice” petition. Davies P.L., Gower and Davies’ Principles 
of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed. 2008) 681-704. 
551 Re a Company (No: 003843 of 1986) [1987] 3BCC 624; Re a Company (No: 003096 of 1987) 
[1988] 4 BCC 80; O’Neill-v-Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092; North Holdings Ltd-v-Southern Tropics 
Ltd [1999] BCC 746; West-v-Blanchet [2000] 1 BCLC 795; Wyatt-v-Frank Wyatt & Son Ltd [2003] 
EWHC 520; Isaacs-v-Belfield Furnishings Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 216. 
552 Although the Takeover Panel purports to be part of a system of self-regulation and to derive its 
power solely from the consent of those whom its decisions affect, it is in fact operating as an integral 
part of a governmental framework for the regulation of financial activity in the City of London, is 
supported by a periphery of statutory powers and penalties, and is under a duty to exercise what 
amounts to public powers to act judicially.  
553 R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] 2 WLR 699. See also Regina v. 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc. – [1990] 1 Q.B. 146; Idem, [1990] BCLC 
255; 
554 s. 172 of the Companies Act 2006. For a fuller discussion compare Davies P.L., Gower and 
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed. 2009) 479 f. and 495 ff.; 
Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 299 ff.  
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employees, suppliers, customers and others.555 Despite this, the preferable analysis of 
s. 172 is that it requires directors to have regard to the long-term interests of the 
shareholders. It may happen that directors may have to take account of other 
stakeholder groups but only in order to support the long-term growth of the 
company.556 Thus, in a solvent company, it is the interests of the shareholders that 
remain the dominant concern. In fact, although lenders contribute significantly to 
corporate governance by monitoring the directors in accordance with their own 
interests, they are well protected by contract and by capital maintenance regime. 
In the US, the duty of loyalty is used to monitor transfer of control in closely 
held companies as well as in publicly traded ones. These duties may impose an 
obligation upon the controlling seller either to compensate the remaining 
shareholders for foreseeable harm caused by the transfer557 or to share the premium 
with the non-controlling shareholders when the transfer can be identified as 
involving the alienation of something belonging to all shareholders.558 However, 
these cases do not state the general rule. US courts have not adopted a general 
equality principle, which might have led them to generate an unqualified right for 
non-controlling shareholders to share in the control premium.559 A controlling 
shareholder can dispose of voting right securities for a price that is not made 
proportionally available to other shareholders, but is subject to a requirement for fair 
dealing. Providing self-dealing is effectively controlled, permitting sales at a 
premium price gives both seller and acquirer an appropriate regard for their extra 
monitoring costs.560 
As in the UK, the main US doctrine has excluded bondholders from the 
protection of these duties, because no agency or trust relationship exists between 
                                                
555 See Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, 306 per Lord Greene MR. Directors do not owe 
duties to individual shareholders. However, they may do so in specific factual circumstances: Peskin v 
Anderson [2001] 1 BCC 874. 
556 Kershaw D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 349-351. 
557 See, Gerdes v. Reynolds 28 New York Supplement Reporter 2nd Series 622 (1941). 
558 Perlman v. Feldman 219 Federal Reporter 2nd Series 173 (1955); Brown v. Halbert, 76 California 
Reporter 781 (1969).  
559 See Clark R.C., Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986) 478-98. 
560 Gilson R. and J. Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling Shareholders’, 152 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 2003, 811-816. 
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them in law.561 The contrast between the rights of debt-holders and the simple 
expectations of equity holders, who are protected by fiduciary duties, has also been 
noted by the US courts of Delaware in several cases,562 where they declined the 
imposition of a fiduciary duty in the absence of an equity interest.563  
However, in past years, especially in the US, a pluralistic approach of the 
maximisation of the company as a whole has been developed at least at a doctrinal 
level, together with the conviction that directors’ fiduciary duties are owed to the 
company.564 In this line of reasoning, the doctrine has tried to relax the strict legal 
definition of the fiduciary relationship, adopting instead an economic concept of it. 
This study extracts generally applicable concepts of the essential fiduciary obligation 
from its particularised manifestation in agency and trust relationships, to replace 
them with a flexible definition of the fiduciary obligation as the “exercise of 
judgment on behalf of another”.565 This definition permits the identification of 
numerous interrelating fiduciary obligations in corporate structures and consequently 
obligations arising from contractual relationships as fiduciary. Furthermore, if, on 
the one hand, as long as the corporate debtor remains able to repay the debt, 
creditors’ interests have not been impaired sufficiently to justify legal restraints on 
the corporation’s self-interested actions, on the other, a different judgement is made 
regarding the insolvent corporate debtor when the insolvency jeopardises the 
                                                
561 For an analysis of the main case law on this matter see Fraidin S. and F. Stevelman, “Duties to 
Bondholders in Recapitalizations and Restructurings”, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series, 754 PLI/Corp 277, accessible at http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/1/3/4/30/31/32/PLIDuties.pdf  
562 See Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 347 
A.2d 133 (Del. Supr. 1975); In re Will Of Miguel, 71 Misc.2d 640, 336 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 
(Sup. Ct. 1972). 
563 Based on the decision in Harff and In re Will of Miguel, the court in Simons v. Cogan, 549 
A.2d 300 (Del. Supr. 1988) concluded: “In sum, a convertible debenture represents a contractual 
entitlement to the repayment of a debt and does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing 
corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties”; 
549 A.2d at 303. 
564 Parkinson J., Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1993), 21-41; Kelly 
G. and J. Parkinson, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach’, 2 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 1998, 174; Mitchell L.E., The Fairness Rights of 
Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 1990, 1165; Millon D., ‘Theories of the Corporation’, 
Duke Law Journal, 1990, 201; Llewellyn K.N., ‘What Price contract? An Essay in Perspective’, 40 
Yale L. J., 1931, 721. Also see Leung W., ‘The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed 
Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests’, 30 Columbia Journal of Law and 
Social Problems, 1997, 589; Worthington S., ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and 
entitlements (Part 1 and 2)’, 22(9) The Company Lawyer, 2001, 258 et seq. 
565 Jacobson, ‘Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd’s Law of Fiduciaries’, 3 Cardozo L. Rev., 
1982, 519 and 527; Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’, 71 California L. Rev., 1983, 795 and 808-809. 
   
   183 
repayment. In such a situation, the balance of interests shifts to favour the creditors, 
giving rise to creditor protection in law.566  
The traditional analysis has challenged the idea of expanding the directors’ 
fiduciary duties towards the creditors on the basis of the assumptions underlying the 
contract of corporation. Over the years there has been a weakening of the strong 
distinctions equity-debt, shareholder-bondholder and, consequently, a 
reclassification of their relationships into neat corporate and contract categories.567 
Corporate law used to tolerate only limited contractual alterations of the terms 
governing relationships between the corporation and its stockholders, but today, 
especially with respect to closely held corporations, as is suggested by the case of 
hybrid instruments, contractual arrangements between the stockholders may restrict 
the exercise of management discretion granted under the pure corporate model in 
much the same manner as negative covenants in bond contracts or veto rights in 
preference shares have done all along.568  
For example, the convertible bond relationship presents an area of overlap 
between contract and fiduciary restraining principles. Outside the overlap, contract 
and fiduciary duties go off in different directions, with fiduciary duties focusing on 
the protection of the dependent party and contract duties focusing on the effectuation 
of the parties’ allocation of risks. Generally fiduciary duties tend to impose a higher 
degree of selflessness than is imposed on contracting parties subject to the good faith 
duty. The fiduciary must put the beneficiary’s interests ahead of his own even though 
the costs to the fiduciary exceed the benefits to the beneficiary. In contract, under a 
good faith approach the party under the duty need only give equal consideration to 
the other party’s interests, placing them ahead of his own only where the balance of 
costs and benefits gives primacy to the other’s interests.569 
From another point of view, however, as some attentive doctrine has pointed 
out, the issuer fiduciary duty to bondholders is indistinguishable from the contract 
                                                
566 Clark R., ‘The Duties of Corporate Debtor to its Creditors’, 90 Harvard L. Rev., 1977, 510. See 
Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 347 A.2d 133 
(Del. Supr. 1975). 
567 Kraakman R. and H. Hansmann, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’, 110 Yale Law 
Journal, 2000, 387-440. 
568 Tung F., ‘Leverage in the Board Room: The unsung influence of private lenders in corporate 
governance’, 115 UCLA Law Review, 2009, 170-173; Hamer H. ‘Corporate Control and the Need for 
Meaningful Board Accountability’, 94 Minnesota Law Review, 2010, 541. 
569 Goetz and Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev., 1981, 1128. 
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interpretation informed by a good faith duty.570 While the duties in theory originate 
in different places – the contract law duty in the particular contract’s bundles of 
promises and conditions, and the fiduciary duty in the issuer’s exercise of judgement 
over the bondholders’ investment – they become functionally identical as long as the 
bond contract is granted primacy over judicial fairness notions as the source of the 
relationship’s rights and duties. Both duties justify bondholder protective filling in of 
contractual interstices and perhaps a generalised duty to disclose, but do nothing 
more.571  
A court treating a contractual relationship too easily might be led to an 
erroneous avoidance of an unobjectionable contractual allocation of risk, by a 
rhetoric of selflessness that originated regarding very different fiduciary 
relationships.572 The strain of bending fiduciary principles to fit the convertible bond 
context creates a risk of over-protecting bondholders. Since the results of the effort 
only duplicate results obtainable through contract law analysis, and since contract 
law provides a more precise set of analytical tools for resolving conflicts between 
issuers and bondholders, the courts have mostly abandoned this approach in 
fiduciary protection.573  
Importantly, a justification key to the relative interests of stockholders and 
creditors only partially applies to hybrid securities like convertibles. The conversion 
privilege creates an additional bundle of bondholder interests to be thrown into the 
balance. One court, recognising this, hit upon the neat solution of extending 
management fiduciary duties to convertible bondholders only in cases where the 
“wrongs alleged [impinge] upon the equity aspects [of the bond]”.574  
 
 
                                                
570 Anderson A.G., ‘Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure’, 25 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev., 1978, 759-760. 
571 On good faith and duties implied in law, compare with Bratton W., Corporate Finance, Cases and 
Materials (5th ed., New York, 2003) 438, 440-452. 
572 See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947). 
573 Chirelstein M.A., ‘Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards Act’, 30 Clev. St. L. Rev., 1981, 210; 
Bratton W.W., ‘The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds’, 1984 Wis. L. Rev., 730, 734 
and 736-739; Benjamin J., Financial Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 560-561. 
574 Green II, No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op., at 17 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1981) 
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7.2.2.1.  Do directors owe fiduciary duties to preference shareholders? 
Regarding preference shareholders, the situation may be different considering that 
being part of the company’s share capital, preference shares constitute an ownership 
interest in a corporation. Thus, it is certainly arguable to propose that the claim of a 
preference share could be a right shared equally by the common and preferred 
shareholders where fiduciary duties are owed. On the other side, as the previous 
historical analysis showed, it is true that the preference shares may hold a right to 
participate in the company’s fortunes or misfortunes but more likely will have a 
fixed claim only subordinated to that of the creditors. To the extent that they enjoy 
fixed claims their interests may not be long-term as the ordinary shareholders’ 
interests. However, English courts have not adopted the approach favoured by the 
High Court of Australia in Gambotto v WCP Ltd.575 Instead, the English courts apply 
a subjective test576 in order to understand whether the decision of the majority 
shareholders is bona fide in the interests of the company.577 The burden of proof is 
on the claimant. This will leave a preference shareholder not many other alternatives 
other than a petition for unfair prejudice, but even on that ground the courts have 
held that if the offer of the majority to buy out the minority is fair any exclusion of 
the minority shareholder would not be unfair.578 The rationale underlying it is the 
pre-eminent position of shareholders in a solvent company. The UK has adopted a 
shareholder-centred approach and the “enlightened shareholder value” 
recommendations of the Company Law Steering Group.579 
Similarly in the US, the courts have basically recognised that the rights of 
preferred shareholders are “essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is 
appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract”.580 
                                                
575 (1995) 182 CLR 432, 447 (HC Aust). In this case, the majority shareholders altered the articles of 
the company in order to acquire compulsorily the shares of the minority shareholders. The High Court 
held the expropriation to be unlawful on the basis that it was oppressive to the minority shareholder 
although the price offered was more than its market value including the future possible cash flows. 
576 Allen Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656. 
577 Citco Banking Corp NV v Pusser’s Ltd [2007] UKPC 13; [2007] BCC 205, Shuttleworth v Cox 
Brothers and Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9, 23. 
578 O’Neill v Phillips, [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
579 See DTI, Company Law Reform (Cm 6456, 2005), para 3.3. 
580 These are the words of the court in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. 
Ch. 1986) at 594; Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979). In the UK, see Lord 
Simonds in Scottish Insurance Corp v. Wilson & Clyde Coal Co. [1949] A.C. 462; 1949 S.C. (H.L.) 
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Because of this, they have generally assigned no claim for breach of fiduciary duties, 
when the shareholders’ rights are specifically stated and governed by the articles of 
the company. In such cases, in fact, that device already protects the preference 
shareholders.581 Therefore, it would seem that the contractual rights of preferred 
shareholders exist alongside but independently from the duties of care, loyalty and 
disclosure that are owed to all shareholders of a corporation.582  
Generally, in corporate restructuring transactions such as mergers or 
reorganisations, directors cannot always overlook the fiduciary duties owed to 
preferred shareholders, particularly where the transaction involves an insider or an 
affiliate and benefits the common shareholders to the detriment of preferred 
shareholders.583 However, as it has emerged in case law, the board of directors may 
sometimes encounter difficulties in owing fiduciary duties to the shareholders as a 
whole when the interests of the internal shareholder classes may diverge.584 Thus, it 
could be argued that another key to interpreting the directors’ fiduciary duties can be 
proposed. It could be assumed that preference shares are granted certain rights by 
statute and common law even where the corporation’s organic documents are silent. 
In this way, where the contract is silent, preference shares should get the same pro 
rata voting and participation rights as common shares.585  
                                                                                                                                     
90; 1949 S.L.T. 230; and Sir Raymond Evershed in Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply Co. [1950] 
Ch 161, CA. 
581 HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040* (Del. Ch. June 
9, 1993) 
582 According to the court in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
“when a right asserted is equally shared by preferred and common stockholders, the right and scope of 
the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards”. Similarly, in Eisenberg 
v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987) recognised that a corporation’s 
directors “are fiduciaries for the Preferred stockholders [sic], whose interests they have a duty to 
safeguard, consistent with the fiduciary duties owed by those directors to [the corporation’s] other 
shareholders and to [the corporation] itself”.   
583 See Jackson Nat.l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 387 (Del. Ch. 1999); Dalton v. 
American Inv. Co.,  490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch.) aff’d, 501 A.2d 1238 (1985); Judah v. Delaware Trust 
Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628, 631 (Del. 1977); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42, 46.47 (3d 
Cir. 1947); Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 11 Del. J. Corp. L. 602, 1985 WL 11566 (Del. 
Ch. June 25, 1985); Kimeldorf v. First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investments, 309 A.2d 
151, 754 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep’t 2003); Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) LLC v. Kenetech Corp., 24 
Del. J. Corp. L. 748, 1998 WL 778359 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1998), appeal refused by Kentech Corp. v. 
Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) LLC, 723 A.2d 839 (Del. Supr. 1998). 
584 See the US court in Delaware In Re: Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, No. 1512-CC 
(July 24, 2009).  
585 As it is the case of Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
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Although in theory this scenario is possible, the approach of extending the 
fiduciary duties does not really eliminate potential conflicts of interest between the 
holders of preferred and common stock when those interests clash.586 After all, as the 
courts have made clear, the preferred shareholders are not entitled to an equal share 
in the merger consideration but only to a fair share.587 The difficulties arise when the 
board has to decide what is fair ex ante, because although the board makes a good 
faith effort to set a fair price, the indeterminacy of valuation means that reasonable 
people could differ. Different is the case in which a prospective buyer that is a third 
person proposes the bid for common and preferred shares. In fact, the board would 
likely escape liability.588 
A possible solution would be to assimilate the preference shares to the debt 
contracts. In contrast to preference shares, bond contract terms can be hundreds of 
pages long and generally deal with virtually every imaginable contingency. 
Therefore, the vacuum left by the preference share contract could be filled by the 
courts presuming, by analogy to the bond setting, an implied covenant of good faith 
rather than fiduciary duties. In the context of financial distress, where the company is 
unable to satisfy the expectations of all the constituencies, such a covenant would 
prevent the board from perpetrating opportunistic behaviour that deprives the 
preferred shareholders of the benefit of their bargain.589 Alternatively, a special 
committee representing each of the different classes of stock could be created only 
during certain critical corporate transactions.590  
Nevertheless, it is wrong to think that protection for preference shareholders is 
to be found only in the mandatory provision of company law. Provided that these 
                                                
586 Compare “Fiduciary Duties and Preferred Stockholders”, in Professor Bainbridge’s Journal of 
Law, Politics and Culture, available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/08/fiduciary-duties-and-
preferred-stockholders.html (accessed in January 2011); McEllin M.M., “Note: Rethinking Jedwab: A 
Revised Approach to Preferred Shareholders Rights”, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 2010, 895; Sepe S., 
“Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts”, 36 J. Corp. L., 2010, 113.  
587 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
588 In Re: Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, No. 1512-CC (July 24, 2009). The board could 
defend itself on causation grounds that is, whether or not the board breached its fiduciary duties, that 
breach was not the cause of plaintiff’s injuries, see, for example, Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 
574 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 501 A.2d 1238 (Del. 1985). 
589 Bainbridge S.M., Much Ado about Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-26, at 26. 
590 See this and several proposed solutions in McEllin M.M., “Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised 
Approach To Preferred Shareholder Rights”, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 2010,  919-933. 
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shareholders have sufficient bargaining power, they may be able to negotiate for 
special private protections. Surely no court or any third party is better positioned 
than the parties to design the arrangements best suited to govern their relationship. 
They know what types of investment have been made and the related risks they are 
facing and, therefore, only the parties, if they wish so, can design effective 
mechanisms to neutralise these risks.591   
 
 
7.3. Financial contract design for controlling the board’s power in exit 
events: veto rights, drag-along and tag-along clauses      
The above analysis of the court’s approach to the protection of preferred 
shareholders is a strong incentive to bargain for any rights contractually in order to 
avoid future surprises and misunderstandings. For this reason, to protect both the 
value and the liquidity of an investment in the event of any projected transaction 
involving its share capital or the composition of its shareholding, it is becoming 
common practice especially in venture capital financing to confer on the participants 
special rights to control, to a certain extent, how transfers of shares in the company 
shall occur.592 These are also called the “drag-along” and “tag-along” clauses. These 
clauses present an alternative to the conversion feature attached to preference shares 
or subordinated debt. As suggested earlier, the founders, who control sufficient 
stock to block a corporate reorganisation, will often prefer to hold the firm as an 
independent vehicle in order to protect their employment or more frequently 
because their inflated expectations suggest that, in few more years, the investment 
may give a much higher return. On the other hand, given the time value of money, 
the venture capital funds may be impatient to realise on their investment.593 
Tag-along and drag-along arrangements entitle one shareholder to participate 
in another’s sale to a third party. These clauses are attempt to control two types of 
opportunistic behaviour both associated with underinvestment problems. On the one 
                                                
591 See Sáez Lacave I. and N. Bermejo Gutiérrez, ‘Specific Investments, Opportunism and Corporate 
Contracts: A Theory of Tag-along and Drag-along Clauses’, (2010) 11 EBOR, 423-458. 
592 Robinson D.T. and T.E. Stuart Robinson, ‘Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances’, 
(2002) Working Paper available at: <http://www.ssrn.com>, 21; Cumming, ‘Contracts and Exit in 
Venture Capital Finance’, 21(5) Rev. Financ. Stud., 2008, 1975; Broughman B. and J. Fried, 
‘Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC Backed Firms’, (2010) 95 J. Fin. Econ., 384-
399. 
593 Gompers  P.A. and Lerner J., The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2nd eds. 
2004) 345 ff. 
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side, there is a risk of expropriation of the investment on the occasion of inefficient 
sales; on the other, there is a risk of extortion in efficient or productive sales, a 
problem also referred to as free riding.594 
Drag-along rights give someone the right to drag someone else along in a deal. 
The provision would generally state that if a specified percentage of shareholders or 
perhaps only certain categories of shareholders accept an offer to sell, then on 
condition that the terms being offered to all parties are economically the same, those 
majority shareholders can force the minority shareholders to sell even when they 
may not wish to do so.595 In particular, upon the occurrence of the triggering event, 
an agent for any dissenting shareholder will be appointed as a director of the board 
with authority to sign the stock transfer forms and any other necessary paperwork on 
their behalf.596  
The ratio of the drag-along clauses lays in the attempt to prevent one of the 
shareholders from staying in the company to appropriate the added value generated 
by the third party newcomer. These clauses are commonly found in private equity 
investing in various forms. It is possible to identify the percentage of the group of 
investors or class of shareholders that is required to trigger the rights or to set a 
condition to a transaction as for instance a minimum price that can trigger those 
rights. Private equity investors often have these clauses included in a shareholders’ 
agreement applicable to all shareholders who are a party to that agreement. In certain 
locked-in start-ups, where the shareholders commit to a specific investment, the 
company agrees not to issue additional shares of stock unless the purchaser becomes 
a party to the shareholders’ agreement. The only limit remains whether this 
combination of defensive measures and deal protection terms becomes so rigid to 
preclude the ability of the directors to exercise their fiduciary duties and of the 
                                                
594 See Aghion P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey, ‘Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information’, 
(1994) 62 Econometrica, 257-282 and Chung T-Y., ‘Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and 
Risk Sharing’, (1991) 58 Rev. Econ. Stud., 1031-1042. 
595 Sáez Lacave I. and N. Bermejo Gutiérrez, note 591, 423-458; Cumming, ‘Contracts and Exit in 
Venture Capital Finance’, 21(5) Rev. Financ. Stud., 2008, 1947-1982; Cumming D., ‘Capital 
Structure in Venture Finance’, (2005) 11 J. Corp. Fin., 550–585; Zingales L., ‘Insider Ownership and 
the Decision to go Public’, (1995) 62 Rev. Econ. Stud., 425-448; Smith, D.G., ‘The Exit Structure of 
Venture Capital’, 53 UCLA Law Review, 2005, 315-356.  
596 Bartlett J.W., Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restructurings and Reorganizations, 
(Aspen Publishers, 1995) 233; Aghion P., P. Bolton and J. Tirole, ‘Exit Options in Corporate Finance: 
Liquidity versus Incentives’, (2004) 8 Review of Finance, 349. 
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shareholders to reject that transaction.597 For this reason, a right to compel sale 
should be drafted with particular care to set out exactly the respective obligations of 
the parties.598 The practice has known some special rights to petition for dissolution 
that can be included in a venture capital agreement.599 
Conversely, tag-along rights address the concern of minority shareholders 
neutralising the effects of inefficient sales. Since these exit events fail to maximise 
the value of the company as a whole, they constitute expropriation. A majority 
shareholder could sell his holding to a third party under terms that would pay for him 
more than his share of the surplus due to him under the provisions of the agreement. 
Thanks to the use of a tag-along clause, if the majority sell their shares, the minority 
will have the right to have the offer extended at the same price.600 In other words, the 
clause obliges the shareholders with selling power to give notice to the other 
shareholders and negotiate for them too.601  
The tag-along clauses protect the investor exposed to an expropriation risk 
through a property rule designed ad hoc in the agreement.602 Assuming a private 
                                                
597 See, Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A. 2d 914 - Del: Supreme Court 2003, where the 
Court nullified these provisions because they included an irrevocable agreement among the holders of 
65 per cent of the target’s outstanding stock to vote in favour of the deal; an agreement to put the 
merger to a vote of the target’s shareholders even if the board of directors withdrew its 
recommendation for the deal and the lack of an effective “fiduciary out”. 
598 For Delaware corporations at least, drag-along rights prevent some issues of fraud or duress would 
be enforced, see Del. Cod. Ann. Tit. 8, 202 (1983) and the case that has construed the sections of the 
Delaware statute enabling shareholders to enter agreements amongst themselves including an 
agreement respecting a forced sale: Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d 161, 168 (Del. Ch. 1985). In US 
courts other than Delaware see also in favour Gottschalk v. Avalon Realty Co., 23 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 
1946); contra In re Bacon, 287 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E.2d 105 (1941). 
599 One of the least complicated is the “shootout” or “Texas auction” arrangement, whereby one 
shareholder may compel a dissolution of the deadlock by fixing a price on his shares (or a formula for 
fixing the price) and the other party must elect either to sell or buy at that price. 
600 Beddow S., The Equity Deal, in C. HALE, Private Equity: a Transactional Analysis (Globe 
Business  Publishing, 2007), 51: where a shareholder is selling a partial stake in the company, the 
other shareholders have the right to have a corresponding percentage of their holding of shares 
purchased at the same conditions. 
601 A similar employed device to accomplish the same aim in the US practice was to issue redeemable 
preference shares at the option of the holder. The expectation of such preferred shareholders is not 
necessarily that they will be able to exercise their right to put their shares of the company at some 
price formula at the end of the financing cycle, but rather the threat of such a put being exercised will 
be enough, when the time comes, to bring the founder into line. See, Bartlett J.W., Equity Finance: 
Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restructurings and Reorganizations, (Aspen Publishers, 1995) 231 where 
some cases are reported in fn. 52. 
602 Property rules are known to be the classic ‘anti-expropriation’ rules. See Calabresi G. and A.D. 
Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, (1972) 85 
Harvard Law Review 1092-1093, 1105-1106. 
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equity fund holds a minority share in the company but the largest stake of hybrid 
capital. Therefore, it would suffer from an asset substitution problem when a third 
newcomer acquires the company from the majority shareholder and starts selling the 
assets piecemeal, the tag-along clause allows the investor to co-sell its stake when 
the entrepreneur decides to sell.603  
Finally, other provisions commonly used in practice are: the demand rights or 
registration rights, the piggyback rights and the catch-up clauses. Demand rights 
allow the parties to force their partners to agree to take the firm public in an IPO 
while piggyback rights allow the parties to demand to be included in an IPO in 
proportion to their stakes in the firm. Finally, the catch-up clauses deny the parties 
holding a call option the ability to profit from exercising their call prior to a trade 
sale or an IPO.604 
 
7.4. An evaluation of hybrid financial instruments’ use and protection in the 
UK and US jurisdictions 
The disputes arising from the opportunism of the parties in corporate agency 
relations are on the same footing as bad faith and a form of breach of contract: the 
breach of contract respecting shareholder exit and cash flow rights. If the parties 
agreed to certain distribution of common earnings, any ex post alteration by one of 
the parties to appropriate part of the gains due to the other is contrary to good faith 
requirements. The UK and US legal systems adopt ex post standards strategies to 
protect minorities. US law, which is more protective of the prerogatives of 
management, places the decision on the control transaction in the hands of the board 
and relies on fiduciary duties, which assuming shareholders’ good faith afford 
protection through the judicial review of their unfair behaviour. The UK legal system 
of company law has instead always been shareholder-centred. The decision-making 
on control shifts is given wholly to the shareholders, and the protection of the 
minorities is left to the Takeover Panel, which acts as authority. Other ex post 
                                                
603 For an economic rationale for the use of these clauses see Chemla G., M.A. Habib and A. 
Ljungqvist, ‘An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements’, (2007) Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 93-94 and 101-113. 
604 Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. and Tirole, J., ‘Exit options in corporate finance: liquidity versus 
incentives’, 8(3) European Finance Review, 2004, 348; Chemla G., M.A. Habib and A. Ljungqvist, 
note above, 93-94. 
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remedies like the petition for unfair prejudice or for breach of fiduciary duties are 
also available. 
The Takeover Panel offers some advantages compared to the US framework 
for regulating takeovers and protecting minority shareholders. In fact, it addresses 
takeover issues in real time, imposing little or no delay on the takeover effort. In the 
context of an active bid, the Panel’s Executive requires participants to submit regular 
updates on compliance. The Panel evaluates on a case by case basis whether a class 
of preference shares should receive an offer according to the equity rights included 
in the shares and supervises the fairness of the offer. If one of the parties to a bid 
protests to the Takeover Panel, it will issue rulings as appropriate and, in contrast to 
the US courts, these decisions are virtually immediate and provide real-time 
decisions on takeovers. Furthermore, the Takeover Panel operates a pro-active and 
flexible regulatory approach, which falls outside of the courts, allowing it to adjust to 
the regulatory requirements of a changing business environment. Thus, in contrast to 
the US, tactical litigation as a takeover defence is virtually ruled out of the takeover 
process. The Takeover Panel normally prohibits a target company from taking legal 
action that would have the effect of frustrating an offer, unless shareholder 
permission is obtained. Instead objections and appeals are heard directly by the 
Takeover Panel and are dealt with outside of the courts.605  
In addition, in EU countries, the Directive on takeovers introduced the 
mandatory bid rule that provides a very effective exit right for minorities. However, 
the use of the mandatory bid rule is questionable, especially for closely held 
companies. It has been argued that the application of this rule can cause high costs to 
minority shareholders and slow down corporate restructuring, because it makes the 
total price of the target firm more expensive for potential bidders. In so doing, the 
rule may deter value-increasing takeovers because the price fails to compensate the 
block owner for their private benefits.606  
                                                
605 Armour J. and D.A. Skeel, “Who Write the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar 
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation”, 95 Geo. L.J., 2007, 1744. 
606 However, the Directive leaves the countries a lot of scope for the implementation of this rule. 
Some systems do allow variations between the price offered to the minority and that paid for the 
controlling shares, or permit partial bids in certain cases. The UK City Code is unusual in applying 
the mandatory bid rule to any acquisition of voting shares by a shareholder holding between 30 and 
50 per cent of the voting shares. 
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Despite this, no rule can replace the flexibility of the venture capital agreement 
in private equity control transactions. The problem is also that it is often difficult for 
third parties - courts - to verify a breach, and thus ex post defences fail to provide 
shareholders with satisfactory protection for their interests. Provided that these 
shareholders have sufficient bargaining power, they may be able to negotiate for 
special private protections. Surely no court or any third party is better positioned 
than the parties to design the arrangements best suited to govern their relationship. 
They know what type of investments has been made and the related risks they are 
facing and, therefore, only the parties, if they wish so, can design effective 
mechanisms to neutralise these risks.607  
























                                                
607 See Sáez Lacave I. and N. Bermejo Gutiérrez, ‘Specific Investments, Opportunism and Corporate 
Contracts: A Theory of Tag-along and Drag-along Clauses’, 11 European Business Organization Law 
Review, 2010, 423-458. 
   
   194 
CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 8. Conclusive Considerations 
The analysis contained in this thesis has shown that the dichotomous legal distinction 
between equity and debt can be meaningless and the results of that categorisation 
misleading. The law has the necessity to classify financial and voting rights in the 
equity-debt continuum because it relies on classifications as a control over 
regulations. Several regulatory areas adopt different approaches to classifying 
hybrids driven by the purpose they are trying to achieve. However, none of these 
approaches is able to consistently deliver the “correct” results, even within the 
narrow boundaries of the respective discipline or regulatory aim. Hence, they often 
create incentives for regulatory arbitrage. The capacity of hybrids to replicate 
characteristics of equity or debt, depending on the situation, makes these securities 
largely adopted as tools for intra-group financing, driven by both tax and accounting 
regulations. Moreover, issuers can raise finance without fully having reflected their 
true financial positions in head-line financial metrics such as the debt-to-equity ratio.  
From a company’s perspective, opportunities for hybrid-driven arbitrage also 
exist in the field of corporate law. This is an area that has so far received only scarce 
attention in the legal literature. While deeply interwoven with accounting and 
insolvency law, corporate law also uses the distinction between debt and equity as a 
reference point when assigning roles within the organisational governance structure. 
While economic models typically regard shareholders’ governance rights as a natural 
counterweight to their “residual claimant”-nature and their lack of fixed entitlements 
to the firm’s assets, company law typically takes a very formalistic approach towards 
assigning such control rights. However, an issuer is always able to create an equity-
like financial position which, from a corporate law perspective, does not make the 
holder of the instrument a shareholder. This is the case of the economic owner of 
firm who does not hold voting rights. This can also have important regulatory 
consequences affecting third parties, since creditors’ protection rules such as the 
rules on share buy-backs can effectively be disapplied by the company. Likewise, 
shares can also be structured in a way that closely resembles debt instruments, 
conferring control rights on parties with no (real) residual claim. In other words, by 
using hybrid financial instruments, parts of the mandatory corporate law can 
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effectively be side-stepped, leading to a more flexible framework within which a 
company can reach a bargain with its investors than envisaged by the legislator.  
While it is clear that regulatory arbitrage is currently the main driver behind the 
use of hybrids, the question remains whether such instruments can fulfil any useful 
economic function besides granting companies additional flexibility as to the 
applicable legal regime. As described in Part II, hybrids do indeed play an important 
function in areas such as private equity and venture capital where parties rely on 
complex allocation of financial rights and decision making rights and where plain 
vanilla debt and equity instruments are incapable of providing the economic 
exposures the different investors want to create. In order to assess the role of hybrids 
the thesis develops a functional approach that focuses on the economic logic of 
corporate law. Often hybrids have been analysed in relation to one or some of their 
features but never in context. Since economic theories have evolved with the 
development of the corporation, the analysis of corporate structure and in particular 
of its financial instruments must also be adjusted. The functional approach not only 
stresses the agency problems at the core of corporate law but also integrates the 
theories of the firm on transaction costs and property rights studies. Accordingly, it 
shows that hybrids can be written as compensation contracts to align the ex ante 
incentives of managers and investors and therefore reduce agency costs, while at the 
same time being stipulated as contingent to critical strategic events and to the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives in order to provide investors with a flexible 
governance mechanism of ex post regulation or measurement during the life of the 
firm. The study deals with various typologies of preference shares and convertible 
bonds. The definition of hybrids also includes debt with covenants, which may 
constrain management discretion. 
 
 
8.1. The rationale for hybrids and implications for corporate governance 
The first conclusion derived from the analysis contained in this study highlights an 
important rationale for the use of hybrid instruments, that is the firm’s need to 
allocate control and cash-flow rights in a way that diverges from the classic 
allocation resulting from equity and debt. This need is evident in private equity and 
venture capital transactions where hybrid financial instruments play an essential role 
in financing innovation. In particular, these advantages are observable in situations 
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of economic integration, when two firms, usually an established corporation and a 
small research-intensive firm or a start-up, consider an R&D alliance or develop a 
contract together. The small firm has the know-how but may not have the funds or 
the ability to commercialise the innovation itself. Hybrids can be stipulated as 
compensation contracts to align the incentives of managers and investors. 
Performance can be tied to several measures and compared to various benchmarks. It 
is possible to include commitments to contract for R&D on specific topics, milestone 
payments contingent on the achievement of technological and marketing objectives 
or renewal of the agreement and a royalty on the eventual sales generated by the 
product. In addition, hybrid instruments empower compensation schemes and give 
investors an incentive to get involved in the business and monitor the firm closely, 
because a specific allocation of the cash flow is linked to certain performance 
records. In this way, entrepreneur and investors ensure that appropriate decisions are 
taken and that suitable progress is being made.  
There is a strong rationale for convertible instruments and debt with restrictive 
covenants in a firm’s reorganisation and restructuring because they largely reduce 
the agency costs of debt, which are caused by the incentive of the directors to engage 
in transactions that lower the value of the firm but nevertheless increase shareholder 
wealth by shifting wealth from bondholders to shareholders.  
However, these advantages do not come without costs. The fact that funds in 
private equity and venture capital are constrained with respect to time and capital 
creates costs of wealth expropriation. These costs result in dilution for the investors. 
On one hand stands the need of the founder investor (angel) not to be excessively 
diluted in terms of control and financial rights; on the other is the danger that an 
excess of veto rights could hinder the firm’s capitalisation. In the case of firms 
raising finance through an issue of convertibles, where information disparities exist 
over issuance of these securities, it is reasonable to acknowledge the desirability of a 
conversion adjustment. Using price-based methods of anti-dilution is a common way 
to avoid the outright expropriation of value from the convertible-security holders to 
the common stockholders. However, a commonly used market-based adjustment 
may not always be the solution because it relies on an initial conversion price set 
with admittedly faulty information. In some situations conversion-adjustment 
formulas provide protection that is inferior to other alternatives. For instance, in 
young growth-oriented high-technology based firms, investors may suffer not only 
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from economic dilution, but also from the dilution of ownership interests. This 
dilution occurs in situations of financial distress when an entrepreneur-manager 
decides to raise additional finance that the existing investor is not able or willing to 
invest.  
In fact, a new investor entering the firm’s capital at that point may bargain and 
obtain better conditions and a discounted price. This dilution may also occur when 
an entrepreneur-manager, holding control of the board, decides to sell the company 
or its assets to a third party. If the entrepreneur has the power to sell the firm, they 
may accept a price that rewards their efforts but which may be at a loss for the 
investor who has contributed finance in several tranches. Since it is very difficult to 
establish ex ante whether minority shareholders such as preference shareholders will 
be disadvantaged by the sale of the controlling block, the regulatory choice hesitates 
between reliance on general corporate law to protect the minority against unfairness 
in the future and giving the minority an exit right at the time of the control shift 
through the use of the mandatory bid rule.  
The usefulness of hybrids in private equity and venture capital is most evident 
in control transactions, where hybrid instruments present an optimal compromise to 
the firm’s need of a bespoke capital structure able to allocate efficiently cash-flow 
rights and control power for exit decisions. In these situations, investors have to 
address the principal-agent problems that arise when a potential bidder attempts, 
through offers to the company’s shareholders, to acquire sufficient voting shares to 
control the company. The acquirer may collude with one of the initial contracting 
parties to extract a surplus from the other. Two main types of opportunism are 
discussed – the expropriation of the entrepreneur’s private benefits of control and 
asset-stripping at the expense of the existing (venture capital) investors. Accordingly, 
an outside investor could take over a firm, which is performing well and fire its 
entrepreneur if he does not have the right to sell control of the firm without 
compensating him for his private benefits. Alternatively, an outside investor could 
acquire a firm that is near insolvency or performing badly for a small price and take 
assets out of the firm without paying their full market value, therefore harming the 
interests of the existing investors, if their financial rights are not protected 
contractually or they do not control the firm. The parties have to resolve 
distributional conflicts and make use of the right to sell control in the event of a 
future sale of the firm. It is essential that whoever has the power to sell, takes the 
decision that is most efficient for all parties. This is possible with hybrid instruments, 
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because they provide an asset-specific governance system. In fact, financial 
contracting on observable, if not verifiable, events, milestones or objectives, allows 
an efficient allocation of propriety rights between the parties so that crucial decisions 
are always taken by the party that has the best incentive to maximise the firm’s 
value. Critical control mechanisms, such as the right to approve or oppose important 
decisions for the firm, need to be effectively allocated in any relationship between an 
entrepreneur and investors. Thus, contract design of hybrid instruments anticipates 
the uncertainty existing in the business by preserving the flexibility to terminate the 
contract if input costs rise to the point where they exceed the output benefits. 
Hybrids’ contractual features, which may either set performance obligations or 
define contingencies, reduce the ex post costs of litigation, facilitating the provision 
of efficient incentives and the signalling of private information at the time of 
contracting and renegotiation. Since most of the provisions included in hybrid 
instruments are performance-related or contingent to observable but not verifiable 
events, the parties will prefer to bargain for a solution that maximises the common 
benefits instead of supporting costs of litigation with uncertain results.  
Transaction cost economics and property rights theory both focus on the role of 
ownership in supporting relationship-specific investments in a world of incomplete 
contracting and potential hold-up problems. The property rights approach put a 
strong accent on incentives driven by ownership when investigates how control 
rights should be allocated efficiently in a firm. The capital structure impacts the 
governance structure of the firm and it can thus be viewed as a mechanism for 
dealing with incentives and hold-up problems.  
 
 
8.2. Legal strategies for protection: the need for regulation or more flexibility?   
Another important aspect of this thesis is its focus on the analysis of investor 
protection in relation to holders of hybrid securities. Hybrids as a tool of corporate 
finance ought to offer to particular investors the certainty of entitlements, while at 
the same time allowing businesses a more flexible allocation of equity or debt like 
cash-flow rights as well as control rights. For example, through hybrid issues the 
firm can raise additional funds without diluting the voting rights or the amount of 
final surplus distributable in liquidation. At the same time, the firm does not 
necessarily incur the risk of insolvency if it fails to satisfy the financial entitlements 
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of its hybrid holders. This element features prominently in banking regulation, where 
the use of hybrids often primarily tries to achieve a more robust financial position 
without forcing institutions to raise traditional equity.  
Conversely, investors subscribing to convertible bonds or preference shares 
accept a lesser degree of control and long-term commitment on the part of the issuer 
in exchange for more extensive financial entitlements. Although the nature of a 
preference share has never been declared by the courts, the rights attached to a 
particular class of shares have traditionally been considered contractual in nature. In 
some respects, this has made the status of a preference share more like that of a bond 
than an ordinary share. However, as emerges from the historical analysis in this 
thesis, the position of preference shareholders vis-à-vis the firm has often given rise 
to a number of grounds for dissatisfaction in the past. Companies in need of finance 
often raised funds in the forms of preference shares promising the investors higher 
returns that never materialised, because once the economic conditions became 
favourable again the law – and imperfect contracts – opened several avenues to 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the issuer. Companies sometimes were able to 
effectively cancel dividends in arrears, freeze out preference shareholders when the 
economic outlook became rosier, or force them to surrender their class rights. 
Nowadays, the UK courts seem to have reached a definitive canon of 
construction regarding the rights attached to preference shares. Shareholders in UK 
firms have a strong legal position vis-à-vis the firm regarding changes of a firm, 
including merger and major restructurings. This somewhat contrasts with the 
situation in the US, where preference shareholders are offered less protections as a 
separate class and it is still unclear whether or not directors owe them fiduciary 
duties. However, US law arguably provides stronger protection to minority 
shareholders in general – whether they hold ordinary shares or preference shares – 
by providing exit rights in the form of appraisal rights.  
In UK law, minority shareholders, including preference shareholders, are 
protected by the regulation of class rights variations and the unfair prejudice 
provisions. In addition, the Companies Act confers a right on dissenting shareholders 
holding no less than an aggregate of 15 per cent of the issued shares of the class in 
question to petition the court for an annulment of changes to class rights. This 
remedy, however, shows important weaknesses, given the self-restraining approach 
taken by the courts when deciding what constitutes a variation of a class right. The 
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distinction between rights affected as a “matter of law” and as a “matter of 
business”, and the notion that losses of the enjoyment of rights are not the same as 
losses of the right itself often lead to incomplete protection of preference 
shareholders’ interests. This is particularly true in the area of private equity and 
venture capital, where changes affecting the enjoyment of a right as a matter of 
commercial reality may completely change the original bargain and severely modify 
the incentives. 
Likewise, the UK law allows minority shareholders including preference 
shareholders, who believe their interests are being prejudiced by the behaviour of the 
majority shareholders, to file a petition for unfair prejudice. British courts have 
developed a technique for encouraging an agreed solution to unfair prejudice claims 
by allowing the minority to have their shares liquidated at a fair price. This approach 
allows the courts to leave directors with the discretion to manage the company’s 
affairs without interfering excessively. However, this remedy has proved to be very 
time-consuming, burdensome and expensive. In the fast-moving world of the high-
tech industry, where hybrid forms of financing are particularly prevalent, this 
remedy does not seem to constitute an adequate solution to the problems identified 
here. Moreover, determining the “fair price” of an immature business is a difficult – 
and sometimes impossible – task, which further questions the ability of the unfair 
prejudice remedy to resolve conflicts between hybrid holders and the controllers of 
the business. 
Finally, both the UK and US legal systems rely on the judiciary to oversee 
transactions associated with structural changes to the corporation, particularly in 
relation to mergers. Two different doctrinal paths have emerged in these two legal 
systems. The US approach is more protective of the prerogatives of management and 
assigns to them the decision on the control transaction but gives to the target 
shareholders a veto over the transaction. Conversely, the UK scheme of arrangement 
regulation is more shareholder-centred and leaves to the shareholders the decision-
making on control shifts with little use of appraisal rights and veto rights.  
In relation to takeovers, the UK has effectively delegated the task of protecting 
shareholders to the Takeover Panel (whose jurisdiction also includes schemes of 
arrangements). Notably, the Takeover Panel takes a less formalistic or legalistic 
approach compared with the court-based protection of (preference) shareholders. It 
also addresses the issues arising from control transactions in real time, imposing 
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little or no delay on the transaction. This standards strategy does not impede a 
preferred shareholder from bargaining for additional protection in the form of 
contractual clauses. However, according to the equity- or debt-like nature of the 
hybrid contract the Takeover Panel retains the right to decide whether a class of 
preferred shares has to be included in the group of relevant “shares” for an offer. 
Doing this, the Panel adopts a far more functional approach to the classification 
exercise than we examined in other legal areas. 
It is legitimate therefore to wonder whether the protection of preference 
shareholders, whose contribution fulfil much of the same function as traditional 
equity financing (they are subordinated to all creditors in liquidation as the ordinary 
shareholders and have no certainty of a periodic interest), should be a mandatory 
matter of company law outside the takeover context, too, or whether this should 
simply be left to the parties’ freedom of bargaining.  
This, in effect, is a question about the legislator’s trust in the efficient 
functioning of the market. To the extent markets are efficient, and investors act 
rationally, the answer to any such concern could simply be that hybrid securities are 
priced in anticipation of future opportunism, and hence any materialisation of such 
anticipated opportunism does no harm to the investor. 
If one doubts such a smooth functioning of the market, which arguably requires 
a sophisticated understanding of the intricacies of the law by (institutional) investors, 
the obvious question is whether hybrid holders are offered enough protection under 
the current law.  
The findings described in this thesis are twofold. Holders of preference shares 
seem to be under-protected, creating some scope for opportunism on the part of the 
issuer. Both institutional investors and the London stock exchange discourage the 
use of preference shares, mainly because of this imperfect protection the law 
offers.608 This in itself seems to partly rebut the “right price – no harm” argument 
made above. Where, in addition, institutional investors shy away from non-voting 
preference shares, and such instruments are primarily held by less sophisticated 
individual investors, the case for increased protection is further strengthened. 
                                                
608 See Brennan, M. and Franks, J., ‘Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings 
of Equity Securities in the U. K.’ 45 Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, 391 (395). 
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Holders of convertible bonds, on the other hand, do not seem to lack relevant 
protection. The underlying conflicts here are essentially the same – opportunism by 
the issuer – but the problems naturally revolve around the conversion privilege. 
Corporations are not static. Their capital structure changes and the share of stock of 
today, while legally an identical unit with the share of yesterday, may represent an 
investment in an entirely different commercial entity tomorrow. Between the time of 
issuance of the convertible bond and the vesting of the conversion right shareholders 
– and managers – have an incentive to develop the business in a way that allocates a 
larger-than-expected part of the company’s cash-flows to their current shareholders. 
A simple example would be a dividend payment, which essentially devalues the 
conversion right, while benefitting the issuer’s current shareholders. While this case 
could relatively easily be dealt with in the bargain, many other corporate actions with 
an impact on the value of the conversion right are harder to anticipate. The problem 
can thus be seen as one of incomplete contracts.  
However, rather than abandoning convertible securities because of these 
problems, practice has developed in a direction which can be regarded as over-
protective. Lacking the ability to anticipate the exact avenues of future expropriation, 
convertible bond holders often bargain for extensive (negative) control rights to 
secure their position, arguably granting them a higher degree of influence over the 
issuer’s business than would be justified based on their economic exposure. 
Technically, this (over-)protection is typically achieved through the use of restrictive 
covenants. 
This is especially relevant in the realms of private equity and venture capital, 
where the business evolves in conditions of particular uncertainty. Here, the main 
concern is economic dilution. Convertible bondholders use a standardised set of anti-
dilution clauses to protect their rights to address these problems. However, not all the 
issuances of new shares are a cause of value dilution and restrictions on the 
managers’ discretion can come at a cost. Ideally, covenants would distinguish 
between truly dilutive issues and those that merely reflect market information about 
the issuer. However, any assessment of the dilutive effect of subsequent rounds of 
financing necessarily depend on the knowledge of (or agreement on) the company’s 
fair value. As mentioned above, a consensus on the fair value will often be hard to 
achieve, particularly in relation to immature businesses or financially distressed 
companies in transitional phases trying to turn-around their fortunes. 
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The causes for disagreement between holders of ordinary and preference 
shares, as well as shareholders and convertible bond holders, do not always stem 
from opportunism. Often they can simply be found in a disagreement about the 
firm’s strategy. While the parties may have agreed on a business strategy ex ante, 
this may change as the business develops and conditions change ex post. This adds to 
the disputes arising from the opportunism of the parties in corporate agency 
relations. In these situations, the protection of hybrid holders – originally developed 
to address concerns about opportunistic behaviour – suddenly has wider 
implications. Where certain hybrid holders are found to be over-protected, which as 
described is a strategy to resolve the problems created by incomplete contracts, the 
protective covenants may enable them to substantially influence the business 
decisions of a corporate venture, particularly where they effectively have a veto right 
in relation to all possible responses to changed economic conditions. This, in turn, 
may lead to opportunism on the part of the hybrid holders, who may have an 
incentive to only agree to transactions that distribute a disproportionate part of the 
possible gains to them. Hence, the risk of opportunism exists on both ends of the 
bargain. 
Surely no court or any third party is better positioned than the parties to design 
the arrangements best suited to govern their relationship. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no role for courts to resolve conflicts arising from unexpected 
developments after the investment has been made. This is acknowledged by UK 
company law, where additional discretion is vested in the courts in the form of the 
unfair prejudice remedy and the procedure in s 633 CA 2006 regarding the variation 
of class rights. 
In the UK and especially US, the contractual design in the practice of the 
markets has seen extensive use of drag-along and tag-along clause and even explicit 
veto rights, giving preference shareholders or convertible bond holders wide 
discretion in relation to corporate policy. Arguably, this development should be met 
by courts taking a more active role, even if this means that the traditional self-
restraint of judges in relation to business decisions may suffer. 
On this basis, it can also be discussed whether some common forms of hybrid 
financial instruments should be standardised. In my opinion, a less flexible 
regulatory framework could impede financial innovation and impose obstacles to the 
parties’ incentives to devise the terms that will best protect their interests, suit their 
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circumstances and redesign governance mechanisms to reflect the changing 
economic environment. The contractual design of hybrid financial instruments is the 
optimal way to fill the vacuum voluntarily left by mandatory company law in favour 
of a major flexibility in the market and a more business-friendly legal system.  
Standardisation may also take the form of default, rather than mandatory rules. 
Pure default rules would not, however, stifle innovation. In fact, they could reduce 
transaction costs and add to legal certainty by broadening the scope of application of 
court decisions dealing with standardised terms. With added legal certainty and a 
more balanced distribution of rights and financial entitlements, there is scope for 
hybrid financial instruments to play a more important role outside the realm of 
regulatory arbitrage, allowing market participants to fully realise the potential of a 
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